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By T. W. Beck

Roof bolter occupations in underground coal mines continue to experience overexposure to respirable dust. One potential source of dust in roof bolting operations is the exhaust from the roof bolter dust collection system. A wet exhaust conditioner (water box) has been developed to reduce dust emissions from the exhaust of the vacuum dust collection system on roof bolting machines. The exhaust conditioner consists of a muffler chamber and a water chamber with four internal partitions to direct airflow over the surface of the water. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health conducted a series of laboratory tests to assess the respirable dust capture ability of this device as compared to the standard exhaust muffler. To determine the dust collection efficiency, both devices were placed in the exhaust stream of a simulated roof bolter dust collection system. Gravimetric samplers were operated upstream and downstream of the exhaust conditioner and muffler to evaluate the ability to capture both respirable coal and limestone dust. Researchers observed a 41 % reduction in dust concentrations for the water exhaust conditioner in the laboratory configuration. Significant levels of dust deposition in the sampling chambers may have contributed to this effective capture rate.

Jan 1, 2012

By Carl L. Renzoni

INTRODUCTION This paper defines equity as the issuance of a permanent interest in the business on a broadly distributed basis. As such, it excludes the issuance of equity to either a merchant bank or to another corporation. Nearly twenty years ago the equity markets were very simple: The instruments used were primarily common shares, convertible debentures or convertible preferred shares. Another equity-type option often used, especially by junior companies, was the sale of joint venture interests. Issue sizes were generally in the order of $25 - $100 million and issues were syndicated primarily in North America and Europe by one or two investment dealers. Mining corporations today benefit from a market with much more depth. Issues are syndicated by dealers on a truly international basis, and issue sizes now often range up to $300 million. Moreover, dealers are now willing to take significant risk in buying the issues for redistribution. This discussion of trends in equity markets will encompass: 1) common shares 2) warrants to buy common shares 3) convertible debentures 4) commodity backed instruments A review follows of events that affect the mining industry and investment dealers as they have a bearing on the equity markets for the metal producers. FACTORS AFFECTING THE MINING INDUSTRY The current business cycle, up to October 1987, had been characterised by a buoyant stock market and depressed base metal prices. Mining companies entered this period with weak balance sheets and little prospect of cash flows meeting capital needs. The issuance of equity and the sale of assets were used extensively to reduce debt to manageable levels. During this period, the relative high price for gold, and more important, the very high earnings and cash flow multiples afforded to gold producers, caused companies to target gold as the only game in town. The need for capital to acquire and develop gold properties prompted an unprecedented volume of equity issues. (Burns Fry led or co-managed over $1 billion of mining equity issues per year during this period). This high demand for equity capital by the industry prompted an increase in the use of equity instruments, such as commodity backed instruments. In addition, government tax incentive programs in Canada, such as flow-through shares, allowed smaller companies to raise significantly more equity than would otherwise have been possible. Over $1 billion in flow-through equity was raised in 1987 alone. The abundance of flow-through capital in Canada made it easy to form a new company. One flow-through share fund developed a system of providing the working capital required for a company to be eligible to receive flow-through share capital so that an entrepreneur required only a mining property to get started. Many new companies were formed and several flourished in a buoyant stock market environment to the point that market capitalizations grew to $100 million or more. The current period is in stark contrast to that before October 1987. The equity markets are generally available to the resource industry only on a window basis and only for senior companies and for special situations. The industry is benefitting from buoyant metal prices, and bankers are anxious to provide debt capital. Investment dealers previously processing several equity issues

Jan 1, 1990

By Robert A. Brusca

OUTLINE Mineral Poor, but great primary inputs Net importer of most primary inputs • Copper • Zinc • Aluminum • Oil Problems for Japan • Supply Disruption • Currency Swings Remedies • Yen pricing of primary products • Long term contracts • Ownership of primary commodity producers Current Approach No Text Available

Jan 1, 1990

By Craig E. Saporito

INTRODUCTION Freeport-McMoRan Inc. has been very active recently with two major discoveries and its restructuring activities. This paper describes Freeport-McMoRan's businesses, the two major mineral discoveries, and exciting opportunities within the oil and gas operations. BUSINESS ACTIVITIES Freeport-McMoRan is the largest and one of the lowest cost fully integrated U.S. phosphate fertilizer producers. It is the second largest domestic Frasch sulphur producer. Freeport- McMoRan will become the largest domestic producer of Frasch sulphur when its Main Pass Block 299 sulphur deposit reaches full production in 1993. Furthermore, it is the largest transporter of sulphur produced by others. Its oil and gas activities rank among the largest U.S. independents in terms of production and proved reserves. The copper/gold operations in Indonesia are among the world's lowest cost. When expansion operations reach full capacity levels in 1992, the Indonesian copper/gold complex will be the fifth largest copper operation in the world. Operations are divided into three business segments that include: 1. Agricultural minerals, incorporating sulphur, phosphate rock and phosphate fertilizer activities; 2. Energy, including oil and gas activities; and 3. Metals, incorporating copper, gold and silver operations in Indonesia. In early 1989, Freeport-McMoRan announced the discovery of two world-class ore bodies; a sulphur deposit off the coast of Louisiana on Main Pass Block 299, and a copper/gold deposit -- the Grasberg in Indonesia -- approximately two miles away from the existing Ertsberg East operations. As a result of these major discoveries, Freeport- McMoRan decided to carry out a restructuring program. Its purpose was to sell $1.2 to $1.5 billion of non-strategic assets. Debt levels and associated interest expenses will be significantly reduced, and general and administrative expenses will be reduced, which will place Freeport- McMoRan in an excellent position to fund the development of the Main Pass Block 299 sulphur discovery, the Grasberg discovery, and oil and gas discoveries. This restructuring program also will allow Freeport-McMoRan to achieve the greatest future value for shareholders by focusing on its principal businesses (Figure 1). Strategic Restructuring • Sell $1.2 - $1.5 Billion Of Non-Strategic Assets • Significantly Reduce Debt • Significantly Reduce G&A • Fund Development Of Main Pass & Grasberg • Stronger Company; Positioned For Future Growth • Focus Is On Principal Businesses: - Sulphur/Phosphate Fertilizers - Indonesian Copper/Gold - Oil And Natural Gas Figure 1 - Strategic Restructuring AGRICULTURAL MINERALS Main Pass Block 299 Discovery The Main Pass Block 299 discovery has a proven reserve of 67 million long tons of recoverable sulphur. This is the largest known Frasch sulphur deposit in North America. The discovery increased Freeport-McMoRan's sulphur reserves more than five-fold, and is synergistic with the company's phosphate fertilizer assets. The

Jan 1, 1990

By Phillip Crowson

INTRODUCTION This discusses some of the economic risks and uncertainties which face any company investing in new mineral ventures. These differ mainly in degree rather than kind from other large capital intensive projects, except that economic risks are compounded with technical risks. Mines face a wide variety of physical risks, and in addition the ore reserves may not prove as ample, nor as amenable to treatment as the feasibility studies indicate. On the economic front, mineral projects are subject to risks of fluctuating prices and sales volumes, no matter where they are located, or how they are financed. Typically, they are heavy users of capital compared with their owners' internally generated funds. Long term debt of various types is still the favoured form of finance. A project's currencies and cost often differ from each other and from those of the parent company. Facing up to the various risks associated with fluctuating and uncertain revenues, interest rates and exchange rates are amongst the hardest tasks for natural resource companies. ATTITUDES TO THE MINING INDUSTRY Some have questioned whether the game itself is now worth playing. They have argued that the mining industry's mediocre rewards in the past decade have been insufficient, compared with the risks involved. They can see no prospect of dramatic improvement in the next decade. Demand is highly cyclical and tends to grow less rapidly than economic activity, as a whole. Barriers to entry are low in most mineral markets, but impediments to exit can be substantial. Exit is especially problematic in those minerals where there are large state shareholdings and/or where less developed countries are major producers. The consequence is claimed to be an endemic tendency to excess capacity, and prices barely adequate to cover marginal cash costs. Many of the petroleum companies that moved into mining with such high expectations in the late 1970s have retreated, often bearing the scars of heavy losses. Individual shareholders, taken collectively, place low valuations on their investments in mining companies. The price/earnings ratios of the major mineral producing companies are low compared with their historical averages and with those of other industries. PRICE: EARNINGS RATIOS (October 1988) [UK Industrials 12.0 RTZ 8.4 Cons Gold 12.2 US Industrials 13 - 13.4 Alcan Alcoa Amax Asarco Cyprus Minerals Freeport Copper Inco Inspiration Magma Copper Newmont Mining Nord Resources Phelps Dodge Reynolds Metal Canada TSE 300 10.6 Cominco 8.7 Falconbridge 5.3 Noranda 7.0 Rio Algom 7.2 Teck Corporation 17.] NOTE: Mining companies' p/e based on prospective 1988 earnings, from Kleinwort Benson Securities' weekly Mining World, October 1988. Until 1987, it was argued that share prices correctly reflected the companies' poor earnings potential. Subsequently, the argument has been that earnings have been unnaturally boosted by cyclically high metal prices. The stock market valuations, therefore, correctly reflect future earnings, or at least expected earnings. This seems to be a case of Heads, I win; Tails, you lose. The underlying analysis of metal markets appears

Jan 1, 1990

By Stewart Murray, Philip Klapwijk

INTRODUCTION Forecasting commodity markets is like predicting winners in a horse race: to get the answers right, one needs both luck and judgement. Commodity analysts bear some resemblance to racing tipsters as they try to convince interested parties that they have an inside track on which metal is going to win the great minerals race of the 1990s. Commodity analysts share some features with the gentlemen of the turf: • They influence other people in how to spend risk capital, • They don't put their own money at risk, and • If their tips consistently fail to deliver, then they end up looking elsewhere for employment. In order to find winners we need to know about the kind of race we are in and the strengths and weaknesses of all the runners. Miners are not interested in a five furlong sprint: their race is a long distance affair -- after all, the lead-times between discovery and start-up generally approach a decade for mines that will provide the staying power which leaders require in this industry. We need to look at the environment in which our commodities will be competing: in racing parlance, the going. Our equivalent is the economic background: just as some horses are at a relative advantage when the going is soft, so some commodities will do better than others if economic growth is sluggish. If we are going to pick the winners for the late 1990s, and as an industry, make the right investment decisions, nothing is more important than being able to forecast (with at least a semblance of accuracy) how and where the world's economy is going to develop in the next decade. In addressing the question of whether minerals are going to be leaders in the 1990s, this paper considers the idea that it will increasingly be the world outside the industrialised OECD that will provide the incremental growth in demand for mineral products. Economic growth in the Developing World is fundamentally different from that in the OECD, and the pattern of demand for materials in relation to economic output is much more favourable than in the OECD. If we are to forecast the future, we need to be able to understand the past, both in the boom times of the so called Golden Sixties and in the lean years that followed them. This should help us to decide whether the future is going to be like one or other of these extremes or, on the other hand, a return to normality. Having forecast the going, we can look at individual competitors. • Which are best placed to take advantage of the economic, social and industrial trends that we can now dimly foresee? • Which can resist the continued onslaught of the new materials and technologies? • Which of them will best weather the economic storms (assuming that recessions have not yet been abolished)? If we can provide answers to these questions, we will be well on our way to picking winners, i.e., the metals and minerals that will reward their owners with growing demand, steady (and high) prices leading to profits beyond the dreams of avarice.

Jan 1, 1990

By D. W. Loughridge

INTRODUCTION Raising capital in the 1990s is a timely subject. However, many of us thought why should raising capital in the 1990s prove to be unlike it was in the 19805, the 1970s, the 1%0s, or earlier? There are a lot of creative people in banking and in corporate treasury departments. New tools and techniques are continuing to emerge, many of which are discussed in other papers in this book. While we have new financing tools at our disposal, the underlying issue has not changed. Projects and investments must be judged on their own merits. If they cannot be justified by conventional financial analysis, they should not be built. If they can be justified, it is likely that the financing will be available. The challenges faced in raising capital in this decade will persist to the next. The issues of the 1980s -- currency fluctuation, disruptive merger and acquisition activity, commodity price volatility, political risk, and debt crisis -- will all persist in an increasingly international business environment. I will focus on the financing we have just completed for the Escondida Copper Project in Chile. The Escondida financing is structured along the classic project financing model developed in the late 1970s, but it deals with issues of the 1980s and the 1990s. The financing was intriguing, not just because of the technical issues involved, but also the challenge of reaching an agreement in a large and diverse group. Escondida had the one essential feature that made its financing possible. It was commercially very attractive. It would produce at low cost a commodity (copper concentrates) that direct consumers felt would be in tight supply. The project had the direct support not only of its sponsors, but also its customers, and, very importantly, its host government. The non- recourse financing of Escondida would not have been possible without the support of these parties, and without the robust economics that made this effort worthwhile. The issue was more complicated. Operations in all parts of the world entail some political exposure. This project is in Chile, where there was a constitutional requirement that a plebescite be held when the project would be in its early stages. This plebescite would determine the fate of a 15 year old military dictatorship. The project is copper, a commodity generally deemed to be in surplus. Copper has a history of price volatility (whose price has varied from $.58 to $1.53 per pound over the past two years). It is politically sensitive, not only in Chile, but in the United States, Canada and other developed countries. The project is international, with all the problems of dealing with a variety of currencies, a variety of cultures, and a variety of laws and commercial practices. The project is also large and capital intensive, with a total cost of U.S. $1.1 billion. ESCONDIDA PROJECT Escondida, the largest known copper ore body in the world, was discovered in March of 1981, by Utah International in a joint venture with Getty Oil Company. In 1984, both Utah and Getty were involved in ownership changes, Utah being acquired by BHP. A later restructuring of the ownership of Escondida resulted in BHP, as manager, carrying a 60% interest, Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation (RTZ) 30%, and a consortium of Japanese companies led by Mitsubishi Corporation with 10%. The Japanese consortium is incorporated as JECO (Japan Escondida Corporation). This ownership structure, which spread ownership around the world, was the first tangible step toward managing both the commercial and political risk associated with the project.

Jan 1, 1990

By William Cruger

OUTLINE SUMMARY A. Brief Description B. Characteristics 1. Can be highly cost effective 2. Restricted in usage 3. Political Controversy 4. Volume of Transactions 5. Users C. Mechanism 1. Five steps D. Investor issues 1. Application 2. Restricted usage 3. Discount 4. Formal or informal process 5. Restricted benefits 6. Recompense 7. Window of opportunity THE VARIOUS PROGRAMS1 A. Brazil B. Chile C. Venezuela D. Argentina E. Mexico USAGE IN THE MINING, METALLURGICAL, AND PETROLEUM INDUSTRIES

Jan 1, 1990

By Anna H. Connard

SUMMARY The discussion focusses on developments in the debt/equity swap market since the Marte project was negotiated in early 1988. It emphasises carrying forward the recent market trends to anticipate the breadth and scope of debt/equity conversions for mine development in the 1990s. Secondary market prices of LDC paper, conversion values and political influences in the host countries and the use of near debt and commodity-based instruments as components of mine financing in debt/equity deals will be placed in the perspective of recent trends and expectations for the future. THE MARTE PROJECT The Marte mine is a gold porphyry deposit in Chile's high Atacama, for which financing was put together at the beginning of 1988. The Marte project was financed by a combination of common equity and loans. It was unusual that the equity infusions were made under different programs. Some of the international equity was infused with fresh funds via DL 600. Other common foreign equity was provided through the conversion of Chilean bank debt under Chapter XIX. On the loan side,. export credits for the import component of machinery and equipment were sought. Local bank financing was negotiated for the remainder of ' the project's anticipated cost. The debt conversion market in Chile was at its apex in terms of interest, activity and government support when the mine financing was arranged. The price of Chilean paper in the secondary market hovered about 62 to 66 cents per U.S. dollar of face value. Meanwhile, the Chilean government was negotiating conversion redemptions significantly closer to full face value. The government differentiated between debt paper exchanged for corporate investors who had sourced that paper in the secondary market, and debt paper held by bank investors who would incur a transaction loss in the conversion. The use of a combined DL 600lChapter XIX equity financing created different yield calculation bases for the various investors. Chapter XIX prevents remittance of profits before year 5 and capital repatriation before year 11. Investors choosing this vehicle have either for a corporate policy in the target project not to declare dividends until repatriation is allowed, or they have to seek uses for the peso liquidity that would be generated through dividend declarations in the early years. However, DL 600 investors face no such waiting period on dividends, nor do they have restrictions imposed on cashing out of the investment before the 11th year. Therefore, any equity structure with components of both investment mechanisms will have inherent differences in cost basis and future income flows for the various participants. This equity imbalance is defensible if the investment motivations of the parties are analyzed: a mining investor using fresh funds looks for a hurdle return on equity calculated at conservative commodity prices, with as much flexibility to reap upside benefits as possible; a mining investor choosing to invest through a debt conversion mechanism will realize a modest short term gain on the conversion, reducing his effective cost basis, but sacrificing some return because of the waiting period on repatriation of dividends. INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES A bank investor exchanging his own paper for an equity participation in a mining project realizes a conversion loss on the transaction. He seeks a risk adjusted acceptable hurdle rate of return to recoup that loss over time. Motivation for the bank investor to take that loss may be derived partly from a strategy to diversify its existing portfolio by internal policy and externally regulated guidelines. The bank will compare yields on its loan portfolio to that country with anticipated dividend flows discounted back at a risk adjusted rate. It will analyze the project with return objectives of yield enhancement over time and with

Jan 1, 1990

By Ian MacGregor

INTRODUCTION I retired in 1977 and have been enjoying myself ever since doing odd jobs for various people - on occasions, politicians. I commend it to you as post retirement - get involved in situations that nobody else will take on. It produces all sorts of excitement, it is a lot of fun and, courtesy of the media, you provide great raw material for their current Punch and Judy shows. The example of the adventures in the Escondida financing made me think about the history of the minerals industry in the United States. In order to see more clearly what is going to happen in the future, we have to look at the past and what we have learned, and try to extrapolate from that a scenario for the future. This paper is about global material cycles and the financial needs of the extractive industries. Since about 2,000 years B.C. we have been living in the Iron Age. Since about 4,000 B.C. we have been living in the Copper Age. These have been the two foundations of modern industrial society. Understanding the use of metals and materials helps us understand the civilization in which we live today. Let me focus more closely on the United States, particularly in this century. In the first two-thirds of this century the United States was growing and expanding and developing. It was providing for its inhabitants a society which was enjoying the benefits of a rising standard of living, improved opportunities and the ability to support a population growing at quite a dramatic rate. It is still growing. In the Department of Commerce, there is a clock that shows how many people there are in the United States. It turns all the time; the numbers are going up. On January 21,1980, when Ronald Reagan was sworn in as President, the number on that clock was a little over 220 million, and in the last week before he left, it was travelling towards 245 million. During his period in Washington, we have added , the equivalent of one total state such as California. That gives the dimensions of the U.S. appetite for raw material inputs. The inputs are of critical importance. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE During the first two-thirds of this century, the minerals sector enjoyed comparative advantages. There was a clear understanding of the importance of minerals enshrined in the tax legislation of the country from the early decades of this century - the depletion allowance. No other country identified as clearly that the supplies of minerals were finite. As they are used up, just as with a wearing-out machine, one must get capital back to replace the resource when the time comes. Within the last decade, that idea has been questioned and criticised. It is now seen as giving money away to a preferred part of the economy, instead of recognizing what depletion is all about. In previous times it insured that the U.S. always was able to regenerate the capital in its minerals industry, so that it could remain competitive. The U.S. had plenty of everything, including energy. We had a growing population. Equally important, we had an agriculture that led the world in productivity, even as far back as the turn of the century. It continues to do so. We still retain that comparative advantage, an ability to produce our foodstuffs in quantity and quality at excellent cost. Look at another ingredient of our comparative advantage, the energy position. We ran through the first two-thirds of the century with ever- decreasing energy costs. In the 1940s and 1950s the coal industry went into a decline. Why? Because the $3.00 - $5.00 a ton cost of mining coal in the U.S. represented relatively expensive energy. A ton of good grade bituminous coal contains 25 million BTU's. $0.20 a million BTU's represents $5.00 a ton at the pithead. That price was undermined by the increasing ability to find petroleum at even lower costs. At the apex of the growth of development of the American dominated

Jan 1, 1990

By William J. Potter

The current financial environment differs markedly from past commodity price expansions, which have benefited the mining industry. Deregulation, financial innovation, and the globalization of capital markets in the 1980s have altered financing and investing patterns. Investment bankers and smart money within the industry have recognized the alterations and trends that facilitate fee revenue and profitable growth. This paper profiles transactions exemplifying change and documents financing techniques or instruments that have developed during the past half decade, emphasizing equity in the global marketplace.

Jan 1, 1990

By Jan H. Hommen

TRENDS IN MINE FINANCE Reviewing historical trends may help in dealing with future funding strategies. The first trend is the increase in the use of debt to fund corporate America. Surprisingly, when comparing that with other corporates in the global marketplace, the U.S. does not look too poorly. Japanese, in particular, but also German companies, are much more leveraged than their U.S. counterparts. Note that in Japan and Germany the government and the consumer have shown substantial restraints when it comes to credit. Not so in the U.S. where the savings rate (4%) is much lower than that in Japan (20%) and in Germany (14%). As a result, the cost of leverage is substantially lower in Japan and in Germany than in the U.S. Lower debt costs in these countries allows one to obtain more of it for the same price. The close relationships between financial institutions, corporations and governments in Japan and Germany also make the risk of leverage more bearable and understandable. Also note that interest rate volatility in these countries is more subdued. The investor base in common stock is also changing. Private pension funds have been net sellers of equities during the last few years while public pension funds have been net buyers. Individuals are basically out of the market. It is estimated that over $330 billion of equity was retired in the U.S. through 1986-1988. The reasons are well known: restructurings, buy-backs, takeovers, mergers, and buy-outs. This de-equitization is likely to continue as the cost of equity capital is higher than the cost of debt capital, even on a before-tax basis. Because there has been no market for equity since October 19, 1987, junk bonds have replaced equity capital in the corporate finance structure. The non-investor-grade borrower has access to the public markets through high-yielding debt securities that often look like senior equity. Deregulation has also provided 24-hour markets; securitization can now liquify assets that before were rusting on balance sheets; information processing and communication tools give facts that are instantaneously available, creating the need for products to cover risk and exposures unknown before the start of the information and technology explosion. Thus we now have swaps, options, futures, options on futures, caps, as well as program trading, portfolio insurance, index funds, etc. Globalization will be unstoppable. Today's environment demands it. Corporations are now global competitors, even though they may have never shipped a product off-shore. Boundaries are disappearing and impediments have been removed. Stocks can be issued in a global offering with distribution in all major financial centers of the world. The high leverage of Japanese companies has made common stocks very scarce, which with the high savings rate, makes equity capital inexpensive in Japan. If markets were perfect everyone would issue stock in Tokyo and buy it back in New York. This would certainly stop the bleeding on the balance of payments. With the deficit balance of payments in America, it is no surprise that the cost of money is expensive here. The risk-return relationship on U.S. equity is not favorable enough to appeal to Japanese equity investors. The Tokyo-market, helped by a stronger yen, surpassed New York as the most important equity market in the world. The question is, will the Tokyo market hold up when Japanese domestic consumption increases at the expense of savings? In the U.S. debt markets, the plain vanilla debenture is making a comeback after a period of absence. Commercial paper has replaced short term bank borrowings for working capital funding by larger corporations. The banks have made an interesting comeback with loan sale programs that will continue to attract borrowers. There will be a continuing

Jan 1, 1990

By Nicholas S. Young

The one million ounce Newrnont Gold loan has focussed attention on gold's new role as a financing vehicle. This paper explains the background of the new role for gold, and details various gold denominated products now available to the mining industry. The discussion highlights the importance of gold-based products, and how they should be used in developing business strategy for gold mining companies. [ ]

Jan 1, 1990

By Dennis Peterson

INTRODUCTION The business arena has dramatically changed for most producers and consumers of commodities. International debt, currency shortages, political upheavals, etc., require corporations today to be sophisticated and flexible enough to change their purchasing and sales techniques in order to maximize returns. Many external factors, such as interest rates, trading partners, currency changes, and government edicts, can have an adverse effect on a company's bottom line. Totally out of a company's ability to control or predict, these. factors force the commodities based corporation to constantly re-evaluate its operating scope and domain. The principle of back-yard only operations and the laissez-faire with blinders style of management is no longer a viable way to run a business. The industrial world has been operating for the past 10 to 15 years as though there were no commodity nor raw material crisis. For developed countries the primary products sector has become marginal, whereas it was central in the first half of the century. A radical change in the method of doing business is necessary to offset a depression in the industrial economy. The risk of collapse may be heightened by a banking crisis caused by massive defaults on the part of commodity producing debtors, whether in the third world or in our own farm producing sector. The raw materials economy has become divergent with the industrial economy. This is a major change in the world economy with tremendous implications in both developed and developing countries for economic and social policies and economic theories. Basic competition issues, such as low labor costs, are likely to become less of an advantage in international trade. In developed countries these costs are going to account for a smaller portion of total costs. The total costs of automated processes are lower than those of traditional plants with low labor costs. Automation in the commodities sector eliminates the hidden but high cost of not processing at capacity created by poor quality, rejects and maintenance for product change-overs. The cost of capital will become increasingly important in international competition. Over the last ten years the U.S. has become the highest cost country in this area. Reversing the U.S. policy of high interest rates and costly equity capital should be a priority for management decision makers. In the rapid industrialization of this century, Japan developed by exporting raw materials, (principally, silk and tea), at steadily increasing prices. Germany developed by leap frogging into the high-tech industries, mainly in electricity, chemicals and optics. The United States did both. Both avenues are blocked for today's rapidly industrializing countries because (a) the deterioration of the terms of trade for primary products, and (b) it requires an infrastructure of knowledge and education far beyond the scope of a poor country. Many explanations exist for the explosion of international money flows. The shift from fixed to floating exchange rates in 1971 may have given initial impetus by inviting currency speculation. The surge in liquid funds flowing to petroleum producers after the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 was definitely a major cause. There can be little doubt that the U.S. government deficit also played a big role. The American budget deficit has become a massive void, sucking in liquid funds from all over the world and making the U.S. the world's major debtor country. In reality, a trade and payments deficit is actually a loan from the seller of goods and services to the buyer, that is, to the U.S. From now on, the global ramifications of business will have to be treated in economic theory and business policy alike. Economic theory teaches that the comparative advantage factors of a real economy determines operative and financial policy. These comparisons -- labor costs, productivity, raw materials cost, energy costs,

Jan 1, 1990

By Klaus M. Zeitler

INTRODUCTION One cannot discuss the subject of "Raising Capital in the 1990s" without having a crystal ball and a reliable fortune teller. This discusses "Raising Capital for the 1990sW, which is what Metal1 Mining Corporation did in 1987. We raised (3166 million in an IPO (initial public offering) that was originally planned for only some (375 million. Why did we raise this money? How did we do it, and why was this IPO so successful? The answer to the first question requires a description of the promoter and principal shareholder of Metal1 Mining Corporation, Metallgesellschaft AG. This West Germany company was founded over 100 years ago in Frankfurt as a trading house for non-ferrous metals. It has developed into one of the world's leading firms in the non-ferrous metals industry. The company's worldwide activities in all areas of that business include mining, smelting and refining, the trading of ore, base and precious metals, the production of semi-fabricated and finished metal products, and the provision of engineering, construction and transportation services. Metallgesellschaft AG has also diversified into many other areas, the most significant of which are manufacturing, the production of chemicals, the development and application of technical and chemical processes, the planning and construction of industrial plants, and activities associated with finance, insurance, shipping and freight forwarding, and the provision of barter and countertrade services. The company maintains a network of more than 100 offices around the world; it employs some 25,000 people in its worldwide activities. [Selected financial data, as of September 30, 1987: (MetaUgesellschafl AG) Working Capital DM 8%.6 million CDNS 672.8 million Long Term Debt DM 568.0 million CDNS 426.2 million Sales DM 14.9 billion CDNS 11.2 billion Net Income DM 87.7 million CDN$ 65.8 million Market Capitalization at April 27, 1987: (Metallgesellschafi AG) Outstanding Shares ~,6oo,o0o DM 1,875 million CDNS 1,407 million] For the fiscal year ended September 30, 1987, Metallgesellschaft AG had, on a consolidated basis, net sales of DM13.3 billion, net income of DM100 million and total assets of about DM7.0 billion. Metallgesellschaft AG established the American Metal Company, a predecessor of AMAX Inc. one of the largest ventures undertaken by Metallgesellschaft AG then was the acquisition, through the American Metal Company, of a majority share in the Mexican Penoles mine, a large lead and silver deposit. METALLGESELLSCHAFT AG Figure 1 depicts an overview of Metallgesellschaft AG before and at the time the initial public offering of Metall Mining Corporation's shares took place. It shows that mining was far from the centre of Metallgesellschaft's activities. Therefore, it could not expect to receive an extraordinary amount of board attention. Thus, mining investments not only had to compare well with other mining opportunities, but were in fierce competition with projects from other divisions. In addition, mining was sub-divided into two separate departments -- domestic and international. These two departments had different management styles and diverging interests which resulted in a minimum co-operation between them. The domestic mining department was primarily interested in the survival of the local mines. These mines were characterized by rising operating costs and declining ore grades. It took a special commitment and continued ingenuity to develop and adjust to local conditions, and modern mining and processing technology, in order to remain competitive, or at least survive within the international mining industry. Local management

Jan 1, 1990

By Alistair Frame

INTRODUCTION In April 1988 discussions were about to start with BP on the possibility of buying their- mineral interests, and it took a long time to arrange a deal. I will talk about RTZ without BP Minerals, look at the new RTZ with BP Minerals, discuss the outlook for metal prices, and review the problems in South Africa and develop the case against sanctions on that country. RTZAT THE END OF 1988 Late in 1987, after completing a worldwide review of our strategic thrust, we decided: 1. That the business focus would be to remain a major diversified natural resource group with interests in related industries. 2. To divest non-core and low growth businesses. 3. To develop a logical acquisition plan. 4. To emphasise organic growth and, most importantly, to enhance shareholders' wealth by capital increase and a progressive dividend policy. Subsequently, we concluded that we should sell our oil and gas business and dispose of several assets for which we saw little growth potential. The disposal programme raised some U.S.$ 1,600 million, representing a significant capital gain on our various investments. All transactions were carried out by our small Head Office staff in London, without the help of merchant banks and lawyers, and we were able to safeguard the employment of our staff in all these operations. The most interesting disposal was of our oil and gas interests. Before the 1987 strategic review, we had ambitions to develop our oil and gas interests and to become the leader in the second division of European oil companies. Our interests, which were purely in exploration and production of oil and gas, consisted of the 100% owned RTZ Oil and Gas company, and 29% of LASMO, a publicly quoted U.K. oil and gas company with extensive worldwide interests. LASMO, in turn, owned 25% of Enterprise Oil, one of the more successful of the North Sea oil exploration and production companies. Prior to the end of 1987, our intention was to acquire control of both LASMO and Enterprise. However, when we evaluated the net asset value of these two companies based on our oil price assumptions, which were pessimistic for the next five years or so, we concluded that they were both trading in the market at significant premiums. This, taken with the additional premium required for acquisition and the high cost of exploration, led us to conclude that, since funds could undoubtedly be used to better effect, we should sell our interests. Turning to the other major achievements in 1988, we commissioned, and built up to design levels in a very short period of time, the Morro do Ouro gold mine in Brazil. This mine reached its design output of 100,000 ounces of gold per year within three months of start-up, which was on time and under budget. We are now considering a possible expansion of this property. In South America, Utah International, Mitsubishi and RTZ arranged non-recourse finance, with post completion guarantees, for the giant Escondida Project in Northern Chile. Financing came from a group of banks in Japan, Germany and Finland -- the countries to which most of the concentrates will be sold -- and from the LEC. The average output of the mine for the

Jan 1, 1990

By Sven A. Wehrwein

Leveraged buyouts are a fixture in today's market place. This paper will include comments on how LBO's are analyzed, structured and sold, as well as an overview on the present environment of LBO's.

Jan 1, 1990

By Robert F. Calman

OUTLINE FIVE EXAMPLES OF GOLD-LINKED FINANCINGS 1. Financing the Lupin Mine • Sale of Cdn $40.0 million of 12% preferred shares and Cdn $40.0 million of Gold Purchase Warrants @ $595 per ounce. 2. Financing the Copper Range acquisition • Borrowing 100,000 ounces from a Canadian chartered bank @ US$307 for five years. 3. Financing the Round Mountain expansion • Borrowing up to US $80.0 million in dollars, convertible into gold, repayable over five years from a group of North American banks. 4. Financing the Tenneco Precious Metals Division acquisition •Sale of SFr 110.0 million of ten year 3-718% bonds with warrants to buy 132,000 ounces of gold at US $560. 5. On Forward Sales, Puts and Calls • Gold, Silver, Canadian Dollars, Swiss Francs THE FINANCIAL RULES AT ECHO BAY 1. Never bet the company 2. Equity is the primary form of capital for a gold mining company 3. On debt 4. The Yardsticks for Corporate Decisions 5. Financial Community Relationships 6. Dividend Policy No Text Available Tables Follow

Jan 1, 1990

By C. P. Mangelsdorf

Introduction The use of frequency of vibration measurements to determine tension has long been accepted by industries that use electrical or stranded cables of wire ropes in their operations. In contemplating how to determine the tension in chords of a roof truss, it seems almost inevitable that a similar approach should be investigated even though there are some important dissimilarities in physical behavior between a chord of a rod-type Birmingham truss and a stretched wire rope. While the dominant feature of both types of behavior is the existence of tension, the bending resistance of the vibrating truss chord cannot be ignored. And it is common to have attached to the chord, pieces of hardware (turnbuckles, extension sleeves, wedge boxes) that represent concentrations of mass not usually found in a vibrating wire rope. Analytical solutions to the problem of vibrating wires or beams can be found in the literature on vibrations (Timoshensko, 1955; Den Hartog, 1956). But in every case, at least one of the ingredients of the vibrating truss chord is missing. The presence of axial tension, or bending resistance, of concentrated masses and of end conditions peculiar to truss chords is a combination that appears not to have been dealt with before, although the techniques for dealing with it are commonly known. The purpose of this note is to report the results of a project to measure and calibrate such frequencies. The work was conducted by the University of Pittsburgh under the sponsorship of the US Bureau of Mines. Field observations Tests were conducted on 24 different truss installations. The first 18 trusses were installed in shale roofs above Kentucky No. 9 seam and Illinois No. 6 seam. The remaining six were placed against the competent sandstone over the Pocahontas No. 3 seam in West Virginia. Chord tension was determined by two electrical resistance strain gages, in series, applied diametrically opposite to one another on the rod before tensioning. Due to the combined effects of inexact gage placement, rod bending and residual torsion in the chord due to tightening, errors in tension as high as 1780 N (400 lb) were reasonably possible. Due to faulty soldering or damage, three of the first 18 trusses and one of the final six were rendered completely unreliable. In addition to strain, the first natural frequency of vibration was observed to the nearest 0.1 Hz. Dimensions recorded included the span between contact points at the bearing blocks (Fig. 1) and the locations and amount of excess rod and rod gap at the wedge box and turnbuckle, respectively.

Jan 1, 1986

By D. Gignac, P. A. Studemeister, H. Koza

Two epiclastic horizons in an Archean volcanic sequence host the gold occurrences on the Dunraine property near Wawa, Ontario, Canada. The Grace horizon of cherty and pelitic tuff strikes northnorthwest and dips east. Native gold occurs with arsenopyrite in bedlike and podlike bodies of quartz lenses and stringers set in a pelitic matrix. The Parkhill horizon of lithic graywacke with associated flow-breccia strikes southwest and dips south, Native gold occurs with minor sulfides in similar bodies of quartz erratic within the Parkhill horizon. The auriferous bodies occupy paleotopographic channels and troughs within the two horizons. The former producers are the Parkhill mine with 1689 kg (54,300 oz) Au, Darwin mine with 473 kg (15,200 oz) Au, and Van Sickle mine with 48 kg (1536 oz) Au between 1902 and 1944. The gold occurrences are syndepositional with the host volcanic sediments laid during a pause in explosive volcanism. Fumaroles along steep gullies on the flank of a subaqueous volcanic center precipitated aprons of auriferous silica-sulfide mud. Downslope slumping resulted in exhalative debris flows; gold concentrated in flexures and depressions along slumpage channels. Renewed explosive volcanism covered the auriferous sediments with pyroclastic tuffs, arresting the slumping of in situ fumarolic deposits.

Jan 1, 1986