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Jan 1, 1947

Jan 1, 1947

By AIME AIME

IN an address before the New York Section. A.I.M.E., Oct. 20, Alex L. ter Braake, speaking on the tin industry of the Netherlands East Indies, interjected a few remarks, at the chairman's request. on the mineral stock-piling project now before Congress in a bill sponsored by Senator Scrugham. The full text of Mr. ter Braake's paper was published in the Nov. 6 issue of the American Metal Market. Following mention of the buffer stock scheme as applied in the tin industry, Mr. ter Braake continued:

Jan 1, 1943

By W. S. Sanner

Experiments were conducted to determine the quantity and purity of ultraclean anthracite that could be prepared in the laboratory, using conventional separating techniques. A low, a medium, and a high-volatile anthracite were studied. Specific gravity separation followed by grinding, screening, and refloating at lighter specific gravities yielded small quantities of material purified to 1.0% ash, as follows: from low-volatile anthracite, 0.7%; from medium-volatile coal, 1.0%; and from high-volatile coal, 2.3%. The reduction in ash had no appreciable effect on the volatile matter or sulfur content of the coal. The limited quantities of material containing 1.0% or less ash obtainable indicate that if ultraclean coal is desired, a practical approach should include the processing units as an integral part of a convc.ntiona1 dense-media washing plant. Anthracite preparation practices during much of the industry's history were geared to maximum recovery of the larger sizes, pea through egg, which were used in hand-fired, domestic furnaces. Those sizes were cleaned to meet trade requirements, and the smaller sizes were usually higher in ash content. The impression, thus, was that ash content of anthracite always increased as the sizes got smaller. It was presumed that it was impossible to wash the finer sizes to extremely low ash contents. Following World War 11, the classical domestic market began to decline and the finer sizes assumed an increasingly large share of the market. For example, in 1949l 61% of the production was still pea and larger. Fig. l2 shows that -by 1955 these sizes accounted for only 50%, and in 1965, they were only 39% of the total anthracite produced. With the reduction in the market, increased quality was demanded, especially in export markets, and an increasing number of dense-media magnetite washers were installed in new and existing cleaning plants. In 1965, the coarse coal prepared at 59 breakers in the anthracite fields was sampled by the U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBM); approximately 50% of these plants were equipped with dense-media magnetite washers.3 Since 1950, more attention has been focused on the use of finer sizes for numerous industrial uses, including iron-ore sintering, pelletizing, foundry coke-making, cement manufacture, production of calcium carbide, and of carbon electrodes, etc. Most industrial uses require relatively clean anthracite, such as 10 to 11% ash for sintering and foundry coke, 7% for aluminum melting-pot cathode carbon, and 5% for carbide production. Hence, cleaning methods have been improved to the extent that dense-media washers, hydraulic cyclones, and flotation cells have been introduced as fine-coal-cleaning devices. It is now possible to wash the buckwheat, rice, and barley sizes (9116 X 3132-in.) to ash contents as low as 8 to 10% in dense-media devices, but washing the -3132-in. sizes to those limits presents more difficult problems, due mainly to the fineness of the material. This USBM investigation was conducted to determine the amount and purity of ultraclean anthracite that could be prepared in the laboratory, using conventional separating techniques. The goal was to reduce the ash content to a level acceptable for industrial carbon uses, including electrode manufacture, which generally requires an ash content of 1% or less. While low-ash content is of primary importance in selecting industrial carbons, the amounts of other constituents are also important, including iron, silicon, titanium, nickel, vanadium, and sulfur. They were not considered in this work, since their occurrence in deashed anthracite has been studied elsewhere.4 The results of the present investigation were used to design a flowsheet, suggesting a method for producing ultraclean anthracite as part of conventional preparation practice, using dense-media vessels, crushers, pulverizers,

Jan 1, 1970

By W. M. Corse

AT THE TURN of the century the nonferrous alloy industry was awakening to the value of scientific metallurgy, and brass foundries and rolling mills began to establish their own research laboratories for scientific research and control. As the industry grew and its scope broadened it became apparent that an organization was needed that would stand in the same relation to the nonferrous industry as the American Foundrymen's Association did to the iron foundry business. The brass founders' group of the foundrymen's association discussed the matter and it was finally decided to appoint a com- mittee to draw up a constitution for a new organization to be known as the American Brass Founders' Association. Charles J. Caley was chairman and Dr. Richard Moldenke secretary of this committee. The object of the organization as defined by the constitution was the study of the technological development of alloying and founding non- ferrous metals, and furthering the advance of nonferrous metallurgy and the standardization of materials and operations in cooperation with the Bureau of Standards and engineering societies.

Jan 1, 1932

By J. W. Stewart

That our American civilization will have extensive postwar problems in such fields as economics, unemployment, and social adjustment is now well understood by all readers of the press and listeners to the radio. But precious little is heard from these sources regarding the impact of the war on education, though education is one of the fields where the effect of the war is going to be felt most-for youth is fighting the war. Unquestionably, serious educational problems will ;rise in the postwar period, challenging the best efforts of our educators. Most acute will be the problems at the college level of education, for it is this age group that will have had its educational process most thoroughly disrupted. The return of these students to our college and university campuses wiI1 bring about a new set of conditions which we might as well try to foresee and begin to prepare for now. To begin with, the average returning college student who has had his education interrupted by war service will certainly be more mature in both years and mental outlook, and possibly married. As a result he will want to finish his college education as quickly as possible. His natural action will be to shop around among the various schools of the country to see where he can get the most credit for work he has done or thinks he has done. It is just possible that what might impolitely be termed "dark - market" schools may arise to cater to his needs. These schools will not think of them- selves in this light, of course, but will be conscious only of a keen sympathy for the veteran student and an urgent desire to help him solve his pressing problems. A considerable number of American colleges are going to be pretty well impoverished before this present war is ended and unless some professional organization takes it upon itself to place this possible situation under supervision and regulation, we may well suffer a serious setback to the

Jan 1, 1944

By H. C. Chao, L. H. Van Vlack

Small MnS inclusions with known crystallographic orientations were placed inside powder compacts of low-carbon steel. After the metal was axially campressed with negligible end friction, the deformstions for the metal and the inclusions were compared. The MnS inclusions deformed more when the [100] direction was aligned with the compression axis than when the [111] direction was parallel to this axis. The deformations of the inclusions in the two principal radial directions were equal for each of the above orientations. Inclusions with [110] compression alignments did not deform with radial symmetry. The relative deformation of the inclusion and metal was closely dependent upon the relatiue hardness of the two phases. The relative deformation of the two phases was not sensitive to the rate of deformation. RECENT studies by the authors1.&apos; suggested that the plastic deformation of MnS in steel would probably be highly sensitive to the orientation of the inclusions and to the temperature of the metal. This paper reports an investigation of these factors upon MnS behavior within steel. Manganese sulfide (MnS) possesses an NaCl-type structure and typically has extensive (l10) {110} slip as a separate (noninclusion) crystal.&apos; A secondary slip system, ( l 10) { l l l}, has also been observed where the major slip system is restricted. In general, MnS inclusions must be rated as a highly deformable second phase.3 The amount of sulfide deformation varies, however, with several composition and processing factors. Some of these have been only partially assigned. For example, it is known that minor amounts (<0.01 pct) of silicon within free-machining steels will increase the amount of MnS deformation,4 but the mechanism of the added deformation can only be surmised at the present. Manganese sulfide and steel have sufficiently comparable deformation characteristics so that slip which is started in steel may be continued through the sulfide inclusions and back into the steel if the crystal orientations are favorable.5 A more detailed discussion of previous work on the plastic deformation of NaC1-type crystals and on the plastic deformation of inclusions within a metal is given in Chao&apos;s work.6 EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE The manganese sulfide which was used in this study was prepared by previously described methods.&apos; Single crystals of MnS, both as cleavage cubes and as spheres, were oriented within steel powder compacts so that the desired crystal directions were parallel to the direction of axial compression. A four-stage hydrostatic compaction procedure was used and involved the following steps. In the first stage part of the powder was placed in a metal die 1 in. in diameter with a thick (1 in. OD, 5/8 in. ID) rubber liner which had one end plugged. The steel powder was hand-rammed, making it as dense as possible before placing a carefully sized MnS crystal (either as a sphere or as a cube) near the center. The crystal was oriented with the chosen direction vertical; viz., [001], [011], or [111], with the aid of a X10 microscope. A pair of tungsten wire threads 0.020 in. in diameter was inserted along the side of this (&apos;core compact" to locate the desired plane after the compression tests. After the crystal was positioned in the center of the die, more powder was added and carefully rammed by hand. The die was then capped with a rubber plug of the same hardness and thickness as that of the liner. The whole assembly as shown in Fig. 1 was compacted by a ram load of 54,000 lb (about 70,000 psi). In the second stage a smaller, 3/4-in, rubber-lined die was used to give a stress of approximately 120,000 psi. The above process was repeated with the initial compact serving as a core for a larger compact. The final product after sintering was a cylinder 1 cm long and 1 cm in diameter, having a density of 7.54 g per cu cm. This was close to the theoretical density since the metal contained a non-metallic phase. There was no evidence of MnS deformation during the hydrostatic compaction or subsequent sintering. Elevated-temperature hardness data were obtained by procedures previously described.2 Compression tests for inclusion deformation utilized the cylinders which were described above. The critical problem in these tests was the lubri-

Jan 1, 1965

FOREWORD A SERIES of papers on strategic and otherwise important mineral products was prepared some ten years ago under the joint auspices of the Committee on Foreign and Domestic Mining Policy of the Mining and Metallurgical Society of America and the Committee on Industrial Preparedness of the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers. These papers were later published in a joint volume entitled International Control of Minerals (1925). Amongst them was one on manganese. The Subcommittee on Manganese prepared its paper in two forms. One was intended for inclusion with the series above referred to and approached its subject more particularly as an international problem. The other dealt more definitely with manganese as an element in the problem of national defense. This last was first written under date of January 24, 1924 as a confidential report, for and at the request of the War Department. It was later released and published, in slightly modified form, as a separate pamphlet by the Industrial Preparedness Committee of the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers. After the lapse of eight years, in view of the vital position of manga-nese in the problem of industrial preparedness against a war emergency, the War Department made a request to have the conclusions of 1924 reviewed and brought up to date. To comply with this request the manganese subcommittee was reconvened (with a somewhat changed personnel) and exhaustive studies were once more made of the entire subject of manganese. A new report, with specific recommendations, was submitted to the War Department in February, 1932. This second report is now herewith released for publication. Certain specific conclusions and recommendations as expressed to the War Department are omitted. Otherwise the report stands as prepared and submitted by the manganese subcommittee of 1931. The members of this committee were: C. Minot Weld, Chairman, R. C. Allen, Arthur S. Dwight, J. W. Furness, D. F. Hewett, Reno H. Sales, Theodore Swann and Scott Turner. ARTHUR S. DWIGHT, Chairman, Committee on Industrial Preparedness.

Jan 1, 1933

A SERIES of papers on strategic and otherwise important mineral products was prepared some ten years ago under the joint auspices of the Committee on Foreign and Domestic Mining Policy of the Mining and Metallurgical Society of America and the Committee on Industrial Preparedness of the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers. These papers were later published in a joint volume entitled International Control of Minerals (1925). Amongst them was one on manganese. The Subcommittee on Manganese prepared its paper in two forms. One was intended for inclusion with the series above referred to and approached its subject more particularly as an international problem. The other dealt more definitely with manganese as an element in the problem of national defense. This last was first written under date of January 24, 1924 as a confidential report, for and at the request of the War Department. It was later released and published, in slightly modified form, as a separate pamphlet by the Industrial Preparedness Committee of the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers. After the lapse of eight years, in view of the vital position of manga-nese in the problem of industrial preparedness against a war emergency, the War Department made a request to have the conclusions of 1924 reviewed and brought up to date. To comply with this request the manganese subcommittee was reconvened (with a somewhat changed personnel) and exhaustive studies were once more made of the entire subject of manganese. A new report, with specific recommendations, was submitted to the War Department in February, 1932. This second report is now herewith released for publication. Certain specific conclusions and recommendations as expressed to the War Department are omitted. Otherwise the report stands as prepared and submitted by the manganese subcommittee of 1931. The members of this committee were: C. Minot Weld, Chairman, R. C. Allen, Arthur S. Dwight, J. W. Furness, D. F. Hewett, Reno H. Sales, Theodore Swann and Scott Turner. ARTHUR S. DWIGHT, Chairman, Committee on Industrial Preparedness.

Jan 1, 1933

By Basil B. Zavoico

ALTHOUGH the American petroleum industry was affected by the Second World War from its early beginning it was not until Dec. 7, 1941- that the industry was placed on full war footing. Even throughout most of 1942 the American overseas operations were limited and not until late in the year did expansion of military activities, more particularly the offensive in North Africa, affect the domestic supplies to such an extent that critical deficiencies developed locally in this country, particularly along the East Coast. The definite outlook for greatly expanded offensive operations by the United States on both Atlantic and Pacific fronts makes certain that during 1943 the domestic situation will. not be alleviated; rather it may become even more critical even though additional transportation facilities, now being built and planned. will be completed from the southwestern producing states to the East Coast.

Jan 1, 1943

By AIME AIME

ON THE occasion of the eightieth birthday of Captain Robert W. Hunt, the Iron and Steel Committee of the Institute, desiring to commemorate the great contributions made to the steel industry by Captain Hunt during his long career, conceived the idea of a Hunt Medal to be awarded annually by the Institute for meritorious contributions to the art of making steel. The project was received enthusiastically by all to whom it was proposed, especially by Captain Hunt&apos;s partners and employees who considered it their right, and asked for the privilege of -. - raising the necessary funds within their own circle. This was agreed to, and the Institute has received from them $7500 as an endowment fund to provide an annual award, and $1000 for the expenses of providing of medal.

Jan 1, 1920

The world&apos;s largest steam-driven mine hoist, built by Nordberg Manufacturing Co. a half century ago, has become a major tourist attraction in Michigan&apos;s Upper Peninsula. The hoist, designed by company founder Bruno V. Nordberg, is located in the Quincy Mine Number Two, just north of Hancock. Nordberg began construction of the mammoth machine before World War I, but delayed completion until after the war. The hoist became operational in 1920 and continued running until the mine was shut down in 1931.

Jan 9, 1968

By John S. Brown

IN 1925 the writer undertook a detailed statistical study of all producing areas in the Joplin district as a basis for evaluating programs and measuring objectives. For this purpose, the published figures in the yearly volumes of Mineral Resources were used, supplemented for earlier years by publications of the Missouri Geological Survey and other local and less official sources. When all else failed, the available data were projected backward to hazard a reasonable guess as to the unrecorded early output of important areas. Fortunately, the proportion of such prehistory production is not a large factor in any of the totals. These results were used during the next few years to measure the relative importance of various producing areas and to predict the peak period of development of the all-important Picher field. For the purpose of this review, the charts have been completed to the end of 1950. During World War 11, the U. S. Bureau of Mines became interested in a similar study and issued comprehensive statistical tabulations of data up to 1945 ( Info. Circular 7383), which have been checked against the figures used herein. This tabulation, however, does not include all the earlier data used by the writer nor does it offer any estimates of the wholly unrecorded era in the beginnings of the earlier camps. The area covered in this study is shown in Fig. 1 on which are indicated the relative location and approximate outlines of the principal producing camps. This also shows the approximate yield to date of each major camp in terms of combined lead and zinc concentrates. The output of zinc concentrates is roughly seven times that of lead. Hence, the economy of the district has depended primarily on the price of zinc, with lead as an important byproduct. Over much of the productive period, lead concentrates averaged about twice the value of zinc concentrates per ton, and in certain mines or areas the proportion of lead to zinc was substantially above average. The Joplin district is largely flat prairie but is partly moderately dissected, partially wooded land with a relief generally less than 100 ft. The rocks are almost flat-lying, nearly parallel to the surface, and the chief ore formation is the Mississippian Boone limestone, including its cherty phases. This formation either outcrops in the producing areas or is covered by a thin veneer of Pennsylvanian shales. Virtually all the ore occurs within 400 ft of the surface, and a large part at less than 300 ft in depth. Most of the land was divided into small farms or town lots before mineral development; tracts seldom exceeded 160 acres, and averaged considerably less. Mineral rights followed the surface ownership, segregation was rare, and a system of leasing for mineral development became well established early in the region&apos;s history, many landowners deriving small to sizable fortunes from royalties. Because of the shal-lowness of the ore and other factors, prospecting and mining was cheaper than in almost any comparable mining district in the United States. This situation, coupled with the widely divided land ownership, offered a fertile field for promoters and speculators and led to the rise of many small mining concerns. Only in its later history, under stern economic compulsion, has control tended to centralize in a few companies. Under these conditions, any important new discovery or successful development had much the effect of a gold rush or an oil boom. Every property in the area was leased quickly, promptly drilled, and, if ore was found, it was soon on the market. Many companies and individuals participated, and the average producing lease-hold probably was about 40 acres in extent. Any important field thus was attacked by anywhere from 10 to 100 or more producers. Production zoomed, eventually steadied or wavered, and ultimately subsided, leaving a desolation of tailings mountains, cave-ins, empty housing, and wreckage. The object of this paper is to depict the pattern of this process, so far as metal production is concerned, and to note the way in which it reacted to economic and political pressures. Production Charts In Fig. 2 is charted the production record, in tons of lead and zinc concentrates combined, of eight of the principal camps, which together account for approximately 99 pct of the total district production, over the years from 1870 to 1950. This period covers all but the very minor beginning of mining history. Two important camps are divided by state lines; hence, it has been necessary to combine production records for the two portions, based on estimates that may be slightly in error. Certain camps are sub-dividable into important units for which separate figures are available in whole or in part and have been charted as fractions of the major unit. The corresponding price of zinc is shown above all the charts. Three camps, Aurora, Neck City, and Galena, show a remarkably symmetrical graphic pattern, which is interpreted as the norm. The curves rise steeply to a peak, level off for an irregular interval, and then drop sharply to zero on a slope corresponding roughly to that covered by the initial rise. The three portions of these charts seem appropriately characterized by the designations of youth, maturity, and decline. On the whole, with some irregularities, the production in each of the three periods seems to be almost equal. A fourth camp, Granby, fails to conform to the normal pattern. It exhibits a very long period of reasonably uniform, stabilized production corresponding to maturity, followed by a rather precipitate decline. Its youth is hidden in the era of prehistory. This habit of steady, long-continued production at an even keel is attributable to the fact that this camp, more than any other, was controlled largely by a single principal owner at any given period over most of its history and this permitted the imposition

Jan 1, 1952

By R. W. Raymond

FOUR portraits have recently been hung in the rooms of the Institute, in recognition of four illustrious men with whom we, as mining engineers and metallurgists, may claim fellowship. LUTHER. Martin Luther is often spoken of as a miner&apos;s son; but it is less generally known that John Luther, his father, was, in a small way, a metallurgist as well as a miner, and that Martin Luther himself, in his youth, worked in a forge or bloomary established by his father at Mansfeld, Saxony. Since this is the only manual occupation on his part of which we have any record, it is fair to assume that the great scholar and reformer derived from his work in this department the practical familiarity with the conditions of human labor so abundantly evinced in the homely illustrations which accompany even his serious arguments, and in the witty apothegms of his famous "table-talk." At the same time, I must confess that 1 have not been able to find in any of the works of Luther distinct allusions to mining or metallurgy. KÖRNER. Theodor Körner, a student at the Mining Academy of Freiberg, Saxony, threw himself into the German War of Freedom in the first decade of the 19th Century. He was a poet of no mean rank ; and his " Song of the Sword " is one of the great lyrics of literature. This poem was written but a few days before he died in battle. In many respects, Körner may be compared with our American hero Theodore Winthrop, who similarly met a glorious fate, and left behind him prophetic indications of genius, of which his premature death prevented the complete fulfillment. I am informed by a member of the Institute that Körner&apos;s admirable collection of minerals is still preserved at Dresden.

Nov 1, 1908

By C. C. Nitchie, G. S. Brooks

With the gradual depletion of the natural-gas pools of the Kansas district, together with the uncertainty of further cheap fuel developments, some of the western zinc companies turned to the coal fields, attracted by their permanency and the success of the Matthiessen & Hegeler Co. and the lllinois Zinc Co. Being then confronted with the problem of using a relatively high-priced fuel, although the ultimate supply was very great, the fuel economies of the kilns and furnaces became of far more importance, and the more modern equipments, as a result, embodied distinct gaias in this phase of the business. In addition, there have been some pronounced advances in the actual making of gas from these coals. Increased efficiency in gas making has contributed its hare to lowering costs and those plants located in the higher priced fuel districts have probably been obliged to study these economies somewhat more closely. Naturally, many beneficial changes have resulted in both practice and apparatus in these sections. On certain western coals, for instance, the actual saving in fuel consumption has been 50 per cent. By this is meant that, where about 1.75 tons were burned to smelt 1 ton of oxidized ore, 0.7 to 0.9 ton is now required. While comparisons by T. R. Ingalls1 of fuel economies in smelting in this country and Germany before the war may, in general, be correct, they do not appear to do justice to the more progressive American practice. It is doubtful whether German plants were substantially bettering these fuel ratios. Data furnished by Bender and Frams do not afford records averaging less than 0.9 ton coal per ton ore on materials from 40 per cent. to 50 per cent. zinc. Fuels As producer fuel, Illinois, Indiana, and Kansas coah offer a wide range of material, although varying much in their amenability to gasscation. The proper fuel for each plant can only be determined after com-

Jan 1, 1920

By AIME AIME

The Washoe plant, 1 in Anaconcla. Mont., together with the local street-railroad, ranches a. foundry and machine-shop a brick-plant and the Montana hotel, form a property under one management; to which should be added the mines in Butte owned by the company, from which part of the ore-supply of the plant comes. The Anaconda Copper Mining Co., controlled by the Amalgamated Copper Co., was reorganized under the laws of Montana in 1893. A map of the plant, showing the numerous departments and illustrating the details of tracks, pipe-lines, and charging-stations for compressed-air locomotives, is given in Fig. 1.

Jul 1, 1906

By G. Caetani

I. INTRODUCTION. WE owe to the courtesy of Mr. R. M. Raymond, Manager of the El Oro Mining & Railway Co., Ltd., the permission of publishing in this paper the results of a series of experiments and tests made in view of determining the economical limit to which the fine grinding of the ore by tube-mills could be carried on. For the sake of clearness, the following definitions are given of certain terms used in this paper, as well as of the units and screens in the experiments. Slime : In a general way " slime" is that mill-product, of which from 90 to 95 per cent, will pass a 200-mesh screen (0.067 mm. aperture), and which is treated as one class of material in the El Oro cyanide-plants. As a screen-product, slime constitutes all material that *ill pass a 200-mesh, screen. In sizing, the following products are distinguished:- Coarse Sand : That material remaining on a 100-mesh (0.111 mm. aperture) screen. Fine Sand : That passing through. 100-mesh and remaining on a 200-mesh (0.067 mm. aperture) screen. Slime: That passing through 200-mesh. Fines, which pass through 200-mesh and settle in 30 seconds, and silt, which does not settle in 1 minute. Sand-index : The number proportional to its total fineness considered from the economical point of view, as explained on page 93. Absolute extraction : The percentage of values actually brought into solution. Actual extraction: The percentage of values actually brought to the ziuc-boxes. Units : Dollars, U. S. Currency; pounds; and short tons (2,000 lb.). Gold is valued at $20.67, and silver at $0.50 per ounce. Screens : In the sizing-tests the screens used were:¬ Mesh (per 1 in.), . 24 30 40 60 80 100 150 200 250 Aperture (mm.), . 0.740 0.515 0.424 0.250 0.159 0.111 0.090 0.067 0.058 Strengths of solution : Strengths are expressed in the percent- . age of KCN contained, though the sodium cyanide, which is

Jan 1, 1906

By W. R. Ingalls

THE paramount subject of interest and concern at the present time is the readjustment in economic conditions following the cataclysmic disturbance produced by the war and the misconceptions leading to an orgy of extravagance that prevailed during two years following the armistice he, time is too short for me to undertake to review the nature and extent of the upheavals occurring between August, 1914, and October, 1920. Bulky volumes will be written about them. . But I shall have to refer to some of the results in order to outline a prognosis. It is the future, not the past;&apos; that is of most interest to us. Let me be so bold as to say, without further preface, that I am not optimistic as to the near future. .We shall, indeed, have revivals in trade, but they will be delusive if their nature be not &apos;understood. We shall build hopes and expectations upon political maneuvers and events, only to find in the end that they were folly. In the meanwhile fundamental economic influences will continue to exert their steady and irresistible pressure. The new administratiow at Washington has no magic wand with which to kindle the fires in our idle steel furnaces, or create a million new houses for the people; nor can the premiers of Europe put into motion the spindles of the cotton and woolen mills, or by any incantations compel the people of the Orient to buy goods. The people of the Orient, and of, Europe, and of the two Americas are in the grip of the same economic forces. The readjustment has proceeded further in some parts of the world than in others. In the United States I do not think we, have gone more than over the threshold. I shall tell you why 1 think thus, but in telling you I shall be limited, in view of the immensity of the subject, to a series of bald statements, without much elucidation.

Jan 1, 1921

THE Johnson award for 1926 was given to T. L. Joseph for his experimental work on blast-furnace operation. When the Bureau of Mines undertook its experimental blast-furnace investigation in 1919, a number of operators and metallurgists were doubtful as to the practicability of small-scale tests. Several pre-vious attempts, outside the Bureau, to operate small furnaces had been unsuccessful. However, pig iron was produced in three and four-ton furnaces during the first half of the nineteenth century. The operation of a small furnace did not therefore seem an impossible task. This point of view, together with a realization of the importance of problems connected with the pro-duction of pig iron, prompted the Bureau to undertake this work. Such problems as the feasibility of using charcoal briquets as a fuel, the application of oxygen enriched blast, and the use of new ores and raw ma-terials, in general, can be investigated only at consider-able cost on full sized furnaces, while with an experimental furnace they can be conducted at a com-paratively ;small, cost. The results of small-scale tests are sufficient to determine whether the problem. War-rants the expenditure required for a trial on a com-mercial scale. The accompanying photographs and chart show the various stages of the experimental furnace development. Some idea of the size and shape of furnaces which were tested can be had from the development chart. In oper-ating furnaces A to F, a series of changes were made to increase hearth temperature. Perhaps the most im-portant change was the position of the tuyeres with respect to the bottom of the hearth. The height of the tuyeres above the hearth was gradually increased and the hearth diameter decreased. It was shown by this series of furnaces that metal and slag are the chief source of heat supply to the crucible. For this reason there is a minimum rate at which these materials can be brought into the hearth of a small furnace if it is to function properly. The rate of slag "and metal fall are determined by the burden on the furnace and the rate of blowing. Due to lack of funds necessary to provide ample blowing equipment, hot blast stoves, essential mechani-cal features, and to meet operating expenses, it. was necessary to work with much smaller furnaces, such as G to K shown in the chart. The particular object of these tests was to study the extent to which reactions could be speeded up by decreasing the size of the stock. One decided change, noticed at the beginning of this series of tests, was the effect which coke size had on the production of a strongly reducing gas. Furnace G, 22 in. high, operating on coke crushed to pass 10 mesh, made a gas richer in carbon monoxide than did fur-naces A to F, operating on run-of-the-oven coke.

Jan 3, 1927

Jan 1, 1969