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By Everett M. (Original by) White

Numerous articles have been written about the coal mine ; he has been compared with brave men who have gone out to conquer some unknown hazard throughout the ages. Now, however, modern mining is no longer something to be avoided, but a vocation that anyone can be proud of, with remuneration equal to or above that of almost any industry. A concerted effort is being made each day by both the operators of most mines as well as the state and federal inspectors to see that coal mines are as safe or safer than work places in any other industry. How- ever, it is true that mine fires and explosions have occurred in the mining industry since its inception. One of the earliest accurate references to such an occurrence is found in the transactions of the Royal Society of London. In the Colliery Managers' Handbook, 1898, Caleb Pamely writes of an explosion that occurred at Fatfield, England in August 1708, resulting in the deaths of 69 persons. He states: "Three of them, viz, two men and a woman, were blown quite up from the bottom of the shaft, fifty-seven fathoms deep, into the air, to a considerable distance from the mouth of the pit." It is interesting to note that women were employed as miners in England during that period. In the United States, the first record of coal mined was in 1702 by the Jamestown colonists. In 1786, about 20 years after Pittsburgh, PA was first settled, a charter was granted by William Penn to mine coal on the banks of the Monongahela River. Then in 1803, the first important coal company, the Lehigh Coal Co., was established. From this beginning, the mining industry continued to grow in importance and the first state mining law was formulated in 1870. The Pennsylvania state mining law was followed in 1873 by Ohio's, and in 1876 by Maryland's. A mine explosion at Avondale, PA in 1869 stimulated state legislatures to formulate these early laws. In 1907 near the town of Fairmont, WV, there were, within three days, two explosions resulting in a total of 597 deaths. Because of this, the federal government took action and by 1910, the US Bureau of Mines had been established. This was perhaps the most significant change in health and safety for miners during the first half of the 20th century as the USBM concentrated its entire efforts in the study, research, and testing of methods totally directed towards improvement of the health and safety of the miner. After a mine disaster in Illinois, a federal law was passed in 1940 calling for federal coal mine inspectors. Then in 1969, Congress enacted the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act following a mine explosion near Farmington, WV. In 1977, the law was revised and included noncoal mining operations.

Jan 1, 1981

By T. M. Williams

DURING the year just ended we have had three great fires in the mines in the Wilkes-Barre district. One at the Empire Colliery, one at the Prospect shaft, and the other at the Baltimore old mine. It is proposed in this paper to give a brief history of the fire at the Empire Colliery, and the methods employed in extinguishing it. The fire was first discovered breaking out in the air-stack, alongside what is known as the " Kidder Plane," about one o'clock on the morning of December 31st, 1873. Subsequently it was ascertained that the fire originated in the return airway somewhere near the steam boiler, located inside the mine, near the head of No. 5 slope. The coal from this slope was hoisted to the shaft gangway, at a point nearly four thousand feet distant from the foot of the shaft. As there were from four to five hundred mine cars hoisted per day from this slope the steam boilers were located at this place. The mines being of considerable extent required a large volume of pure air for ventilation, and no fan having been erected at this slope at the time, the heat from the boiler was made use of to assist ventilation, by conveying the return air from No. 5 slope into the large airway made from these boilers to the surface through the old "Kidder slope" to the stack where the fire was first discovered. The length of this slope or airway was about one thousand feet, with a sectional area of about sixty feet. The quantity of air passing through it must have been over sixty thousand cubic feet per minute

Jan 1, 1875

As a number of underground fires have unfortunately happened in the Broken Hill mining district, the writer trusts that a paper dealing with such a subject may prove of interest. To simplify matters, the subject is classed under three mainheadings- I Origin of fires; II Methods of subduing them; III Precautions to minimize the risk of their occurrence.Underground fires may be started in three ways - arson, spontaneous combustion, or carelessness.With regard to the first-mentioned cause, direct evidence is usually lacking to prove that any fire has been caused maliciously; Though definite proof of spontaneous combustion having been the cause of a mine fire has not been brought forward, nevertheless it should be considered, especially in the case of sulphide ore bodies of a more or less friable nature. The writer has been informed on reliable authority that in an open stope on the...

Jan 1, 1911

By George J. Young

(Cleveland Meeting, October, 1912.) I. GENERAL. THE recurrence of mine-fires in Nevada during the past decade is not only a matter of interest, but also one of considerable concern to engineers and mine-managers. The more important fires may he enumerated as follows: Forman Shaft fire., Gold Hill, April 21, 1903 ; shaft-house, machinery, and shaft, destroyed; loss estimated at $50,000.; Cause Unknown. Union Shaft fire, Virginia City, July 14, 1904; shaft-house, machinery, and shaft in part destroyed; loss estimated it $100,000; cause of fire stated as the careless throwing of a match in the rope-house. Sutro Tunnel fire, Virginia City, Jan. 27, 1909 ; 700 ft. of tunnel-timbering destroyed, and direct damage of $10,000; cause ' probably electric wires." Belcher Shaft fire, Gold Hill, Aug. 9, 1910; shaft-house destroyed, machinery ruined, and upper part of shaft damaged; damage, $25,000; no cause given. Belmont Mine fire, Tonopah, Feb. 23, 1911; fire started in winze ; 17 men killed. Giroux Mine fire, Kimberly, Aug. 23, 1911 ; fire originated iii shaft-station from unknown cause; 7 men killed, and $34,¬521 damage caused. (NOTE 1.-On June 11, 1912, some time after the present paper was written, a fire broke out in the pump-room on the 2475 station of the Ward shaft, Virginia City. This fire was caused by the short-circuiting and exploding of the starting-switch on No. 5 pump. The oil in the switch was scattered about and set fire to the timbers and laming of the pump-room. The pump-roan in charge notified the surface, and the * Professor of Mining and Metallurgy, Mackay School of Mines.

Oct 1, 1912

By Richard P. Rothwell

FIRES in mines are so serious in their consequences and of such frequent occurrence, that their causes and the means of extinguishing them are certainly questions of the greatest interest to a large part of the engineering profession. We have already, in this country, many mines which have been burning for years, and though our hard anthracite is so difficult to ignite that for a quarter of a century after it was first discovered it was not known how to burn it except with the aid of an artificial blast, yet most of the fires which have occurred underground have been in anthracite mines, and in the coal itself. The injury which these fires have caused to properties in various parts of the anthracite regions, and the cost of extinguishing them, would amount to many millions of dollars, and they have also occasioned the loss of many valuable lives. It is not surprising, therefore, that the subject has already attracted much attention, and the exercise of great ingenuity ; and the present communication is made less with the expectation of announcing anything new, than with the object of putting upon record the present state of our knowledge on this subject, or, in other words, of indicating how defective are the present means of combating underground conflagrations. (Causes of Mine Fires.-Even upon the surface, fire is a terrible foe to contend with, and there is probably no other which inspires such thorough and well-founded alarm. With what feelings, then, must we look upon this destructive element, when its field is in the narrow galleries of a mine, where the poisonous products of combustion, spreading in every direction, protect, in the most effectual manner, the fire itself from the attacks of extinguishers, while, if the face of attack be ventilated so as to enable them to approach the seat of the fire, the air current simply increases the extent and violence of the conflagration. Fires underground originate in as various ways as those on the surface, and it is scarcely necessary to say that, except in the rare cases where they are the result of design, they are invariably classed as " accidents," and most generally as " unavoidable accidents." In reality, by an intelligent understanding of their causes and with due precautions, they can almost always be prevented. Ignorance and

Jan 1, 1876

By I. J. Duckworth

Due to improved, stringent safety regulations, many modern road tunnels are statistically safer, per kilometer, than above ground roadways. However, the public perception and reaction in the event of a serious tunnel fire is very different to that associated with a surface incident. Vehicle fires in road and rail tunnels are recognized to represent an immediate and extreme danger to the patrons of those systems. Unlike workers in the mining and civil construction industries, the general public are neither trained nor equipped to fight fires or evacuate under deteriorating smoke conditions. Accordingly, for the majority of modern transportation tunnels the ventilation infrastructure is sized on the requirement to control the combustion products from worst-case fire scenarios and to provide a tenable evacuation route for the tunnel users. It is common for these same emergency ventilation systems to be employed, often in a reduced capacity, for other operating modes such as the dilution of pollutants during congested traffic conditions. This is one of the fundamental differences to mine ventilation, where primary ventilation systems are not typically sized based on fire scenarios. This paper presents an overview of the subject of fires in vehicular tunnels. This includes a brief history of major transportation tunnel fires followed by a discussion on the resulting legislation and standards that govern the design and operation of tunnel emergency ventilation systems. A summary is provided on the common criteria, theory, and design techniques that are employed during tunnel emergency ventilation systems design. Information is provided on fire detection and suppression, with a discussion on the growing acceptance of wet suppression as a means to mitigate major fires in road tunnels worldwide.

Jan 1, 2009

The first metal-mine accident-prevention course was prepared and published in 1942-45 as a series of seven miners' Circular (Nos. 51-57). The scope of the course has been broadened, revised, and brought up to date and is being published as a similar series of seven miners' circular pros. 51-57, revised) on accident prevention in metal and nonmetallic mines. These circulars are: Accident Statistics (Miners' Circular 51), dealing with general statistics on accidents and injuries at metal and nonmetallic mines, including causes, costs, and the uses of investigations and reports of all accidents.

Jan 1, 1957

By Richard J. Mainiero, T S. Bajpayee

The U.S. Bureau of Mines (Bureau) has conducted research to evaluate the firing accuracy of electric delay detonators used in surface blasting operations. Over four billion pounds of explosives and blasting agents are used every year in surface blasting in coal, metal and non-metal mines. In a typical large-scale surface blast, several thousand pounds of explosives are fired in a timed sequence using delay detonators. The delayed firing of explosive charges allows time for the fragmented rock to move out before the next charge is fired.

Jan 1, 1990

By J. R. Knudson

A major contribution to the art of blasting was made at the Cleveland- Cliffs Iron Company?s Hawkins Mine in Cashwauk, Minnesota during April of 1956. It was here that the first experiments with fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate were conducted-experiments which led to the development of the ammonium nitrate and fuel oil method of blasting which has been eagerly adopted by open pit and quarry operators throughout the United States. While this new blasting agent was a more or less natural outgrowth of the Akremite Process devised by Maumee Colleries of Terre Haute, Indiana; no one, to our knowledge, had used this particular combination of ingredients prior to this time. Certainly this was a "break-through" as far as the Lake Superior District was concerned. Akremite consists of a mechanical mixture of grained ammonium nitrate and a solid carbonaceous material packed in a plastic bag. At the time of its introduction to the Mesaba Range, Akremite sold for 10.5 cents a pound as compared to the 18 cent powder previously used in both wet and dry large hole blasting. The discovery of this agent was indeed a remarkable achievement, one that afforded a substantial reduction in blasting costs. However, Akremite proved to be only an intermediate step in the evolution of our present low cost explosives. Cleveland-Cliffs utilized prilled ammonium nitrate and fuel oil and then eliminated the mixing and packaging plant entirely by combining the two raw materials in the field at the drill hole collar or in the hole itself. Thus we have approached the ultimate in simplicity, for the blaster and his helper now manufacture their own explosives not only as they are needed but where they are needed, and at a cost of under 4 cents a pound. This two-man crew may charge and explode as much as 8 tons of ammonium nitrate in an eight-hour shift and in so doing break some 65,000 tons of ore.

Jan 1, 1959

By P. V. Barr, Y. -H. Li, A. P. Watkinson

Subsequent to a campaign of pilot-kiln trials of firing bio-oil and natural gas, scale-up to commercial lime kilns was made using an in-house mathematical kiln model. Both dry limestone and lime mud kilns of 3.5 m OD. by 100 m length were used for bio¬oil firing simulations. Comparisons were made against natural gas firing on the basis of specific firing rate, off-gas volume, energy consumption and overall lime quality. Model simulation results indicate that conversion from natural gas to bio-oil with no productivity loss will increase energy comsumption by about 7.5% and total off-gas volume by about 8%. Alternatively, a 6% decrease in productivity would be expected if off-gas volume is maintained constant. The calculations are sensitive to deviations in the lower heating value (LHV) used in the simulations. A 5% increase in the LHV of the bio-oil, which could result from a 3% decrease in the moisture content, reduces the energy penalty to 2% coupled with a slight reduction in off-gas volume.

Jan 1, 2004

Electronic detonators are receiving increasing acceptance in the blasting industry. Electronic detonators offer several distinctive features over electric and non-el (shock tube) detonators including better timing accuracy resulting in excellent fragmentation and vibration control, field programmability and digital safety means. Several electronic detonator systems are available commercially today serving the surface, underground and seismic needs.

Jan 1, 2010

By Warnie Flint

According to statistics that have been compiled by the National Safety Council, U.S. Bureau of Mines, American Medical Association, and other agencies, accidental injuries cause more deaths than all the leading diseases. There isn't anyone who is immune to an accident. Probably the best way to describe an accident is to say that it is an unexpected happening. The automobile driver isn't expecting a terrifying crash, the electrician isn't expected to be electrocuted, nor is the coal miner expecting the roof to fall on him. All personal injuries will not result in death. There is a multitude of victims who are living proof of what accidents can mean to an individual. These are the victims who are blind, paralytic, missing arms, legs, etc. In most instances the earning power of these individuals is gone, and they are utterly dependent upon family or welfare. For many years there seemed to be an attitude that prevailed upon industrial America that accidents were inevitable, and that so many fatalities and injuries should be expected. This, of course, was utter nonsense. Since the birth of such organizations as The National Safety Council, American Society of Safety Engineers, and the U.S. Bureau of Mines, much progress has been made in reducing accidents. The enactment of compensation laws greatly contributed to the progress that has been made. Does this mean that all accidents can be prevented? Unfortunately, it doesn't. Human psychology indicates that men will work unsafely or perform unsafe acts for the following reasons: 1) Lack of knowledge or skill. 2) Conflicting motivations, such as: (a) to be more comfortable, (b) to save time or effort, (c) to be accepted by a group 3) Physical or mental condition.

Jan 1, 1973

By Warnie Flint

PERSONAL INJURY ACCIDENTS According to statistics compiled by the National Safety Council, US Bureau of Mines, American Medical Association, and other agencies, accidental injuries cause more deaths than all the leading diseases. NO one is immune to an accident. Probably the best way to describe an accident is to say that it is an unexpected happening. The automobile driver is not expecting a terrifying crash, the electrician does not expect to be electrocuted, nor is the coal miner expecting the roof to fall on him. All personal injuries will not result in death. There is a multitude of victims who are living proof of what accidents can mean to an individual-victims who are blind, paralytic, missing arms, legs, etc. In most instances the earning power of these individuals is gone, and they are utterly dependent upon family or welfare. For many years there seemed to be an attitude that prevailed in industrial America that accidents were inevitable, and that so many fatalities and injuries should be expected. This, of course, was utter nonsense. Since the birth of such organizations as The National Safety Council, American Society of Safety Engineers, and the US Bureau of Mines, much progress has been made in reducing accidents. The enactment of compensation laws greatly contributed to the progress that has been made. Does this mean that all accidents can be prevented? Unfortunately, it does not. Human psychology indicates that men will work unsafely or perform unsafe acts for the following reasons : 1) Lack of knowledge or skill. 2) Conflicting motivations, such as: (a) to be more comfortable, (b) to save time or effort, (c) to be accepted by a group. 3) Physical or mental condition. Nearly everyone desires his own safety, but not all individuals are willing to do what they know to do to insure their own safety.

Jan 1, 1981

By Warnie Flint

PERSONAL INJURY ACCIDENTS According to statistics compiled by the National Safety Council, US Bureau of Mines, American Medical Association, and other agencies, accidental injuries cause more deaths than all the leading diseases. NO one is immune to an accident. Probably the best way to describe an accident is to say that it is an unexpected happening. The automobile driver is not expecting a terrifying crash, the electrician does not expect to be electrocuted, nor is the coal miner expecting the roof to fall on him. All personal injuries will not result in death. There is a multitude of victims who arc living proof of what accidents can mean to an individual-victims who are blind, paralytic, missing arms, legs, etc. In most instances the earning power of these individuals is gone, and they arc utterly dependent upon family or welfare. For many years there seemed to be an attitude that prevailed in industrial America that accidents were inevitable, and that so many fatalities and injuries should be expected. This, of course, was utter nonsense. Since the birth of such organizations as The National Safety Council, American Society of Safety Engineers, and the US Bureau of Mines, much progress has been made in reducing accidents. The enactment of compensation laws greatly contributed to the progress that has been made. Does this mean that all accidents can be prevented? Unfortunately, it does not. Human psychology indicates that men will work unsafely or perform unsafe acts for the following reasons : 1) Lack of Knowledge or skill. 2) Conflicting motivations, such as: (a) to be more conformable, (b) to save time or effort, (c) to be accepted by a group. 3) Physical or mental condition. Nearly everyone desires his own safety, hut not all individuals are willing to do what they know to do to insure their own safety.

Jan 1, 1981

By Warnie Flint

According to statistics compiled by the National Safety Council, US Bureau of Mines, American Medical Association, and other agencies, accidental injuries cause more deaths than all the leading diseases. No one is immune to an accident. Probably the best way to describe an accident is to say that it is an unexpected happening. The automobile driver is not expecting a terrifying crash, the electrician does not expect to be electrocuted, nor is the coal miner expecting the roof to fall on him. All personal injuries will not result in death. There is a multitude of victims who are living proof of what accidents can mean to an individual-victims who are blind, paralytic, missing arms, legs, etc. In most instances the earning power of these individuals is gone, and they are utterly dependent upon family or welfare. For many years there seemed to be an attitude that prevailed in industrial America that accidents were inevitable, and that so many fatalities and injuries should be expected. This, of course, was utter nonsense. Since the birth of such organizations as The National Safety Council, American Society of Safety Engineers, and. the US Bureau of Mines, much progress has been made in reducing accidents. The enactment of compensation laws greatly contributed to the progress that has been made. Does this mean that all accidents can be prevented? Unfortunately, it does not. Human psychology indicates that men will work unsafely or perform unsafe acts for the following reasons : 1) Lack of knowledge or skill. 2) Conflicting motivations, such as: (a) to be more comfortable, (b) to save time or effort, (c) to be accepted by a group. 3) Physical or mental condition. Nearly everyone desires his own safety, but not all individuals are willing to do what they know to do to insure their own safety.

Jan 1, 1981

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Jan 1, 1938

By Yanis Miezitis, Gerald Mueller, Timothy F. McConachy, Ronald G. Sait, Keith R. Porritt, William J. McKay

In November 2004, Australia lodged with the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf possible new maritime boundaries in relation to Australia’s continental shelf extending beyond 200 nautical miles from the Territorial Sea Baseline (Colwell and Symonds, 2005). If agreed by the commission, just over half of Australia’s land mass will lie below the sea, and Australia will have one of the largest marine jurisdictions in the world (14.41 million km2). With this jurisdiction comes a responsibility to manage and sustain the marine environment (McConachy, 2006). Knowledge of minerals and their resource potential is part of this responsibility but is generally poorly known (McConachy, 2005).

Aug 24, 2006

By C. D. Breeds, F. E. Valencia, J. H. Pye

The "FIRST AUTOMATIC SHOTCRETE TECHNIQUE" (F.A.S.T.) system, provides safe, efficient methods of remotely lining, shafts/raises. Two systems are available; one system will be used to shotcrete a 3.04m (10-ft.) diameter ventilation raise at a mine in Mexico; the other system incorporating remote control and sensing devices will to used to shotcrete ventilation raises from 2.75-4.9m (9-16 ft.) in diameter. This paper describes development of the system, from idea to field use.

Jan 1, 1981

By S. M. Hsiung

In late September 1984, a longwall panel in West Virginia lost 60 powered supports when the face had advanced for 250 ft. from the setup entry. An in-mine investigation showed that it was a first weighting failure resulting from inadequate Support capacity. This paper presents the results of finite element modeling, which have led to a better understanding of the first weighting failure mechanism. The dynamic impact of the first weighting failure on the powered supports is analyzed. The optimum capacity for the powered supports in order to control the roof at face area under the geological condition is discussed.

Jan 1, 1984

It is a commonplace of our industry that prices of most minerals have been historically weak during the 1980s. The International Monetary Fund's index of prices of metals fell 25 per cent between 1980 and 1982, rose slightly in 1983, and has since fallen further. In December last year it was 37 per cent below its 1980 average. The few temporary exceptions to the mineral industry's malaise highlight the excess capacity, which largely explains the weakness of prices. The industry has painfully come to recognise that more satisfactory prices will not be restored until supply capability and demand move back into better balance. Mine capacity was installed in the expectation of much faster growth of demand than has occurred. For a variety of reasons mine and plant closures have been insufficient to restore equilibrium to the market-place. The industry may, therefore, have to resign itself to continued weak prices for some years more, at least by the yardstick of the 1970s. Growth rates of demand have slackened off in line with economic activity, and in response to continuing substitution and technological improvements. To the extent that the recent weakness of oil prices stimulates the industrial countries' activity, demand for non-fuel minerals may grow faster than most forecasters now predict. It is, however, much too early to say how long the weaker oil prices will persist, and even more difficult to estimate their probable effects. In typical post-war business cycles the usual response to recession was to batten down the hatches, and ride out the storm. Sooner or later, and probably sooner, demand resumed its previous trend path, and prices recovered. The market, in effect, bailed mines out of trouble; the more efficient could make attractive pre-tax profits whilst even the poor to mediocre could earn a satisfactory living. Prices rose at least as fast as general inflation, and in the early 1970s much faster. In retrospect those price rises of the early 1970s were historically abnormal but they did not appear so in the prevailing inflationary climate of the time. When the market failed in the early 1980s many of the hardest hit companies looked for scapegoats.

Jan 1, 1986