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By B E. Hall, D B. Kahler

"'Optimisation' has become a catchcry among many mining companies looking to tell the market how mining businesses will be improved and shareholder value increased. Consequently, the term 'optimisation' has been adopted by many service providers as they look to assist mining companies in achieving their objectives. But the explosion of services and products being offered with the label 'optimisation' has created some confusion. Mining companies ask for help in 'optimising' and service providers offer their assistance because they have a product that has the word 'optimisation' in its title. This is of course an over-simplification, but not by much! The authors' discussions in recent years with both mining companies and service providers have uncovered a number of very different definitions of optimisation.This paper provides a framework for identifying the scope and approach of different mining optimisation products and services, particularly the distinction between optimisation of components of the operation and the business as a whole. The different types of business optimisation are discussed, highlighting the failings of the mining industry's typical approach of strategy selection (as opposed to strategy optimisation). Mining business optimisation is discussed as a wicked problem, with the implication of this on how strategy optimisation models should be used and what the objectives of a business optimisation study should be.Case studies are also included to illustrate how fully flexible strategy optimisation models have been applied to assist decision-makers understand the impacts of changes in one part of the operation on the whole mining and treatment process, from geological models to the sale of product to customers.CITATION:Kahler, D B and Hall, B E, 2016. Strategic decision-making in mining – business optimisation using flexible evaluation models, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 215–225 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

By P Mitchell, S Pushpan, G Ferres, K Bobbermien, L Hudson

"Falling commodity prices and a rising supply surplus have ushered in a period of restraint in capital project investment across the global mining and metals sector. Competition for capital project funding has seen fewer projects progress through investment gates and a stronger focus on projects that deliver gains in capital productivity and strategic outcomes.Over the course of the 2015 financial year, EY conducted a study of 108 projects in the global mining and metals sector (EY analysis; Larsson and Ericsson, 2014; SNL Financial, 2015). The projects studied were at various life cycle stages and related to the development of copper, iron ore, gold, coal, nickel and other commodities. Each individual project investment exceeded US$1 B, and the studied group represented a cumulative investment value of US$367 B.The research found that the majority of projects were delayed and/or over budget when measured against the initial estimates made during the early stages of the project life cycle. Of the surveyed projects, 69 per cent were identified as facing cost overruns with an average overrun of 62 per cent above the initial estimate and 50 per cent reported schedule delays, even after remedial acceleration initiatives.The analysis found that budget and schedule overruns could be attributed to five key causes:project management factorsstakeholder conflictsresource constraintsregulatory, and policy-related challengesunfavourable external environment.Improving project delivery performance starts with successful planning, followed by rigorous management during delivery. From global experience on large and complex capital programs, EY has observed a consistent theme of underinvestment and a lack of focus in three often-overlooked but critical areas:implementing effective governance and reporting frameworks with lead indicators that reliably flag emerging risks while they can still be mitigatedallocating adequate cost and time contingency to account for risks across the life cycleenhancing the value of contingency by aligning contingency plans with scenario plans.This paper explores the surprising findings of the study, proposes a root cause model and examines key considerations in applying these critical enabling techniques.CITATION:Hudson, L, Mitchell, P, Ferres, G, Bobbermien, K and Pushpan, S, 2016. Are your megaproject schedules and costs under – or out of – control?, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 75–85 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

By P J. Fairfield

"This paper reflects on the author’s experiences in undertaking mining studies and reviewing mining projects and technical reports, particularly over the past five years, and the impact of recent changes in reporting standards and listing requirements pertaining to mining-related evaluation and valuation exercises. It also discusses contemporary changes in the expectations of the investment community and the implications for the role of the technical specialist in providing advice to such stakeholders.Not for the first time in history, the resources industry has experienced a significant downturn after a period of strong, sustained growth in line with the traditional view of the cyclical nature of commodity markets. The resource industry is currently faced with capital austerity in the wake of projects ‘failing’ (not delivering to expectations). In response, the industry has experienced changes in investment behaviour (slowing of investment) and an increasing regulatory burden as stakeholders seek a greater understanding of mining project risks.This paper discusses this response and uses case studies to highlight the key learnings (perhaps re-learnt) by the industry. It also discusses the challenges faced by technical specialists in communicating the results of technical and valuation studies to the investment community.As investors seek to take advantage of the current stage in the investment cycle, the key challenge of the technical specialist is to effectively communicate the uncertainty in technical assumptions, risks and opportunities that drive project value.CITATION:Fairfield, P J, 2016. Managing expectations – from buyer beware to buyer be aware, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 66–74 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

By D J. Logan, J Jackson

"As of 1 December 2014, the 2012 edition of the JORC Code requires Ore Reserves to be defined by studies at the pre-feasibility or feasibility level. This paper examines how the pathway for most mining developments is determined in the Pre-Feasibility Study and how a trade-off must be made between the need to make the best decision, the constraints of limited time and resources, and the level of the project’s accuracy and uncertainty in terms of value. Issues considered include framing the scope of the study, planning for robust decision-making and ensuring effective communication between the diverse disciplines within the team.An inherent conflict exists between the immediate value added to a mining business from an increase in ore reserves resulting from a ‘quick’ Pre-Feasibility Study and the long-term value of pursuing a development strategy based on proper investigation and evaluation of the options. Recognition and resolution of this conflict is necessary if a project is to progress into future development stages, both in a timely manner and with the optimal development alternative and strategy.The challenge for project developers and those conducting the Pre-Feasibility Study is to understand what the key deliverables are (ie an Ore Reserve statement, option selection, business evaluation, forward work plan or risks) and how to follow good practice to ensure that these deliver value.CITATION:Logan, D J and Jackson, J, 2016. The pre-feasibility study – big choices, little time, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 122–132 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

By A M. Ebbels

"Underground mine scheduling decision-making has been based on production requirements, equipment productivities and the mine planner’s instincts on the best scheduling strategy for the mine to optimise the net present value (NPV) of a project.In the last few years, innovative software has been developed to optimise underground schedules based on NPV. The schedule optimisation tool (SOT) allows the user to set up scenarios based on grade, metal content, capital and operating costs.This paper discusses the results of two case studies undertaken using the SOT software to optimise the NPV of the projects.In each case study, the SOT software has been applied in two ways:using the original mine planner’s scenario and determining whether the NPV could be improved by changing resource capacitieschanging the scheduling goals to determine whether a different mining strategy would have a better NPV outcome.The outcomes of the case studies demonstrate that the mine layout and design were contributing factors to the overall improvement of the NPV and that SOT has a more noticeable impact on the NPV of projects where less sequence constraints are required, such as geotechnical sequencing and access development.CITATION:Ebbels, A M, 2016. Optimising underground mining strategies, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 60–65 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

By M A. Noppé

"Investors and other stakeholders assessing the risk, opportunity and relative value associated with a resource project need to appreciate the project in its correct context. Errors, omissions, biased reporting or conflicting information in project reporting may lead to a misinterpretation of technical and financial results, resulting in biased estimates or assumptions on project value.This paper provides a simple ‘Resource Project Framework’ for presenting a project’s status that may be readily benchmarked against other similar projects and to illustrate the stages required to advance the project outcomes to higher levels of certainty. The framework draws on definitions and guidelines readily available in various resource industry reporting codes and public company reporting requirements.The framework assesses three key areas for placing a resource project in its correct relative context, namely:the project development stagethe confidence in the Exploration Results, Mineral Resources and/or Ore Reservesthe level of accuracy, precision and confidence in the technical and economic studies supporting the reported results or options for the project.The application of the Resource Project Framework is illustrated using two project examples, one from publicly reported company project releases and the other for two development projects.CITATION:Noppé, M A, 2016. A framework for presenting and benchmarking resource projects, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 260–274 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

By J Coombes

"In today’s challenging climate of reduced staffing, limited funding and uncertain markets, we are called on to operate more productively and ‘be more innovative’. As an industry, we are quick to identify our practice areas as a mark of our role in the machinery of the mine value chain. We proudly note our profession – ‘geologist’, ‘mining engineer’ or ‘accountant’ – and demarcate our responsibilities and even our physical space. We even subdivide our disciplines into sacred entities such as ‘logging geologist’, ‘resource geologist’ or ‘structural geologist’ to prevent any blurring as though somehow the confusion will cost valuable disciplinary ground. How can we function professionally to heed the call to be more productive and more innovative?The purpose of this paper is to underscore what is expected from project evaluation, examine the ways in which we work as an industry and explore alternatives used in other industries and environments.The paper begins with a summary of project evaluation expectations and the ways in which disciplines typically interconnect when conducting project evaluations. Next, the paper examines alternative work frameworks and making a distinction between multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary frameworks. In-practice examples of these frameworks in alternative industries and contexts provide evidence for application as well as an opportunity to examine their pros and cons.The paper closes with a call to re-examine working practices in the mining industry, with a view to enhancing productivity and heeding the call for greater innovation.CITATION:Coombes, J, 2016. Transcending the mining discipline divide – multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary?, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 2–10 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

By R Knight

"In project evaluation there are two matters of keen interest to non-executive directors: the process by which an investment recommendation is reached, as well as the investment itself, as presented. It is sometimes mistakenly believed that Boards of directors are interested only in the result. That is not so. The process by which project evaluations are derived and socialised with the Board is as important as the result, sometimes more so.Setting aside the gloomy predictions of the doomsayers and looking through short-term volatility in supply and demand, the overall availability of mineral resources more often than not exceeds demand. There are in reality more development projects in prospect at any one time than are needed to meet the market. Only the fittest will prosper, although some others may survive.Optimism springs eternal in the mining industry and every project promoter, executive or entrepreneur has a convincing project development case. Some will create value for shareholders, but the historical evidence suggests that many will fail to meet the expectations set in their evaluation.Boards of directors make the final decision to invest, or not, in a new mine. Knowledge is power, and on that basis the balance of power favours management. Management has the facts (or in some cases, what passes for fact) and the passion to invest. The non-executives have the power of approval – yes or no – but before making a decision directors must demonstrate due diligence, the essential precursor to project approval.Management has a vital part to play in facilitating that due diligence process and in encouraging the independent thought processes of the Board. A closed approach by management fosters a negative, risk-averse attitude on the part of the Board. One that encourages an understanding of the rigour of the project evaluation process and the robustness of the result will allow directors to understand better the implications of their decision.CITATION:Knight, R, 2016. Project evaluation – a non-executive director’s perspective, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 11–19 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

By L I. Rozman

"There have always been development projects that fall short of expectations. In the last decade, we have seen more than the usual number of mining and oil/gas development projects taking significantly longer to develop and costing materially more than expected. The recent resource-equity market slump proves that investors are now far more cautious about investing new capital in the mineral and petroleum resources sector.What have we learned since 2005? Why have projects missed their targets? Why do investors often feel misled?Valuation of a project and the estimation of value is a more complex process than the evaluation of the merits of project development. The merit of project development can be clear from a prefeasibility evaluation, but this is no reason to skip the rigour of a feasibility study. The valuation of any project that is developed with any added risk should be discounted for this added risk.The development of a project impacts on other stakeholders, and the indirect cost of these impacts can have material implications for the cost structure, time and ultimate valuation of the project for its financial backers. The development of new projects (and thereby supply) can also have an impact on commodity prices, and therefore an impact on returns for financial backers.This paper will provide commentary on the author’s experiences and observations as a project developer and operator for 25 years, before becoming a project financier a decade ago.CITATION:Rozman, L I, 2016. Project evaluation and valuation – an investor’s golden rule, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 31–36 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

By J Evans-Wheeler

"The mandate of the 2005 VALMIN Code to provide ‘(all) reliable, thorough, understandable material information required by investors and their advisers when making investment decisions’ requires that due diligence for tenure be full and thorough. Yet a published due diligence would often appear to be simply a list of tenures allegedly held without any commitment as to the standing of the tenure as safe and secure or otherwise.The value of due diligence for tenure, as mandated in the 2012 JORC Code and the 2005 VALMIN Code, must focus on compliance rather than simply on ‘vital statistics’. Enforcement in every jurisdiction in Australia focuses on penalties (some more harsh than others) for non-compliance, which, in turn and most importantly, reflects directly on security of tenure. Some 22 Acts (on average) impinge on security of tenure and fundamentally underpin the security of any mineral asset.This paper will outline regulatory processes to demonstrate how tenure compliance is achieved and argue that the rigorous application of good practices in tenure evaluation will lead to more of this information being made available on a regular basis.The paper will then focus on further practical examples of tenure compliance failures, the application of these to the requirements of the JORC and VALMIN Codes and due diligence that failed to fulfil the mandate. Examples will be given that alerted other professionals using the JORC Code to complex geological and mining situations of which they were unaware in their valuations.Finally, the author will make a personal plea for tenure to be considered at the commencement of any reporting process.CITATION:Evans-Wheeler, J, 2016. The VALMIN code and tenure compliance – not just a list, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 112–121 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

"Recognising that the mining industry is wedded to the break-even cut-off grade rather than a cut-off grade that optimises value, the author examines some perils and pitfalls in the use of break-even grades that lead to what the author calls ‘negatively geared ore reserves’.Negatively geared ore reserves occur when a portion of the ore reserves actually has a negative value and is effectively being subsidised by the more profitable portion of the ore reserves. This situation is generally difficult to detect with the level of information available to the public investor. The ore reserves can still be quite profitable in total, but now possess a level of risk that may not be appreciated.The risk profile (financial risk) of a negatively geared ore reserve is far greater than for a non-negatively geared ore reserve. Like a negatively geared investment property in a falling property market (for readers familiar with the Australian tax minimisation investment strategy), when the price of a commodity falls, a company that possesses a negatively geared ore reserve loses value at a magnified rate relative to a company that has a neutral or positively geared ore reserve. In the extreme case of a major commodity price reduction, as happened with the gold price in mid-2013, the negatively geared ore reserve can easily become negative value in total, not just in part.The negatively geared ore reserve is sometimes intentional – for instance in order to increase published ore reserve tonnages and meet the CEO’s key performance indicators – but is also often unintentional, resulting from various errors in the break-even calculation. Common errors in calculating a break-even grade include using fixed metallurgical recoveries, not including allowances for ideal laboratory versus real plant results, ignoring available operational data and using modal rather than mean parameter values in cost and performance calculations.This paper examines a common value distribution profile in many ore reserves and the effect of common break-even grade errors on this profile.CITATION:Poniewierski, J, 2016. Negatively geared ore reserves – a major peril of the break-even cut-off grade, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 236–247 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

By E C. Holloway

"The financial valuation of mining assets has a number of fundamental differences to the valuation of many other asset groupings. One such difference is that typically, the greater proportion of both the cost and revenue sides of the cash flow are inherently governed by systemic market forces.As a result, the range of outcomes for the valuation of each mining asset is more unpredictable, with higher levels of risk and uncertainty. In contrast, the management function of many other non-mining businesses or industry groups can control at least a portion of the cash flow by maintaining the margin or controlling the sales price. The management teams of mining businesses and operations typically have limited options, and are thus price-takers for both costs and revenues. As mining is an inherently cyclical industry, large, long-life operations can exist through several price cycles, making valuation both subjective and challenging.The outcomes of both static- and stochastic-based valuations, as well as the internal probabilities of the associated cash flow statements, are significantly impacted when the correlations between the appropriate parameters are quantified, modelled and incorporated into the valuation framework. The appropriate parameters for correlation modelling primarily include those that are governed by systemic market forces. Applying this process results in a different risk profile for the asset by allowing the risks resulting from systemic market movements to be more accurately quantified and then objectively minimised. This process also reduces the level of residual uncertainty in the valuation outcome.This paper presents a valuation methodology to pragmatically incorporate this level of valuation sophistication and statistically quantify the associated increase in the level of confidence of the valuation outcomes reported.CITATION:Holloway, E C, 2016. Correlated valuation methodology, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 181–200 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

By S G. Gemell

"The financial model is an integral component of any project evaluation based on mineral resources, ore reserves and (at least internally) exploration targets. Given the unity of purpose for preparing financial models for project evaluation purposes, the diversity of both format and content of the finalised models is surprising. Many models are prepared by staff or consultants who are comfortable with a particular format that may be used for other purposes, such as budget preparation or financial reporting. It is natural in these situations that the practitioner will take these models and adapt them to the purpose. The end result may or may not succeed in providing a clear, accurate and sufficiently detailed view of the project’s economic viability.When preparing a model, the practitioner should be cognisant of the interpretation and review, or audit, process. The auditor may be a consultant or employee of a bank, potential equity provider or of the project sponsor itself. Depending upon the scale of the project and the level of participation of the entity that the auditor represents, the financial model will be interrogated more or less rigorously. In any event, the end user will require the model to permit easy change of inputs and will wish to confirm that such change is appropriately and thoroughly transmitted throughout.Accordingly, there are some ‘dos and don’ts’ that can be readily applied in the creation of the financial model that will greatly assist the end user, not just in the change of inputs, but also in reviewing the model’s integrity. The less time and effort required by an auditor in this regard is reflected directly in the cost of the review process.CITATION:Gemell, S G, 2016. Financial modelling with the auditor in mind, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 172–180 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

By D Hunter, N Cusworth, J Miller

"Recent project failures have called into question the use and relevance of benchmarking and independent reviews, forcing a rethink of traditional processes and procedures.With cost estimates and schedules dramatically varying from lows seen around the global financial crisis to peaks experienced in the recent mining boom, benchmarking has ranged between essential and misleading.Profound shifts are now underway in future project delivery strategies as the market moves away from cost-plus engineering, procurement and construction management. The current trends in project implementation are to utilise more lump-sum design and construct or fixed-price supply and construct contracts. This trend will remove transparency in detailed cost information by reducing the sources and clarity of cost data.Independent peer reviews (IPRs) of studies and investment recommendations performed over the last decade have both failed to prevent flawed or deficient projects from proceeding to approval and funding, and been successful in ensuring that owners did not proceed with doomed investments.In recent times, it has been recognised by some owners, contractors and engineers that traditional benchmarking checks or IPRs, or a combination of both, will not necessarily produce reliable assessments of study conclusions and of the forecasts of project outcomes. To be of value, the benchmarking process now also needs to recognise the highly volatile responses from the engineering and construction industry to the current and future markets for their services.Similarly, reviewers who draw upon benchmarks of past project experiences on an understanding of the things that shaped and influenced their outcomes need to be more aware of how a future dynamic market may impact the outcome of the projects and raise warning flags accordingly.With the commodity cycle currently approaching what is hoped is its bottom, ensuring that benchmarking and independent reviews evolve into reliable, transparent and worthwhile processes becomes even more important. This can only be achieved with more transparent and analytical benchmarking and business-orientated reviews that both recognise and calculate the impacts of dynamic markets on project implementation.CITATION:Cusworth, N, Hunter, D and Miller, J, 2016. The role of benchmarking and independent reviews, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 249–259 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

By R Jacobs

"The Jaguar project is relatively unique in that it was evaluated, financed, built and operated to completion within the last ten years, providing the opportunity to holistically review and reconcile expectations against the actual outcomes. It is a case study that allows wider conclusions to be drawn with respect to the risks and opportunities involved with project evaluation and execution.Jaguar is located in the Leonora Mining District of Western Australia and was commissioned in mid-2007 as an underground accessed, single high-grade volcanic-hosted massive sulfide (VHMS) deposit with an on-site concentrator, producing copper and zinc concentrates exported via the Port of Geraldton to South-East Asian markets.The feasibility study (FS) had several iterations (JML, 2005a); the last dated July 2005 was specifically targeted to secure project funding, and summarised the reserves-only portion of the resource and its planned exploitation. The commissioning of the mine was the transition for the owner Jabiru Metals NL from junior explorer to producer and the project was the dominant asset of the company.Jaguar operated through several significant deviations from the linear project plan set out in the FS, including the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), a corporate takeover and disruption to the mine plan from the onset of material geotechnical issues. Whilst the GFC or mining disruption were not specifically predicted in the FS or peer reviews, the generic effects of the events were assessed in the project risk assessment and they influenced subsequent management decisions. In parallel to the internal project-specific risks, the short planned life of Jaguar was a risk to the continuation of the corporate entity which was being addressed by significant investment into brownfields exploration to extend or replicate the project, and ultimately added value such that attracted a corporate takeover.Holistically, the project delivered the returns predicted in the FS, but in a much different guise than was expected. This paper will describe the reality of operations compared with the study predictions and expectations through the perspective of the project and corporate risk assessment.CITATION:Jacobs, R, 2016. Jaguar base metals project case study – has reality reflected the study?, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 86–97 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

By J A. Wells, K G. Thomas, R F. Dewhirst

"One of the contributing factors to the extreme cost escalation in the first decade of the 21st century was the increase in the amount and cost of engineering work that went into studies and projects. Various reasons for this were identified, including unsatisfactory productivity due to a shortage of experienced/qualified engineers, the increased complexity and infrastructure requirements of many projects due to location, metallurgy that is more challenging and increasing environmental and social requirements. These conditions often led to unsatisfactory project results in terms of cost and schedule blowouts and created a loss of confidence – both internally and externally – in the industry’s ability to complete projects on time and on budget.Technical fundamentals aside, the experience and effectiveness of project teams has had, and continues to have, a major impact on project cost, schedule and ramp-up to nameplate capacity and operating parameters. There are unfortunately too many examples of where project teams have not been as effective as they could or should have been, all to the ultimate detriment of the project.Using the authors’ extensive experience on both owner’s and engineer’s teams, this paper discusses some of the main reasons for suboptimal team, and hence project, performance and offers thoughts on how best to build and maintain project teams. The analysis and conclusions drawn are built around the Tuckman model of group development known as ‘forming-storming-norming-performing’, which was first proposed some 50 years ago. Given the importance of good teamwork to project success, understanding how project teams grow and become efficient and productive is an essential part of good project management that should receive more attention.CITATION:Dewhirst, R F, Thomas, K G and Wells, J A, 2016. Building and maintaining effective project teams, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 38–48 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

By P B. Card

"The website www.economicevaluation.com.au, which had its origins at the Project Evaluation Conference 2009, provides a free way for industry professionals to teach themselves economic evaluation. At its core is a set of fast-moving modules and three worked examples.The website recognises that economic evaluation is a discipline with a hierarchy of three levels:decision-makingevaluating the project/businesshands-on modelling.There are a set of modules for each level that describe the concepts and activities in detail. These emphasise that the most important and rewarding work is the evaluation of Level 2. The economic model created in Level 3 is merely a working tool and should not become a sophisticated ‘trophy’ in Excel that only one or two people can comfortably use.Hands-on modelling contains three sets of practices designed to make any model rigorous and intuitive so that it can be easily understood and used by others in the project team. Even if the model develops into a long, detailed and complex workbook, it should remain easy to follow and be intuitive. The website advocates freedom to devise any architecture that best suits the project under study, but promotes rigour through the following practices:four cash streams and graphsthree architectures – concept, prefeasibility and feasibilitysix principles.The modules in the Level 2 evaluation use conversational language to describe in detail the broad range of activities needed to properly understand and characterise a project/business. It stresses that net present value is nothing more than the mathematical treatment of a whole set of opinions, is not an absolute truth and is only a fraction of the evaluation process. The modules describe in detail the range of economic metrics that should be computed and the full spectrum of equally important characterisations required to make the decision in Level 3.CITATION:Card, P B, 2016. Teach yourself economic evaluation, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 160–171 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

By S Love, M Anderson, M Boland

"The high rate of failure of new mine developments to meet feasibility study expectations has been the subject of many fine technical papers. Yet failure rates remain stubbornly high.Similarly, the common occurrence of disastrous acquisitions resulting from failed due diligence on projects is well known. Yet such mistakes continue to be made.The authors argue that project and due diligence failure are caused at least partly by cognitive biases. These biases pervade decision-making throughout project evaluations.A wider understanding of these biases (and their effects) is necessary. Only then can mitigating actions be taken.The opportunity for this wider understanding exists. A number of best-selling books have been published on the topic in recent years. With wider understanding of key concepts and terms, cognitive biases can be recognised and discussed. They can also be challenged and mitigated.The authors believe that these concepts should be entry-level, required knowledge for anyone evaluating, developing, reviewing or financing mining projects.Perhaps the most prevalent biases in project evaluation failure are the ‘over-optimism’ biases. In particular, the planning fallacy and confirmation bias.The anchoring effect is also pervasive. This bias propagates unrealistic assumptions from scoping and prefeasibility studies through to so-called definitive feasibility studies. Unrecognised anchoring biases also undermine the validity of many ‘independent’ due diligence reviews. They are also prevalent in corporate acquisitions.The availability heuristic refers to a mental shortcut that can lead to a number of biases. One of these is the narrative fallacy. The mind constructs coherent narratives and opinions, regardless of the amount and quality of the information that support them. Narrative fallacy commonly occurs in the evaluation of social and political risk. Another is disaster neglect, which is especially common in the failure to assess risks associated with tailings management.This paper outlines the relevance of these biases to mine project evaluations. It also provides examples where the authors have observed their effects.CITATION:Love, S, Boland, M and Anderson, M, 2016. Influence of cognitive biases on project evaluation, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 226–235 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

"Cash flow modelling during project evaluation is enhanced when probabilistic methods are applied to the inputs. One of the important inputs is the quarterly production profile. Typically, the steady-state production profile provided to project evaluation practitioners is deterministic, with each quarter the same as every other quarter. This is unrealistic as actual production profiles from existing mines exhibit a range or quarter-on-quarter variance. Monte Carlo stochastic simulation of the production profile can be used to provide a range of possible outcomes, but how are these ranges selected? This paper describes the use of quarterly production variance from a large database of mines worldwide as a benchmark to inform the appropriate selection of ranges. The coefficient of variation is used to rank the production from mines, with quartile analysis applied to indicate industry best, median and worst variation. Due diligence of existing mines and evaluation of future production performance can be quantitatively assessed using this approach. Examples of the effect on value are provided.CITATION:Stewart, C A, 2016. Production variance benchmarks and their use in project evaluation and due diligence, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 201–213 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016

By R Jacobs, J Yeates

"The Stockman base metals project is situated in State Forest in the alpine area of East Gippsland, Victoria, adjacent to a National Park and within the headwaters of a major Ramsar-listed wetland catchment and the Murray-Darling River system. Site topography is steep, and elevated (650 m – 1200 m above sea level), and subject to circa 1 m annual rainfall, with occasional winter snowfall. The project consists of two volcanogenic massive sulfide (VMS) deposits to be mined by underground methods and treated in a 1.0 Mt/a central concentrator to produce copper and zinc concentrates for export over a ten year operational life. New resource projects are rare in Victoria. Recognising the sensitive setting, planning for the Stockman Project, which is now in the advanced permitting stage, has focused on balancing economic, environmental and social outcomes to ensure social licence to operate is secured and can be maintained. This has involved close attention to triple bottom line (TBL) risks and outcomes. Stockman has successfully gained State and Federal approvals via the Environmental Effects Statement process. The process of obtaining these approvals has required close attention to effective stakeholder involvement, and management of a lengthy and difficult approvals process, which is still to be finally concluded. This paper is a case study of the process of that permitting and the issues encountered to date. Key learnings from the experience have included: successful approvals require close attention to much more than just the project and its technical aspects and physical setting – effective stakeholder involvement and endorsement is critical the differing consultation requirements for local, regional and government stakeholders, to design and plan implementation of a project to meet TBL objectives, and to gain social licence to operate within the Victorian approvals process, the need for an effective lead government agency with policy authority dealing with material policy change requiring post-closure financial sureties estimating realistic permitting time and cost during the project evaluation phase. CITATION: Jacobs, R and Yeates, J, 2016. Stockman base metals project – sustainability, social licence to operate and permitting lessons learnt, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2016, pp 98–110 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne)."

Mar 8, 2016