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By Ted Schwinden

It's my pleasure to welcome the Rocky Mountain Coal Institute to Montana. Now that you've ended a 74 year history of meeting outside our borders, I hope you'll be back more often. Even if I can't convince you to come back before 2060, when another 74 years will be up, I'm confident the Kalispell and Flathead Lake area will do the persuading for me. In recent weeks, I've made a number of speeches around the state pointing out just how wrong the revenue projections in Montana's state government made in April of '85 were when we came to April of '86. Since the middle of this month, Montana's legislators have been in Helena struggling to balance a state budget that, by the end of fiscal year '87, threatened to be some $88 million in the red. Other western states reliant on natural resource and agricultural economies have found themselves caught in the same deflationary spiral. The "window of opportunity" I proposed and the 1985 Montana Legislature passed, couldn't have been opened at a more difficult time. What was envisioned as an incentive to expand Montana's coal production, and our tax base, ran aground on low oil prices and excess hydroelectric power. De- spite the one-third severance tax rebate offered on new coal production, year-to-date figures published in the June 2nd Coal Week show that production in Montana is down almost 10 per- cent from last year. Again, we're not alone. Production in Wyoming is down 8 percent and in North Dakota, it has dropped 13 percent. An over- all 3 percent production decline in western states looks even worse when contrasted against a 12 percent increase for your eastern competitors. Montana's "window of opportunity" had the potential to be a significant signal to your industry. That potential was quickly tempered by the inability of Arab nations to stabilize world energy prices. If any of us had forgotten, the last twelve months have reminded western states that the well-being of our natural resource economies has a tremendous impact on the ability of all levels of government to provide services. The past year has also driven home that in the world of business and in the business of the world, risk-taking is still the name of the game. The Western Governors recognize the problems facing this industry - and our states - and we're prepared to fight for the future of western coal. In the past two decades, legitimate environmental concerns have created a vast body of new legislation affecting coal producers. The industry has been required to meet new reclamation standards - tough regulations relating to ground water, air quality and wildlife habitat. To the industry's credit, coal companies have hired professionals with the technical know-how to do it right. Rather than considering reclamation laws to be an unreasonable burden, today's coal company is more likely to view its reclamation efforts as a source of corporate pride. In a sense, the industry and the agencies which regulate it have matured together . . . although at times OSM is reluctant to admit that either of us capable of or willing to play by the rules. Certainly some abuses exist and OSM's oversight has been helpful in ensuring parity between those states willing to comply and those that would rather defy federal law. Nonetheless, penalizing the more modem and responsible western coal industry for abuses that occur elsewhere is both unfair and counterproductive. Federal penalties range from "cruel and unusual" reporting requirements to the proposed electricity tax that would effectively force utilities and ratepayers who have already met the sulphur emission standards to subsidize those who have dodged their cleanup responsibilities. As a member of the Alliance for Acid Rain Control, I have joined corporate leaders, academicians, environmental representa-

Jan 1, 1986

By Alan R. Buehler

A mineral survey of the 67, 110-acre Raven?s Eye WSA (Wilderness Study Area) in the north-central Snake River Plain of Idaho was conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Mines in 1985, at the request of the Bureau of Land Management. The WSA is in Blaine and Lincoln Counties; the northwest corner is about 1 mile east of Carey, 10. A search of county mining claim records indicated that no claims have been located in the WSA. Basaltic lava is the only rock type exposed within the WSA. A platy variety of lava (slab pahoehoe) occurs that is produced from other lava fields in southern Idaho. The material is marketed as decorative stone, used for wall veneers, and retails for approximately $125/ton. Within the W5A, approximately 18,000 tons of indicated reserves are concentrated in two areas, and a total of 12,000 tons of indicated subeconomic resources were found at six other localities. An additional 10,000 tons of inferred subeconomic resources are unevenly distributed over the remainder of the WSA.

Jan 1, 1986

By Janet S. Springer

Anomalous gold concentrations in carbonaceous material have given rise to misconceptions about the role of carbon in gold depo its. Some hydrocarbon and carbon-rich black muds may how gold contents raised to 100 time above background by mechanical entrapment. urface effect in fine ediments. and metabolic fixing of gold by micro-organisms. Such concentrates, however, are 10 times too low to be economic. Studie in the Archean of Ontario show that graphite schi t are not the protore to an economically workable gold deposit. A later event of gold introduction ha been uperimposed on the initial low concentrations. Gold enrichment i localized by reduction at vein margins where hear plane . the conduits of mineralization, cut carbonaceou horizons.

Jan 1, 1986

By Jairo Londono Arango

El presente texto realiza un diagnóstico sobre la producción y el mercado del carbón colombiano a través de los datos utilizados del último censo minero realizado en 1983, donde de describe los sistemas de explotación, nivel de tecnificación y los rendimientos alcanzados.

Jul 1, 1985

By Adam H. Zimmerman

Introduction Noranda, like similar businesses, is suffering the pain of previously unheard of currency relationships, a cost structure built in better days, and conditions of gross oversupply possible in almost any commodity. Indeed, it does seem like the worst of all possible worlds is out there before us. To understand a Canadian natural resource company, you must know how the country is organized. So far as natural resources are concerned, Canada is not Canada. Canada is 10 provinces and each own the resources situated therein. Thus, the conditions of extraction, exploitation, and operation are all set by the province, while the conditions of trade and currency are set by the Federal government. This means that what may be the rule in Newfoundland may not be the rule in Manitoba or British Columbia. The second thing is that the Canadian currency has been a satellite of the US dollar for a long time. This means that we hold the unenviable and unjustified position of being the country with the second strongest currency in the world. What this has meant to us is what it has meant to an American operator. Since 1980, a pound of copper fetches 214% more for a Chilean than it does for us and a pound of zinc 115% more for a Belgian. From an American point of view, Canada is favored because its dollar is valued at 25% to 30% less than the U.S. However, because of industrial indiscretions in years past, Canada has a locked in labor cost disadvantage that is very hard to cope with. Canada has a unique situation with its labor unions. Many of the unions are, or have been, internationals and therefore gained undue strength in early days. Canada has a third political party of socialist persuasion. It is entirely funded by dues from laor union members. Thus, we have a politicized workforce. And finally, we have a public service that has the right to strike. This had made the public service unions by far the strongest now in Canada. What this means to the mining industry is that there is somebody out there blazing the trail. The unrelenting power of these public service unions probably creates a climate more conducive to excessive wage settlements in industry than would otherwise be the case. Study, Work, and Pray So what do we do when times get tough? In simple terms, we study a lot, we work harder, and we pray a great deal. We study a lot in terms of learning hitherto unknown strengths and weaknesses of our products, processes, and operations. We work hard in the sense that we do everything possible to improve our productivity. And we pray a lot because, so far, anything else we have done has not been enough. Some years ago, Noranda recognized that its principal base and precious metal operations were diminishing. To provide for the future, we should branch out into other resource type operations. These might be countercyclical and also perhaps a little more permanent. For this reason, Noranda entered the potash, aluminum, and forest products businesses. This, of course, was a 'brilliant' strategy that was much applauded in its early days. We built an excellent potash mine, the smallest inte-

Jan 6, 1985

By E. D. Attanasi, J. H. DeYoung

Mineral exploration activity in the US suffered through another depressed year in 1984. And continued strength in precious metals (and possibly industrial minerals) exploration failed to make up for declines in other minerals. 1984 offered little solace for the explorationist. But some new data on mineral exploration provided better statistics for analysts of US mineral exploration trends. The Society of Economic Geologists (SEG) published data from its survey of 1980,1981, and 1982 exploration by US and Canadian companies - 96 companies responded (Barber and Muessig, 1984). In addition, a Mining Engineering (April 1984 p. 345) article by Emerson and Ivosevic presented their data on annual exploration expenditures in the US for gold and for all minerals from 1961 through 1983. A review of 1984 domestic exploration and development activities reported in several industry journals indicates that almost 90% of those projects were directed at gold and silver deposits. Statistics on 1984 exploration expenditures are not available. But some industry observers believe that precious metals accounted for an even larger share of industry's exploration budget in 1984 than in 1983. According to the data of Emerson and Ivosevic (ME, April 1984, p. 349), gold exploration expendi-

Jan 5, 1985

By Stanley Lefond

The health of the industrial minerals industry appears to be improving year by year. In fact, preliminary information suggests that only three commodities (asbestos, bromine, and sulfur-other) failed to show a production gain in 1984 over 1983. In 1983, 10 commodities failed to post gains and six remained constant. The total value of industrial mineral production in 1984 was $16.7 billion, up $1.4 billion from 1983. Cement, clays, gypsum, and crushed stone production increased. Since these are used in housing and construction, this suggests these industries are moving out of their recent doldrums. Barite and clay production also improved in 1984. Local US barite production, however, still has a long way to go to attain the 1981 high of 2.6 Mt (2.9 million st). Barite imports remain high. But they are not as high as the 1982 importation of 2 Mt (2.3 million st). Bentonite production in 1984 increased 20% in volume and 25% in value over the previous year. This suggests improvement in the drilling industry and an increase in demand for iron ore pelletizing grades. All in all, the industrial mineral industry is alive and well. And it shows signs of great improvement in the next few years. Many thanks to those industrial mineral technical committee members for their assistance in assembling this industrial minerals review: M. F. Dibble, H. W. Allen, G. H. Gallup, S. G. Ampian, D. W. L. Spry, H. G. Fleshman, and L. J. Czel.

Jan 5, 1985

By P. Rosten

US mine production of iron ore in 1984 showed some improvements compared to 1983. But reduced demand from the iron and steel industry caused temporary shutdowns of many iron ore mines and pelletizing plants. US raw steel production in 1984 was slightly above 1983, but still at a depressed level. Production was 83 Mt (92 million st), compared with 77 Mt (85 million st) in 1983 and 68 Mt (75 million st) in 1982. Two major production trends continued in 1984. They were the increased production from electric furnaces and the growing use of continuous casters. Electric furnace production included 33.2% of the steel poured in 1984, compared with 31.5% in 1983. Continuous casting was used for 39% of 1984 steel production, compared with 32.1% in 1983. Statistical Process Control Statistical Process Control (SPC) has taken on new proportions in the iron ore and steelmaking industries within the last year. This mathematical technique is used to monitor, control, evaluate, and analyze a manufacturing process. The technique charts variability of important quality parameters. Training and adaptation of SPC techniaues for process control have been initiated at Inland, Steel's Minorca, Pickands-Mather's Hibtac, Cleveland-Cliff's Empire and Sherman operations, and at Reserve Mining. One of these operations has requested its bentonite supplier provide SPC charts on quality specifications. Some of the steelmaking operations (Inland Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Dofasco, LTV Steel, National Steel, Stelco, Weirton Steel, and Wheeling-Pittsburgh) have set up SPC programs within their operations. And they also have insisted that some of their suppliers use SPC. Plant Shutdowns The permanent closure of Stelco's Griffith mine at Red Lake, Ontario, has been delayed by one year. This gives employees more time to adjust. The mine is now set to close in April 1986, instead of April 1985. Sidbec (Canadian government) and its other partners (including British Steel Corp., Quebec Cartier Mining, and US Steel) closed its iron mining operations at Gagnon, Quebec. The pellet plant has been leased to Quebec Cartier. New Iron Ore Operations The massive Carajas iron ore project in Brazil is scheduled to come onstream in Jan. 1986. It is to achieve full-scale commercial shipments by July of that year. The 66% iron crude ore requires only crushing and screening before shipment. The product consists of 83% sinter feed and 17% coarse ore. Annual production capacity will be 32 Mt (35 million st) when the project is completed. Principal customer for the ore is Nippon Carajas Iron Ore Co., a consortium of Japanese steel mills. The Arab Iron & Steel Co. (AISCO) has started up a $US300 million, 3.6 Mt/a (4 million stpy) iron ore pelletizing plant built by Kobe Steel Ltd., at Al Hidd-hide in Bahrain. By 1986, this grate-kiln-cooler plant will supply high quality iron ore pellets to feed direct reduction plants in the immediate Gulf area and Far East markets. Iron ore supplied from Brazil, Peru, India, and Mauritania provides the feed to the pellet plant. Hydrated lime (2%) is used as a burden.

Jan 5, 1985

By J. D. Morgan

Demand for nonfuel minerals depends on the overall state of the economy, which steadily improved each quarter in 1984. New housing starts rose to 1.8 million units. Automakers turned out about 15% more cars (7.8 million) and 30% more trucks (3.1 million) than in 1983. Nevertheless, many domestic mineral operations experienced difficulties in 1984. This resulted from import competition greater use of newer engineered materials, emphasis on multi-unit housing and downsizing of motor vehicles. About 15% of our energy was imported. This in cluded $36 billion worth of crude oil and $22 billion in refined products This added significantly to the overall merchandise trade deficit of $12; billion. On the bright side for mining, coal production rose 14% to 810 Mt (890 mil lion st). Three-fourths o: the coal was burned to generate electricity and more than half of our electricity was derived from coal-burning plants. With the exception of a few large-bulk, low-value raw minerals, most minerals move relatively freely in world trade. The strong dollar encouraged imports and made exporting more difficult. Consequently, our nonfuel minerals trade deficit rose 60% to $19 billion, reflecting imports of $39 billion and exports of $20 billion. There were increased pressures from some major segments of the minerals industry for some form of import protection. But President Reagan said, "Our goal is a system of free and fair trade in goods, services, and capital. We will work toward this goal through both bilateral and multilateral trading agreements." The US minerals industry consists of domestic mines, concentrators, smelters, refineries, mineral manufacturing plants, and recyclers. It also includes many wholly- or partially-owned operations in many parts of the world, providing employment and income for US citizens and others as well. Compared with 1983, the value of US raw nonfuel mineral output rose 8%, to $23 billion. The $253 billion worth of goods processed from this crude mineral output was a 14% increase. Major Metals Raw steel production - a major indicator of both material use and mineral production-rose 10%, to 84 Mt (93 million st). This stimulated a 36% rise in domestic iron ore production, to 52 Mt (57 million st), about 98% pelletized. Iron ore imports rose 44%, to 14 Mt (15 million st). Despite the increase of steel production, output remained well below levels of just a few years ago. For example, 1984 production was still 23% less than in 1981. Raw steelmaking capacity remained steady at 122 Mt (135 million st). The industry continued to cite steel imports as a major reason for low domestic capacity. In December, pacts with seven leading steel exporting nations were announced. This is an effort to reduce import penetration to about 18.5% of the domestic market. Domestic producers of bulk ferroalloys of chromium, manganese, and silicon operated at about 50% capacity. The US mined no manganese or chromium. Only a small quantity of ferronickel was produced from domestic laterite mining in Oregon. Molybdenum production, at 45 kt (49,500 st), rose threefold. Mine shipments of tungsten, another mineral tied to steel

Jan 5, 1985

By William R. Bond, Jim V. Rouse

Introduction The pressure/vacuum (p/v) lysimeter or soil water sampler has become useful for monitoring vadose zone or unsaturated zone water conditions. The soil water sampler was first introduced around 1961. It was used as a monitoring and research device for studies in agriculture and soil contamination around landfills. Since then, it has been used for many purposes. The use of p/v lysimeters at mining facilities to monitor for solution loss is a relatively new idea. The primary purpose of the lysimeter here is to function as an early warning system. It detects leakage through liners of tailings ponds, heap leach pads, and leachate holding ponds. Their use has proven valuable for collecting baseline data and detecting loss of precious leachate fluid. Different lysimeter designs are capable of vadose moisture sampling from near the surface and down to 90 m (300 ft). They are also capable of sampling soil moisture or saturation plume contaminants from areas not accessible by conventional water well installations. The most common installations are usually simple and cost-effective. In many cases, they can be installed without the use of heavy drilling equipment. A properly placed and installed lysimeter can detect solution leaks in several days or weeks. A conventional perimeter monitor well may take months or years to detect a leak of the same magnitude. A discussion on the general design and installation of p/v lysimeters will give an understanding of its versatility. Three case studies of lysimeter installations at mining sites will be examined in detail. Design, Installation, and Sampling Design The basic design of a p/v lysimeter chamber consists of a porous material through which the soil is drawn into a collection chamber. Access tubes run from the unit to the sample station at the ground surface. Most units currently available range from 25 to 76 mm-diam (1 to 3 in.-diam). The sample collection chamber, or body, can vary from 0.6 to 1.8 m (2 to 6 ft) in length. The body can be constructed of PVC casing or Teflon, depending on the installation desired. The collection chamber functions as a holding reservoir for the collected soil moisture. The intake, or porous material, on the lysimeter is the most complex and vulnerable portion of the unit. The pore size selection varies based on the needs of the installation, type of fluid to be sampled, and type of soil material surrounding the unit. Teflon (PTFE) and porous ceramic are used in fabrication of the porous inlet portion. When using a Teflon material, which is hydrophobic, a larger pore size of 70 µm is needed to overcome surface tension and draw water into the collection chamber. It is typically used at sites involving organic contamination, because of its inert properties. Ceramic material is generally hydrophilic, having less surface tension. Therefore, it has a smaller porosity range to conduct the moisture through the porous medium while under vacuum. Pore sizes may be selected from 0.16 to 6 µm, and can be manufactured for the specific needs of the installation. The final major design component of the p/v lysimeter is the access or sampling tubes. The tubes are usually of 6.3-mm-outside-diam. (0.25-in.-outside-diam). They are made of rigid polyethylene or flexible Tygon with a wall thickness of 1.5 mm (0.06 in.). The con-

Jan 4, 1985

By Gene Mattila, Ron Boyd

Introduction Rock bolting is a general term that encompasses pinning, roof bolting, rib bolting, and cable bolting. Rock bolting contributes the highest nonproductive cost and is the most significant safety risk in mining today. Total installed bolt costs are now more than $20 per bolt. Rebolting or repair work doubles this. And bolting accidents account for about 30% of all fatal and nonfatal lost time accidents. It is only logical, then, for the mine operator to install the highest quality anchors possible. Every bolt on the market - tensioned, untensioned, full contact, or point anchor - has designed capabilities in axial, shear, and fluctuating ground conditions. Bolts will provide a designed support if material specifications and installation procedures fall within the manufacturer's recommendations. This also assumes that there are no unexpected geological or operational changes. Proper material specifications and installation procedures should guarantee the mine operator a quality anchor. To help assure this, the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), the US Bureau of Mines (USBM), and the AMC Manufacturers group developed stringent ASTM materials standards. These govern mechanical point anchor bolts and bolts using threaded and nonthreaded rebar. There are also minimum standards that suppliers must comply with in the manufacture of frictional bolts. However, most frictional bolt standards are based on the manufacturer's own specifications. It would be impossible to set uniform regulations on frictional bolts. Each bolt provides support in a slightly different manner and thereby requires different material needs. Quality Control In any case, material quality can generally be assured through tight order specifications and periodic quality control checks. The problem with installing quality anchors does not solely lie with the material. It includes all the events that occur from the time a bolt leaves a manufacturer to the time it is installed. The anchoring ability of any major type bolt can be affected by transportation, storage, mechanical performance of installation equipment, installation demands of the operator, proper drilling accessories, and local geology. Table 1 and Fig. 1 document the negative events that can affect each bolt and the degree to which it can be affected. Drilling a hole of oversized diameter, for example, is an operator controlled factor. It will adversely affect most bolts. An over-sized diameter reduces, or even eliminates, the anchorage capability of a mechanical shell. It will reduce the support capacity of a split set to nearly nothing. And it will cause a partial or incomplete grouting around the resin bolt. Frequently, due to bit wear, holes are drilled undersized in diameter and may not be properly cleaned out. In this case, it will be difficult for the operator to push the mechanical shell into the hole, thereby causing him to drill another hole. In cases where the bolt is obviously not providing anchorage, operators will probably drill another hole and place another bolt. Rock Bolt Regulations It is the situations where a bolt is improperly installed in the hole, but gives the appearance of a good bolt, that are frightening. In fact, some safety officials and engineers believe that only 50% to 60% of installed bolts are working. These bolts cause irregular ground load transfers in other bolts and overload them. This causes hazardous situations and overstressing. It is these bolts that fail prematurely 200 to 255 mm (8 to 10 in.) behind the face and possibly contribute to the high accident rate. The government and several manufacturers recognized the need to check the integrity of rock bolts. These programs are in different stages today. Tight torque regulations have been established for mechanical

Jan 4, 1985

By Robert S. Shank

Introduction The Pinto Valley open-pit copper mine is located in southern Arizona, 11 km (7 miles) west of Miami. Production at Pinto Valley began in 1974. About 350 Mt (386 million st) of ore and waste was removed by the end of June 1982. At that time, the mine was using more than 90 major equipment items with a total mobile fleet numbering 320. Some of the major equipment consisted of four Marion M4 rotary drills; six P&H 15, 11.5- and 19.1-m3 (15- and 25-cu yd) shovels; and 24,136- and 154-t (150¬and 170-st) Wabco haulage trucks. This equipment was used to move more than 139 kt/d (154,000 stpd) of ore and waste. The mill was processing more than 50 kt/d (55,000 stpd) of mine ore. Shutdown A two-week vacation shutdown began in July 1982. Maintenance jobs were scheduled, and most employees left for the vacation. During the vacation period, copper prices fell below $1.32/kg ($0.60 per lb). Inventories remained at alarmingly high levels. At this point the mine was losing more money operating than it would by being shut down. The vacation shutdown was first extended to five weeks. But, after further evaluation, the mine was shut down indefinitely. In Dec. 1982, Cities Services Co., owner of Miami Operations (which included the Pinto Valley mine and mill), was acquired by the Occidental Petroleum Corp. On March 1, 1983, Occidental sold the operations to Newmont Mining Corp., and Newmont created Pinto Valley Copper Corp., as a wholly owned subsidiary. Copper continued to be produced by the Pinto Valley solvent extraction-electrowinning (SX- EW) plant because of its low cost per pound of production. To ensure proper equipment care during the shutdown, maintenance management was given three goals; • maintain the SX-EW plant; • maintain the environmental and pollution control systems such as domestic water pumps and mine dewatering; and

Jan 4, 1985

By James J. Brady, Joginder S. Bhore, Robert B. Gordon, Jimmy W. Honeycutt

The authors of this paper have a combined construction experience of 70 years. They have served as engineers and managers on projects throughout the United States and Canada. Approximately 50 shafts have been sunk under their direct and daily participation. Several shafts have been selected from each of their experiences and have been briefly summarized here. SHALLOW SHAFT SINKING Sinking shallow shafts in highly urbanized areas adds an additional set of problems to those encountered in normal sinking operations. During the time between July, 1975 and early 1981, a series of shafts were sunk for The Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority. All of these were located along the "A" line, starting soon after the route departed from its path along Connecticut Avenue, proceeding to Wisconsin Avenue and then along Wisconsin Avenue to the city line at Western Avenue. (See WMATA System Map, Figure 1) The first three shafts were subcontracted from Morrison-Knudsen & Associates, Contract A9a, in July, 1975. They were: Albemarle Street - 27'6" diameter, 78'O" deep Brandywine Street - 30'6" diameter, 88.6' deep Ellicott Street - 33'0" diameter, 110'0" deep

Jan 1, 1985

By G. E. Tooker

This paper (1) presents new data on the use of horizontal curves to optimize the alignment of belt conveyors. The operating concept of a horizontal curve is simple. As an element of the belt passes through the curve, it is motivated to drift toward the center of the curve by unbalanced tension forces in the belt. This lateral drift is resisted by the forces of friction and gravity, which in turn can be stated as a function of drift. Resisting forces, as a function of drift, are stated in terms of variables such as the amount of load on the belt, and parameters such as the trough angle, tilt angle, and super elevation angle, and number of rolls in the idler. The trick is to determine that the belt will drift to a position of equilibrium within predictable limits, without physically constraining the edge of the belt. In practice this prediction is not easy to make without the aid of a computer. The motivating force is easy to calculate, but its value is continually changing throughout the angle subtended by the curve arc. The resisting forces are constant throughout the curve for a given drift and load condition, but the calculations are very complex. Data in this paper will assist the conveyor designer in making preliminary calculations for horizontal curves. Presented is the equation for calculating the motivating force, and a family of curves that show the resisting force as a function of lateral drift for some commonly encountered conveyor design criteria.

Jan 1, 1985

By Kevin Connor

There was little change during 1988 in the production of minerals in Burundi. The Government of Burundi, which banned all commercial mining operations in the country in 1979, lifted the ban on mining of alluvial gold deposits and started a program of small-scale artisan gold mining in October. Along with the legal mining of gold, licensed gold trading counters were established. Other mineral commodities produced were kaolin clay, lime, and peat. In compliance with the Government ban, the only mineral wealth exploited for commercial sale and export was alluvial gold. Through financial assistance from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), a study to inventory the country's mineral resources continued throughout the year. As part of this study, during the year, a West German company undertook a drilling program to further outline the nickel reserves of the Musongati area in central Burundi. Results of the work as of yearend were disappointing, with only 12 million tons of ore identified with better than 2% nickel content proven. Investigations also continued during the year regarding the centrally located deposits of vanadium-bearing titaniferous magnetite. A Norwegian company contracted to prepare a prefeasibility study for developing the deposit. The British Sulphur Corp. Ltd. was nearing completion of its $1.2 million2 study of the phosphatic limestone deposit at Matongo-Bandaga at yearend. Ore reserves of about 17 million tons grading 11% phosphorus pentoxide (P2O3) had been identified. The phosphate zone overlies a carbonatite rock, which could provide the basis for a cement industry. Additional drilling was planned for 1984. Exploration for gold was underway in 19S3 in northern Burundi through UNDP funding. Several primary deposits of shallow semimassive sulfides with gold values ranging from traces to 11 grams per ton had been discovered. With assistance from the Federal Republic of Germany, bastnasite reserves of 5,400 tons, with associated high europium oxide and cerium content, were verified, and the prospects for finding

Jan 1, 1985

By Paul H. Lu

This Bureau of Mines report summarizes the analysis and eveluation of the field measurement results of a comprehensive ground control study conducted in a mechanized longwall coal mine in West Virginia. Emphasis is placed on the three basic ground control parameters: ground pressure, ground movement, and geomechanical properties. Specific topics include premining ground pressures, front-abutment pressure in the longwall panel, histories of pillar loading, differential roof-strata movement and bed separation, differential floor strata movement, entry roof-to-floor convergence, in situ moduli of rigidity of coal seam and roof and floor strata, and mechanical properties of coal and coal measures rocks.

Jan 1, 1985

By Tom Tallone

In the majority of metal and nonmetal mining operations, narrow vein deposits are being mined with slusher hoists. Thin; method of mucking is costly, due in part to its inherent labor intense operation and to its inability to muck 100 pct of the deposits. Mechanized equipment would greatly improve the material handling in narrow vein mining and would dramatically reduce the operational cost. The Compact Loader/Trammer, known as the "mini-mucker" has been developed to increase productivity of the load/haul/dump portion of the typical narrow vein mining cycle. This is Volume II of the final report and concerns the operation and maintenance of the mini-mucker. Volume I covers a general and design review of the activities on the subject contract and are available under separate cover.

Jan 1, 1985

By J. Jeffrey Wagner, Michael J. Bailey, Peter M. Douglass

The Chambers Creek Interceptor Sewer Tunnel project consisted of 2-1/2 miles (4 kilometres) of nominal 9-foot (2.7-metre) O.D. tunnel driven through predominantly glacially overridden soils. Mole-Collucio Construction Company initially elected to drive the entire tunnel with a Lovat TBM. However, this machine could not control the fast raveling ground conditions which developed when the TBM encountered sands overlying very dense, hard glacial till or boulders. As a result, a shield and digger machine was brought in for a 1700-foot (518-metre) long segment. Pumped wells spaced roughly 50 to 125 feet (15 to 38 metres) apart were utilized to dewater about two-thirds of the alignment during construction. Initial support consisted of steel ribs and wood lagging, with a final lining comprised of pre-cast concrete pipe segments grouted in place.

Jan 1, 1985

By James M. Barker

No commodity agreements now exist for sulfur and a lack of reference to sulfur commodity agreements exists in the literature. Law (1975) made a passing reference to sulfur as one of a group of commodities where "there have been additional control efforts of various types." Clearly, sulfur was a candidate, at least conceptually in the past, for some form of commodity agreement and the following discussion centers on the world sulfur market of the early 1980's in this context. GENERAL THEORY OF COMMODITY AGREEMENTS The upsurge in demands for commodity agreements seen in the last decade or so stems largely from agitation by the less developed countries (LDC) for better economic treatment by more developed countries (MDC). Several economic factors, real or imagined, adversely affect the LDC's as follows (MacAvoy, 1977): 1) variable demand in MDC's causes wide fluctuations in commodity prices which hurt the economies of commodity producers, who are often LDC's although consumer economies may also benefit from more predictable prices; 2) a general decline of commodity prices relative to the price of manufactured goods which hurts commodity producers in their balance of trade while their stocks and overcapacity rise; 3) instability of LDC economies enhanced by the above factors lowers internal stability, inhibits foreign investment, and retards economic growth; and 4) a lack of self respect when dealing with developed countries o, following the OPEC lead, LDC producers want the stature related to cartel market power.

Jan 1, 1985

By H. Ewaschuk

"INTRODUCTIONRio Algom's Stanleigh Mill in Elliot Lake began production in June of 1983. The highly instrumented mill treats uranium ore at an average rate of 3900 metric tons per day. To help ensure a good start-up and low operating costs, an extensive training program was undertaken prior to and during start-up. This presentation describes how an unconventional operating crew were combined to form an operating unit with a high efficiency in terms of production and labour utilization. I would like to point out at the outset that the operating philosophy, and the role of the supervisors and the operators as set up at Stanleigh is not unique. Indeed, I have seen the same results at a couple of small plants where efficiency meant survival. However, these situations appeared to be the exception, and it was not readily apparent how similar results could be obtained in a larger plant. A factor that existed at the time was low labour turnover. As in most parts of Canada, jobs were easy to get in the Elliot Lake camp in the late 1970's. This, and other factors, contributed to an unusually high labour turnover. This changed dramatically in the early 1980's. Indeed, Rio's two other operating mills, Quirke and Panel reduced crew sizes at this time to reduce operating costs. As a result all of Stanleigh's operators came from Quirke and Panel with experience varying from 4 to 7 years. The experience that operators had was obviously of benefit and served to reduce the scope of the training program from what would have been required with inexperienced personnel."

Jan 1, 1985