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By Arne Paus-Jenssen

Some aspects of the policies developed by Saskatchewan with respect to the provincial potash industry are discussed. The provincial potash policy was developed initially to deal with problems associated with an excess supply and consisted of output restrictions and floor prices. Changing market conditions led to a situation of rapidly increasing prices and revenues for the potash producers, and the nature of the policy problem switched from one of stabilizing the industry to one of levying increased taxes to enable the government to capture a portion of the revenues. The first part of the paper explains why a provincial potash policy was developed, the problems it attempted to deal with and how. The second part is an attempt to examine, from a public policy point of view, the impact of these policies on the potash industry.

Jan 1, 1977

By Arne Paus-Jenssen

The potash industry in Saskatchewan has recently been the focus of much new legislation at the provincial level and, along with other mining industries in Canada, also subject to changes in tax legislation at the federal level. As a result, the industry presently operates under (a) provincial production controls, a prorationing scheme; (b) a new provincial reserve tax on potash only and; (c) a new federal income tax applicable to all mineral industries. The prorating scheme dates back to 1970 and emerged as public policy because of the excess supply situation faced by the international potash industry towards the end of the sixties. This caused special problems for new mines in Saskatchewan and the provincial government decided to intervene. The new tax legislation at provincial and federal levels, both introduced within the last four years, reflects a belief that insufficient revenues accrue to the public sector from natural resources. All mining industries in Canada, including the potash industry, have had their tax positions completely reversed during these four years. Traditionally the mining sector in Canada has been a recipient of substantial tax incentives and has enjoyed low tax rates. This has changed and the mining sector is now one of the most heavily taxed sectors in the economy. In addition, the mining sector has moved from a situation where its rapid development was favoured by governments to a situation where this is no longer the case.

Jan 1, 1976

By Edmund E. Getzin

Of all the developments in the post-war history of Western Europe, none has been more remarkable in its aims and in the progress it has achieved than the movement toward European integration. It is not an exaggeration to say that this movement marks a virtual revolution, an about-face, in the long and complicated history of European states over the past three centuries. Although sporadic efforts to achieve European integration can be traced back for at least a 100 years, it remained for the breakdown of the European economies as a result of World War II and the subsequent Russian threat to give new impetus to the concept of broader economic and political integration. In fact, the economic integration of Europe following the end of the war was considered so essential that, in 1949, the administrator of the European Cooperation Administration, Paul Hoffman, spoke of the economic integration of Western Europe as an objective of American policy embodied in the Marshall Plan.

Jan 6, 1963

By G. R. Mansfield

THE third year of Government exploration for potash by the U. S. Geological Survey and the U. S. Bureau of Mines under the authorization of the act approved June 25, 1926 (Public 424-69th Cong.) is drawing to a close. The results thus far obtained are thought to be sufficiently interesting and satisfactory to justify the presentation of a brief pre¬liminary account of the work. REVIEW OF EARLIER EXPLORATION The general geologic similarity of the Permian basin of Texas and New Mexico to the potash field of Germany had long ago suggested the possibility of the presence of potash salts somewhere in that basin, but petroleum exploration was then making little headway there and the necessary data could not be obtained. The discovery by Udden in 1912 of potash in brine from the Spur well in Dickens County, Texas, was the first direct evidence of its presence. In 1915-17 the U. S. Geological Survey drilled a test well with standard tools at Cliffside near Amarillo, but failed to find potash. Nevertheless, an observer has been kept in the field, at first in cooperation with the Texas Bureau of Economic Geology but since 1922 by the Survey alone, to secure data and samples from oil and gas tests. Since the discovery of oil in Reagan County in 1923 exploration by drilling has been rapidly extended to many parts of western Texas and southeastern New Mexico. The identification of the potash-bearing mineral polyhalite was first announced by the Geological Survey in June, 1921, the material having come from cuttings from the Bryant well in Midland County and the Burns well in Dawson County, Texas. Successive discoveries and announcements of similar purport aroused widespread interest in potash exploration, which culminated in the action by Congress already noted.

Jan 1, 1929

By G. R. Mansfield

THE third year of Government exploration f or potash by the U. S. Geological Survey and-the U. S. Bureau of Mines under the authorization of the act approved June 25, 1926 (Public 424-69th Cong.) is drawing to a close. The results thus far obtained are thought to be sufficiently interesting and satisfactory to justify the presentation of a brief preliminary account of the work. REVIEW OF EARLIER EXPLORATION The general geologic similarity of the Permian basin of Texas and New Mexico to the potash field of Germany had long ago suggested the possibility of the presence of potash salts somewhere in that basin, but petroleum exploration was then making little headway there and the necessary data could not be obtained. The discovery by Udden in 1912 of potash in brine from the Spur well in Dickens County, Texas, was the first direct evidence of its presence. In 1915-17 the U. S. Geological Survey drilled a test well with standard tools at Cliff side near Amarillo, but failed to find potash. Nevertheless, an observer has been kept in the field, at first in cooperation with the Texas Bureau of Economic Geology but since 1922 by the Survey alone, to `secure data and samples from oil and gas tests. Since the discovery of oil in Reagan County in 1923 exploration by drilling has been rapidly extended to many parts of western Texas and southeastern New Mexico. The identification of the potash-bearing mineral polyhalite was first announced by the Geological Survey in June, 1921, the material having come from cuttings from the Bryant well in Midland County and the Burns well in Dawson County, Texas. Successive discoveries and announcements of similar purport aroused widespread interest in potash exploration, which culminated in the action by Congress already noted.

Jan 1, 1929

By P. V. Roundy

PUBLIC lands in Florida were first withdrawn from entry by President Taft on July 2, 1910, as a conservation measure because of their possible phosphate content. The reserve thus established was subsequently modified by further withdrawals and by restorations, so that on Jan. 1, 1934,' it contained 66,796 acres, of which only a small part had been defi-nitely classified. The reserved land was in scattered parcels, ranging from less than 40 acres to 320 or more, distributed in many counties. For administrative purposes and for final disposal of any of the numerous parcels, mineral classification of the land is legally necessary. In 1934 and 1935 the United States Geological Survey, under two successive grants from the Public Works Administration, prospected some 83 tracts of these lands in Polk County, comprising in all about 3300 acres, and six tracts comprising 240 acres in Citrus and Marion Counties. The tracts in Polk County were all in the so-called land-pebble field and the others in the hard-rock field. The Survey field party was under the direction of P. V. Roundy, from whose unpublished report the material in this paper is largely taken. The foreman of the prospecting crew was J. H. Wingate of Zephyrhills, Fla. The individual tracts were identified through the cooperation of the General Land Office, by transitman Hugh B. Crawford. This prospecting work fitted well the classification adopted for Public Works projects in general: it could not he done on any considerable scale under the Survey's usual appropriations; it gave employment to unem-ployed labor; and it may be expected ultimately to repay the Government in royalties more than the cost of the exploration.

Jan 1, 1937

By P. V. Roundy, G. R. Mansfield

PUBLIC lands in Florida were first withdrawn from entry by President Taft on July 2, 1910, as a conservation measure because of their possible phosphate content. The reserve thus established was subsequently modified by further withdrawals and by restorations, so that on Jan. 1, 1934, it contained 66,796 acres, of which only a small part had been definitely classified. The reserved land was in scattered parcels, ranging from less than 40 acres to 320 or more, distributed in many counties. For administrative purposes and for final disposal of any of the numerous parcels, mineral classification of the land is legally necessary. In 1934 and 1935 the United States Geological Survey, under two successive grants from the Public Works Administration, prospected some 83 tracts of these lands in Polk County, comprising in all about 3300 acres, and six tracts comprising 240 acres in Citrus and Marion Counties. The tracts in Polk County were all in the so-called land-pebble field and the others in the hard-rock field. The Survey field party was under the direction of P. V. Roundy, from whose unpublished report the material in this paper is largely taken. The foreman of the prospecting crew was J. H. Wingate of Zephyrhills, Fla. The individual tracts were identified through the cooperation of the General Land Office, by transitman Hugh B. Crawford. This prospecting work fitted well the classification adopted for Public Works projects in general: it could not be done on any considerable scale under the Survey's usual appropriations; it gave employment to unemployed labor; and it may be expected ultimately to repay the Government in royalties more than the cost of the exploration. COMMERCIAL PROSPECTING METHODS Commercial methods of prospecting for phosphate in Florida have been briefly described by Mansfield.1 In the hard-rock field, where the floor of the phosphate deposit is extremely irregular, it is customary to drill as

Jan 1, 1937

By C. Y. Chen

In order to put an end to the uneven environmental standards and enforcement established by various coal mining States in the United States, the Congress passed and the President signed the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (Public Law 95-87 or the Act) on August 3, 1977. Within one year after passage, the Secretary of the Interior was directed to promulgate permanent program regulations implementing Title V provisions of the Act. These regulations were to form the basis for State regulatory programs under the Act and to allow States to assume primary regulatory responsibility. In order to implement the underground mining provision of the Act, the Secretary is directed in section 516(a) of the Act to promulgate rules, but ones which take into consideration the distinct differences between surface coal mining and underground coal mining. The regulations developed by the Secretary and promulgated on March 13, 1979, with respect to subsidence control, included (1) a subsidence control plan as part of the permitting process, (2) substantive provisions establishing performance standards for subsidence control, and (3) provisions providing for the prohibition of mining under perennial streams, impoundments larger than 20 acre feet, and certain public facilities and urban areas.

Jan 1, 1985

By David E. Jones, Dean K. Hunt, C. Y. Chen

INTRODUCTION Of all the numerous geological hazards that threaten the well-being of urban areas in the United States, probably none is so widespread, persistent, and diversified as surface subsidence (HRB-Singer, Inc., 1977). Simply defined, subsidence is the vertical displacement or sinking of the ground surface caused by either natural phenomena or man's activities. The downward movement, however, can be accompanied by horizontal movement, strain, tilt and even by a locally upward movement. Damage to structures and the environment can result from any of these movements. Extracting subsurface materials, fluids and solids, accounts for most man-induced subsidence in the United States. Among all the mining-related subsidences, the collapse of voids created by underground coal mining has been the major cause in inflicting surface damage (Comptroller General of the United States, 1979). Subsidence from coal mining may occur within a few weeks or be delayed for years, depending upon the mineral layer's depth below the surface, the overlying rock strata's characteristics, the extent and methods of mining that were employed, and the time deterioration of pillar and mine structure. Unless underground resources are not mined or control measures are implemented to prevent or minimize damage, some degree of surface subsidence and its accompanied deleterious effects are often inevitable. The ways to control the subsidence and minimize surface damage may include: 1. Precautionary measures built into new structures or surface features. 2. Preventive works applied to existing structures or surface features. 3. Mine design incorporating special underground layouts. 4. Any combination of the above measures. Upon the enactment of Public Law 95-87, the Secretary of the Interior, through the recently created Office of Surface Mining (OSM), was authorized to promulgate rules to regulate mining reclamation including subsidence control. Proposed on September 18, 1978, these rules were finalized, following public comment and hearings, on March 13, 1979, as part of the permanent regulatory program for the regulation of surface mining and reclamation operations which include the surface effects of underground mining. On January 28, 1981, Secretary Watt of the Department of the Interior issued an order to re- quire all agencies to identify with recommendations all regulations which are believed to be excessive, burdensome or counterproductive. Also on February 17, 1981. President Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12291 requiring all Federal agencies to conduct a regulatory review to make a determination that each promulgation of a regulation is clearly within the authority delegated by law and consistent with Congressional intent (Federal Register, 1981). As a result, OSM initiated the regulatory reform to revise the permanent regulatory program. Following a brief discussion of the technical aspects and the effects of subsidence on man and his environment, this paper presents a historical overview of how rules and regulations are used to govern the subsidence related problems. The development of the regulation of subsidence under Public Law 95-87, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA or the Act) are also discussed, including the new regulations being developed under the regulatory reform program. SOME TECHNICAL ASPECTS Am EFFECTS OF FINE SUBSIDENCE An extensive historical review of mining subsidence is given by Zwartendyk (1971) and Shadbolt (1978). Comprehensive technical presentations have been given by Henry (1956), King and Whetton (1957), Hall and Orchard (1963). Muller, et al. (1968). Grard (1969), Voight and Pariseau (1970). Kapp and Williams (1972), Cummins and Given (1973), Brauner (1973) , and NCB (1975). A theory of surface subsidence due to underground mining was perhaps first fundamentally stated by a French engineer, Toillez, in 1838, and formulated by a Belgian engineer, Gonot, in 1839 (Goldreich, 1913, cited by Zwartendyk, 1971). Since that time,

Jan 1, 1982

By Rajesh K. Mishra

The person in charge of Environmental Affairs in a small business has many higher priority projects (such as making money to meet the employee? payroll etc.) than filling out and filing the regulatory forms. It is but. natural to think that these affairs can be managed? by playing ignorant until audited by the regulatory -state and federal agencies. Truth is to. the contrary; generally, it is too late by then. The fines and legal costs even for failing to file the regulatory forms could deliver a serious blow to the financial well-being of a small business. Forms and reports under SARA Title III are not hard to complete., but they are time consuming. In this paper we will discuss the information and data compilation procedures, simplification of some legal terminology into simple technical language, and tips that help in filling out the forms?. Some actual case 'histories of EPA fines will also be reviewed.

Jan 1, 1992

By Thomas V. Falkie

In bygone days, the mineral engineer spent most of his/her time on the technical aspects of designing, building, and managing mineral operations. In the last few decades, mostly since the 1960s, increasing amounts of engineering man power and time are spent dealing with federal, state, and local government agencies, laws, and regulations. It is not possible to plan, design, build, or operate mines, mills, smelters, or even office buildings without detailed consideration of government regulations and permitting requirements dealing with environment, worker health and safety, etc. The four chapters of this section provide an overview of the social, legal, political, environmental, and health and safety aspects of mineral enterprise. The section sets the stage for the working engineer/geologist in industry, government, consulting, or academe and points the direction for more detailed study in each of these areas.

Jan 1, 2008

Government geoscience may be categorised by objective under three headings: Applied Research for Geoscientific Framework Studies, Resource Inventory, and Technical Advice. In Queensland, the Department of Resource Industries is active in all three categories. Under the program-based management system adopted in 1987, three Programs, namely, Geological Survey, Mineral Resources Development, and Energy Resources Development and Utilisation, have geoscience responsibilities.Prime responsibility for geoscience resides with the Geological Survey Program, which provides a geoscientific framework for mineral and energy exploration and the development of the State. Simply stated, the Program goal is to provide geological information when and where it is required. Geological Survey work also encompasses aspects of resource inventory and technical advice, complementing the work of the other two Programs. This role has a 122 year long tradition, for geoscientists of the Geological Survey have been engaged in investigations designed to facilitate the identification and utilisation of the mineral, water and energy resources of Queensland since 1868.

Jan 1, 1990

Australia's gold mining industry has seen a resurgence in the past seven years - a resurgence the likes of which has been seen in very few, if any of this nation's other mineral industries. Industry experts are predicting that Australia could become one of the world's largest gold producers as the future of the South African gold industry looks increasingly tenuous under the present political crisis in that country. Therefore, it is utterly ludicrous for the Federal Government to introduce a tax which will see the Australian gold industry "wither on the vine."The Queensland State Government is utterly opposed to a tax on gold. Anyone in their right mind, who has seen the statistics could only agree with our stance. In 1984/85, activity in the gold mining industry is estimated to have accounted for over $750 million in national income, over$1,200 million in national output, and tax revenue of at least $115 million as well as providing more than 16,000 jobs. Chartered accountants Coopers and Lybrand's survey on the gold industry last year showed an increase in exploration expenditure by gold producers and explorers by up to 36% in 1986 from 1985 levels. That level is expected to be maintained in real terms for most of the remainder of the decade under the present tax arrangements. This is in contrast with the mining sector as a whole, where a recent Australian Mining Industry Council survey forecasted a 14% FALL in production.

Jan 1, 1986

In spite of our deep conviction that it would be wrong for the United States to enter World War II, when, after Pearl Harbor, we were actually in it, I felt that I must do all I could to help. The country had been so good to me that I could not decently stay on the sidelines. My first thought was that I might help with supply and administration in the Air Force, as in World War I. So on the evening of Pearl Harbor I wired the chief of our Air Force in Washington saying that I had been on Gen. William Mitchell's staff in World War I and was offering my services again. I received a noncommital answer, but after a couple of weeks was told to take my physical examination. I passed it, but nothing further happened. After helping to make plans for the wartime operations of Summit King and Desert Silver, Dorothy and I went to New York to spend Christmas with Molly and Peter, both of whom were in college in the East. I had to complete a report on the Argonaut mine in California first, though the war made my recommendations of dubious validity. Before Christmas I received wires from Temple Bridgeman, Phil Wilson, and other friends who had taken positions with government agencies responsible for securing mineral products needed for war use. They urged me to join them. It was evidently a case of not whether but how I could be most useful. After six uncertain days with the family in New York I took the night train to Washington on the 28th of December. I had a hectic day there. First I saw Arthur Bunker and Phil Wilson at what became the Aluminum and Magnesium Division of the War Production Board. Their office was in an old converted barracks. They asked me to examine magnesium deposits in Nevada at once, and then to look at other magnesium and aluminum properties. After leaving

Jan 1, 1976

By A. Eftimie, M. Stanley

The World Bank Group (WBG) believes that extractive industries can make significant contribution to sustainable development and poverty reduction, providing that environmental, social, and corporate governance issues are properly managed. The WBG recognizes that stakeholders have legitimate concerns about the impact of extractive industries, and management proposals are built around the central theme that investments and policy advice in the extractive industries should lead to poverty reduction. To help governments create appropriate policy and regulatory frameworks, this paper focuses on the linkages between overarching policies and laws and the management / governance of extractive industries at the local communities. It encourages the use of new instruments designed to help ensure that local communities benefit from extractive industries.

Jan 1, 2005

By Reno Sales

THE present-day application of geological knowledge to mine opera-tions owes much to Survey activities. Early publications covering developed deposits at Comstock and Eureka in Nevada, and Leadville in Colorado, aroused great interest in mine geology among mine owners and operators. In later years personal contacts between Survey geologists, notably Lindgren, Spurr, Emmons, Weed, and Ransome, to name only a few, and mine managers, mine superintendents and mine foremen, brought directly home the importance of geological mapping and study in connection with mine operations. However, the Survey had recognized from the beginning that it was not practicable, either from the viewpoint of cost or policy, to supply direct help to the miner. The situation was met by many large mining companies through the organization of geological departments to deal with problems of geology which concerned not alone the every-day mine operation but also the life expectancy of the ore deposit. The mine owner therefore looked to the mine geologist to apply the "laws of ore deposition" in estimating the future of his mine. The examination of outside properties also became a duty of the company geologist where replacements were needed or where expansion of operations was contem-plated. And finally, out of this situation there developed the inde-pendent consulting geologist, specializing in geological examinations of prospects, mines, and mining districts, whose duties included the highly important but often difficult task of appraising ore reserves and ore possibilities. Thus, while it may be considered by many that the work of the mine geologist overlaps that of the Survey geologist, their respective fields of endeavor are not in conflict. The appearance of the mine geologist has lessened in no manner the need of intensive field and research work by the Geological Survey and related organizations.

Jan 1, 1934

Keeping the sediment on the mine site and out of the water course is essential from the regulatory, environmental and sustainability perspectives. Regulation of this aspect of mining is embedded in environmental legislation and government receiving water quality standards, and government control has apparently been considered to be the most appropriate method to define mine site discharge standards and the environmental implications of sediment in downstream watercourses. A literature search for guidelines for the site specific design and operation of sediment ponds treating mine site runoff to remove total suspended solids, turbidity and flocculant-induced toxicity, revealed little information on the mining industry?s and government?s roles in defining the ?how to achieve? related to sediment pond design. Is there a need or reason for an industry-driven leadership to clearly define the ?how to? keep the sediment on the mine site and out of the water course? Currently, this issue is addressed in Canada by a federal mining regulation for metal mines which specifies discharge quality for sediment. This paper focuses on the method used in British Columbia, Canada, to regulate and provide a scientific methodology to control the discharge of sediment from mine sites. Management plans relative to this topic are discussed and are considered to have value from the exploration, construction, operation and the onset of closure phases. In addition, the balance and linkage between the erosion control management plan and the sediment pond management plan are discussed in terms of how they may be designed to complement each other to lower the risk of exceeding discharge and receiving water quality standards. If there were an industry-driven standard, or guidance document relative to addressing sediment release, it would benefit mining companies by eliminating the repetitive analysis of this topic for each new mine, mine expansion, and mine modification; also, government may often replace certain aspects of permitting with a regulation, if there is a government/industry established standard defining Best Achievable Technology (e.g. the Canadian Metal Mining Effluent Regulations).

Aug 1, 2013

By DONALD H. McLAUGHLlN

Few factors have had more influence in maintaining the strength and stability of the United States than our persistent habit of providing .checks and balances to the dynamic powers of free enterprise on the one hand and to the controls and guidance exercised by the State on the other. .Indeed, it is this same concern for matching forces against each other that has given our republic its ability -to preserve a democratic basis of life for its citizens, and yet maintain a ,government that is able to protect the rights of all and to resist and minimize the danger of excessive concentration of authority. Our current efforts to clarify the nation's mineral policies and to define more clearly the role that the governmental agencies should play in conjunction with the functions of private -enterprise again reveal the desirability and advantages of maintaining our traditional controls. At times, the equilibrium has been temporarily disturbed by too great enthusiasm for one or the other of these basic concepts. Sooner or later, however, the balance has been restored by the healthy opposition that is always created by excesses of one sort. At the current stage in our history, the swing toward undue enlargement of the powers of the State seems to have gone dangerously far and we would be untrue 'to our traditional behavior if the group that must demonstrate the virtues of free enterprise did not rally to its support with the utmost earnestness.

Jan 1, 1949

By S. Rideout

As Assistant Director for Program Support for the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM), a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Interior, I am responsible for the regulatory and abandoned mine land programs under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, which governs the environmental impacts of coal mining. My perspective is influenced by my current position and my previous positions in government and private industry. Sustainability is a cooperative effort of many parties and can only be achieved if each assumes their responsibilities for making it happen. I will highlight some of my thoughts on the role of government in achieving sustainability in the mining arena.

Jan 1, 2007

The administration came on as a strong supporter of the mining industry in April of 1982 when President Reagan delivered his long-awaited minerals policy statement. He promised to reduce America's minerals vulnerability, and called for spending billions on meeting stockpile goals for strategic minerals, opening up federal lands for mineral exploration, elimination of barriers to deep sea mining, and regulatory relief. He defended the favorable tax incentives in the Economic Recovery Act as a stimulus to private research and development that would ensure the availability of materials essential to the nation's economy and national defense. But the administration just didn't seem to get anywhere. Congress, environmentalists, and even foreign governments fought White House-proposed legislation on all fronts, delivering the ultimate coup in forcing Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Anne Burford's resignation and the subsequent EPA staff house cleaning in early 1983. Anti-Reaganites scored victory after victory against Reagan's efforts to stimulate the minerals industry. Congress was stalemated on so many mining-related issues that not much was done either for or against the industry. And the US was not to get its way on the issue of sea mining either. Most of Reagan's mineral policy objectives failed to be met. Three months after the National Materials and Minerals Program Plan was presented and the Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the Environment was made its coordinator, the head of the Cabinet Council James Watt blamed lack of progress in reviving the mining industry and creating a better strategic stockpile on the weak economy and the House of Representatives, which repeatedly thwarted efforts to open wilderness lands to mining. Congress The 97th Congress spent much of its time saying no in 1982-to the Reagan administration's deep cuts in energy and environment programs, to major changes in clean air and water laws, to oil and gas leasing in wilderness, and to killing the Department of Energy. Most of 1982 (and 1981) was spent in heated budget disputes. Some things that did not happen: • The administration and industry failed to get changes in controls of hazardous air pollutants and sulfur dioxide emissions that are implicated in the phenomenon known as acid rain. Industry had wanted to relax requirements for new industries building in clean air regions where the air act demands prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) of air quality, and to relax requirements tightening up the regulation of emissions of hazardous air pollutants. The air battle is expected to continue on five major fronts-acid rain, hazardous air pollutants, PSD, automobile pollution, and nonattainment. • Regulatory reform legislation to overhaul the way government carries out the law died a slow death last year. Business groups and the administration said federal agencies should be required to consider cost-effective measures of reaching regulatory objectives of protecting public health, safety, and the environment. Opponents, including environmentalists, feared such action would delay, weaken, or scuttle important regulations. • Congress turned thumbs down several times on proposals for oil and gas leasing in wilderness but could not agree on any new wilderness recommendations (see The Wilderness Battle). • Congress refused to open the door to the Reagan administration's plan to raise up to $4 billion a year from sales of federal lands. The administration identified surplus and excess federal lands, mostly obsolete buildings or isolated tracts of land, that could be sold by the General Services Administration (GSA) to help out the federal budget deficit. Congress took no action. Some things that did happen: • Congress extended the Defense Production Act (DPA) for six months through March 1983 without changing the 32-year-old law. That came after it failed to resolve sharp differences over proposals for critical minerals programs. Differences concerned both the amount of funds and the scope of programs that would be authorized under the DPA's Title III. Some proponents pressed for $5 billion in funding for loan guarantees or purchase commitments to spur domestic production of minerals such as cobalt. Other members of Congress wanted smaller amounts of funding, and the Reagan administration, until about November, had opposed any use of federal funds for strategic mineral programs. These measures were certain to come up again before the DPA extension expired in March. • House supporters of the Critical Materials Act of 1982 were unable to come up with the twothirds majority needed to pass the bill, so it died on the House floor in December. The bill proposed that a council be established with responsibility for coordinating federal materials research and development. The administration opposed the council creation contending that the Cabinet Council

Jan 5, 1983