This paper explores Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) reporting practices within the mining industry. Specifically, this paper investigates how and why a mining company makes voluntary reporting decisions to include the GRI indicators that may be considered ?negative? to the company?s reputation. Due to the voluntary nature of the GRI Guidelines, a GRI adopter is not legally obligated to report every GRI indicator. Not surprisingly, empirical studies that evaluated the extent to which companies? sustainability reports meet the GRI requirements (Guenther, Hoppe, & Poser, 2006; Morhardt, Baird, & Freeman, 2002; Samy, Odemilin, & Bampton, 2010; Skouloudis, Evangelinos, & Kourmousis, 2009) have found that reporting practices of the companies under their studies are well below the standards reflected in the GRI Guidelines. An influential study by Clarkson et al (2008) uses economic-based and socio-political theories to explain variation in companies? environmental disclosure. They have found that, as predicted by economic-based theory, superior environmental performers disclosed more ?hard? (i.e. verifiable) environmental information. Inferior environmental performers are found to disclose more ?soft? (i.e., not easily verifiable) claims, which is consistent with socio-political theories (Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & Vasvari, 2008). However, this study and the existing literature do not adequately explain why a company may act in a way that cannot be explained by economic-based and socio-political theories, for example, why it would report some negative soft data that it is not required to report. This paper intends to address this literature gap. GRI reporting by a Canadian mining company, which I would like to call ?Company C?, is used as a case study for this paper. Company C was selected for this research because in addition to ?positive? information, its GRI-based sustainability report also includes both hard and soft ?negative? information such as grievances. Research methods include interviewing Company C?s employees who are involved in preparing GRI reports and reviewing documents prepared both by the company and by external parties. I find that integrative social contracts theory (ISCT) offers a valuable explanation to Company C?s reporting practices. From the ISCT perspective, Company C?s management appears to feel that the company is obligated under social contracts to be transparent. Therefore, Company C disclosed both positive and negative social and environmental information to the public because the management appeared to think that it is the right thing to do. At the same time, being transparent about the bad news gave the company an opportunity to conclude that it had done something to avoid future occurrence of the negative incidents. Therefore, I propose that, in addition to the economic and socio-political theories that are more often used in literature, insights from ISCT are instrumental in improving our understanding of the corporate non-financial reporting practices phenomenon.
Voluntary Reporting of ?Negative? GRI Indicators: Insights from Integrative Social Contracts Theory