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By Dean McDonald

The Committee Bay Greenstone Belt extends over 300km and is one of the largest unexplored greenstone belts in North America with excellent gold and diamond potential. Committee Bay Resources Limited holds over 550,000 acres of land with prospective geology in the Committee Bay area southwest of Melville Peninsula, Nunavut. Committee Bay is a typical Archean greenstone belt comparable to the Yellowknife, Red Lake, Kirkland Lake and other prolific gold belts. Drilling during 2003 at Committee Bay resulted in: 1) the discovery of high-grade gold-bearing quartz veins with silicification and sulphidation at Three Bluffs, and 2) the continuation of high-grade gold mineralization in the hinge area of the iron formation at Inuk. Gold mineralization at Three Bluffs is identified in iron formation and adjacent sediments and has been traced by drilling for over 700m. The Three Bluffs iron formation is open to depth and along strike where is has been traced on surface for over 6km. In January 2004 Committee Bay and joint venture partner Gold Field?s announced a $7.1 million exploration program for the Committee Bay project in 2004. A total of 8,000m in exploration drilling has been approved for the expansion of the Three Bluffs to the resource stage and drilling of at least five new target areas. Additional mapping, sampling and geophysics will be used to identify new gold targets along the very prospective Committee Bay belt.

May 1, 2004

During the year Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 1916, 962 applications for member-ship in the Institute were received, as compared to 558 during the corresponding period in 1915. The lines along which the Committee has, worked during the year, group themselves under seven principal heads. Large Companies.-Early in the year a letter was addressed to each member of the Institute who is the executive head of an organization, pointing out to him the advantages that would accrue to that organization through having as many of its subordinate members as were qualified participating in the activities of the Institute. This was followed by a second letter to those who made no reply to the first. The response to these letters was very gratifying, 12 new members having been secured at a single plant, and smaller numbers at others. This was effectively supplemented by our President, who wrote the executive heads of some of the largest mining and smelting companies, pointing out to them the advantage to be derived from sending some of the junior members of their staff to attend the Arizona Meeting. One organization sent 24 of its younger men, many of whom were not members of the Institute, but who, subsequently sent in applications for membership. It is to be hoped that the precedent thus set' will be acted 'on in -fuller measure in succeeding years.

Jan 2, 1917

C. R. CORNING, Chairman. ADOLPHE E. BORIE, First Vice-Chairman. THOMAS T. READ, Secretary, Woolworth Bldg., New York, N. Y. Vie-Chairmen. JOHN H. ALLEN, GEORGE M. COLVOCORESSES, RICHARD M. ATWATER, JR., ROBERT PEELE, GEORGE D. BARRON, CHARLES P. PERIN, A. CHESTER BEATTY, JOSEPH A. VAN MATER, J. PARKE CHANNING, ARTHUR L. WALKER. D. C. Bard, Howard Eckfeldt. Philip N. Moore, W. de L. Benedict, R. C. Gemmell, T. H. O'Brien, John C. Branner, F. Louis Grammer, James J. Ormsbee. Palmer Carter, Ernest A. Hersam, Edward W. Parker, Allen J. Clark, Edwin C. Holden, John B. Porter, F. Crabtree, William L. Honnold, R. DI. Raymond, George G. Crawford, Reginald E. Hore, Robert H. Richards, O. C. Davidson, C. Colcock Jones, LeRoy Slash, E. V. D'Invilliers, Eugene P. Kennedy, Frederick H. Sexton, James S. Douglas, Chester F. Lee, Henry L. Smyth, Walter Douglas, Richard S. McCaffery, F. W. Traphagen, Howard N. Eavenson, James F. McClelland, Elton W. Walker. Milton H. McLean, The Chairman of the Committee on the eve of his departure frog -,he country for an extended stay, addressed the following letter t ,he President of the Institute NEW YORK, N. Y., APRIL 19, 1913.

Jan 5, 1913

The work of the Committee on Industrial Preparedness* is well summed up in the following letter written by Thomas A. Edison, Chair-man of the Naval Consulting Board, after President Wilson and signed the army appropriation and army reorganization bills: "The Committee on Industrial Preparedness of the Naval Consulting Board, of which committee Howard E. Coffin is chairman, after a five months' campaign in many ways unique in vigor and vision has played a very definite part in the measures for the national defense which have just become law. It is responsible for having laid the foundation for a true industrial preparedness in this nation. "Five months ago the committee, wholly non-partisan in make-up, acting with the civil, mechanical, mining and electrical engineers and the chemists of the country, members of five great scientific bodies, began its work in' every nook and cranny of the land. The purpose was to prepare American industry efficiently to support the armed forces of America in the event of war. "The public, the business men and the legislators at Washington knew little regarding the demands on industry in connection with modern war. No department at Washington was charged with the duty of coordinating the needs of the army and navy with transportation, industry, and kindred functions. The purchasing, quartermaster's and ordnance departments of the army and navy were unable to buy military supplies except by competitive offering in the open market. No one had considered the need, and no legislative machinery was in existence, for preventing the presence of skilled workers on the fighting front when they would in time of war be needed in the factories, mills and mines of the country. Neither at Washington or elsewhere was there even a list of the industrial resources of the nation in such shape as could be used for practical purposes in case war should come. "The three things, then, that the committee headed by Mr. Coffin set out to do and that now have been brought about were as follows: First, to mobilize concretely the business men of America and their output against a day of need. This meant chiefly to discover in fullest detail just what equipment our manufacturers possessed that might be swung over to supply the army and navy swiftly and bountifully from the hour the colors were raised. In a few weeks this initial task, which has been a truly colossal one, will be at an end. A complete report of the equipment of practically every concern of substantial size in the country is now in the hands of the - committee. Directly in charge of the great inventory has been W. S. Gifford, Supervising Director of the Committee. The second step was to procure legislation making possible the placing by the war and navy departments of annual orders for munitions in small quantities to American manufacturers now not producing such things, so that quietly, efficiently and thoroughly they could learn in time of peace how to supply the government in time of war. The new laws make all this possible. It should be said here that this practice will bring about a geographical diffusion of munition plants all over our country, instead of affording us only a few such concerns for the most part near the exposed seaboards, as at present. It is obvious that this system will also throttle all talk of a munitions trust.

Jan 10, 1916

Executive A R LEDOUX, Chairman ARTHUR S DWIGHT CHARLES F RAND E P MATHEWSON J V W REYNDERS Membership E DEGOLYER, Chairman W Y WESTERVELT, Vice-chairman WILLIAM H BASSETT H G MOULTON C MINOT WELD Finance WALTER H ALDRIDGE, Chairman GEORGE D BARRON GALEN H CLEVENGER Library GEORGE C STONE,' Chairman JOHN H JANEWAY ALEXANDER C HUMPHREYS, ROBERT LINTON FREDERICK F SHARPLESS

Jan 1, 1923

STANDING COMMITTEES Executive A, R. LEDOUX, Chairman HERBERT HOOVER EDWIN LUDLOW ARTHUR S. DWIGHT CHARLES F. RAND Membership J. V. W. REYNDERS, Chairman J. V. N. DOER W. H. ALDRIDGE EDGAR RICKARD R. M. RAYMOND Finance MARK L. REQUA CHARLES F. RAND, Chairman J. V. W. REYNDERS Library E. GYBBON SPILSBURY, Chairman ALEXANDER C. HUMPHREYS GEORGE C. STONE JOHN H. JANEWAY BRADLEY STOUGHTON Papers and Publications BRADLEY STOUGHTON, Chairman

Jan 1, 1923

Jan 1, 1918

Executive A. R. LEDOUX, Chairman GEORGE D. BARRON SIDNEY J. JENNINGS J. V. N. DORR J. E. JOHNSON, JR.¬ Membership J. E. JOHNSON, JR., Chairman KARL EILERS F. F. SHARPLESS R. M. RAYMOND LEWIS W. FRANCIS Finance J. V. N. DORR, Chairman CHARLES F. RAND J. V. W. REYNDERS Library E. GYBBON SPILSBURY,' Chairman ALEXANDER C. HUMPHREYS GEORGE C. STONE' JOHN H. JANEWAY BRADLEY STOUGHTON Papers and Publications BRADLEY STOUGHTON, Chairman

Jan 1, 1923

Jan 1, 1947

Jan 1, 1947

Jan 1, 1943

Jan 1, 1943

By James M. Barker

No commodity agreements now exist for sulfur and a lack of reference to sulfur commodity agreements exists in the literature. Law (1975) made a passing reference to sulfur as one of a group of commodities where "there have been additional control efforts of various types." Clearly, sulfur was a candidate, at least conceptually in the past, for some form of commodity agreement and the following discussion centers on the world sulfur market of the early 1980's in this context. GENERAL THEORY OF COMMODITY AGREEMENTS The upsurge in demands for commodity agreements seen in the last decade or so stems largely from agitation by the less developed countries (LDC) for better economic treatment by more developed countries (MDC). Several economic factors, real or imagined, adversely affect the LDC's as follows (MacAvoy, 1977): 1) variable demand in MDC's causes wide fluctuations in commodity prices which hurt the economies of commodity producers, who are often LDC's although consumer economies may also benefit from more predictable prices; 2) a general decline of commodity prices relative to the price of manufactured goods which hurts commodity producers in their balance of trade while their stocks and overcapacity rise; 3) instability of LDC economies enhanced by the above factors lowers internal stability, inhibits foreign investment, and retards economic growth; and 4) a lack of self respect when dealing with developed countries o, following the OPEC lead, LDC producers want the stature related to cartel market power.

Jan 1, 1985

By F. H. Buttner

Commodity currency intrigues most of us because of the problems it offers to solve for the Third and the First Worlds. What problems might be solved, if commodity currency were to be adopted in the Third World? That is really the question we are probing here right now. It would take a while to think through all their subtle consequences of this question, but, off the top, it might well have at least three important impacts. Most important of these to this audience is relief from unfair Third World competition. Second, it might well liberate Third World economies from financial indebtedness to the First World and give them freedom from the liquidity limitations. The third benefit is that it might help relieve World trade tensions. All three benefits are interrelated. We could start our speculations on the application of commodity currency from anyone of these starting points. But let us use the starting point most important to you, unfair competition to the U.S. mining industry. From there we might wind up with some thoughts on things you, yourselves, can do to improve things.

Jan 1, 1978

1. Domestic Production and Use: Twelve companies operated 31 primary aluminum reduction plants, three firms accounting for 66% of production. Washington, Oregon, and Montana accounted for 32% of the total production; Gulf Coast States, 25%; Northern States, 29%; and other Southern States, 14%. Output of primary metal in 1973 was valued at $2.2 billion. About 80% of the secondary recovery was from new aluminum base scrap and 20% was from old scrap. Aluminum consumption by 25,000 firms was centered in the East Central United States. Of aluminum consuming industries in 1972, building accounted for 28%; transportation 19%; electrical, 13%; packaging, 16%; and consumer durab1es, 10%.

Jan 1, 1974

1. Domestic Production and Use: In 1974 twelve companies operated 31 primary aluminum reduction plants, three firms accounting for 64% of production. Washington, Oregon, and Montana accounted for 32% of the total production; Gulf Coast States, 24%; Northern States, 33%, and other Southern States 11%. Output of primary metal in 1974 was valued at $3.4 billion. About 80% of the secondary recovery was from new aluminum base scrap and 20% was from old scrap. Aluminum consumption by 25,000 firms was centered in the East Central United States. Of aluminum consuming industries in 1974, building accounted for about 27%; transportation 19%; electrical, 13%; packaging, 15%; and consumer durab1es, 9%.

Jan 1, 1975

1. Domestic Production and Use: In 1975.12 companies operated 31 primary aluminum reduction plants, with 3 firms accounting for 67% of production capacity. Washington, Oregon, and Montana accounted for 37% of the total production; Gulf Coast States 21%, Northern States 29%, and other Southern States 13%. Output of primary metal in 1975 was valued at $3.0 billion. Aluminum consumption by 25,000 firms was centered in the East Central United States. Of aluminum consuming industries in 1975, building accounted for about 21%; transportation 19%; electrical 14%; packaging 18%; and consumer durables, 9%.

Jan 1, 1976

Domestic Production and Use: In 1976, 12 companies operated 31 primary aluminum reduction plants, with 3 firms accounting for 63% of production capacity. Washington, Oregon, and Montana accounted for 36% of the total production; Gulf Coast States 19%, Northern States 29%, and other Southern States 16%. Based on published producer prices output of primary metal in 1976 was valued at $3.8 billion. Aluminum consumption by 25,000 firms was centered in the East Central United States. Of aluminum consuming industries in 1976 building accounted for about 25%; packaging 22%; transportation 19%; electrical 13%; , consumer durables 8%; and other uses, 13%.

Jan 1, 1977

By G. Pierson

Explanations for commodity price levels (or movements) commonly focus on the fundamentals of supply and demand otherwise they are simply assigned to speculative activity. Comparisons of metal-price histories to monetary and other economic data support the argument that the supply of and demand for money are no less important in the determination of price than are the supply and demand of the commodity itself. That these relationships should exist is evident in the price identity and they are consistent with monetary theory. The patterns developed have limited usefulness as predictors, but their recognition is essential for the construction of price scenarios for planning purposes.

Jan 1, 1998

By G. Pierson

Explanations for commodity price levels (or movements) commonly focus on the fundamentals of supply and demand, otherwise they are simply assigned to speculative activity. Comparisons of metal-price histories to monetary and other economic data support the argument that the supply of and demand for money are no less important in the determination of price than are the supply and demand of the commodity itself. That these relationships should exist is evident in the price identity and they are consistent with monetary theory. The patterns developed have limited usefulness as predictors, but their recognition is essential for the construction of price scenarios for planning purposes.

Jan 1, 1997