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AT THE beginning of September, the French eased their pressure against Germany and allowed the latter to, be granted an arrangement for its reparation payments in kind according to the Lubersac-Stinnes agreement. The whole arrangement as to the German reparations is, however, but temporary. The Greeks suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of the Turks in Anatolia, which rapidly resulted in the expulsion of the Greeks from Asia Minor, the Turks occupying Smyrna about Sept. 10. A few days after entering Smyrna the Turks sacked the city and finally set it afire, creating one of the most terrible destructions in history. At the same time their advance on Constantinople, together with their demands on the Allies, brought them directly in, con-flict with the latter and Great. Britain prepared for a new war, with doubt as to the support of France, whose political interests in the Near East are as different as their economic interests with respect to ;Germany. The Turkish situation became thus a threat against the peace of Europe. A revolution in Greece, followed by the abdication of King Constantine and the return of Venizelos to a function in the Government was one of the conse-quences of the defeat in Asia Minor. Civil war continued in Ireland, with more or less -bloodshed. Economically there has been no change for the better in Europe. In Great Britain there, are no signs of an -important trade revival. In Germany and Austria things are worse. French, Italian and Spanish affairs continue in a bad way. In the United States business is represented as "booming," but many people are inquiring where is the boom? About the middle of September Congress passed the tariff and the soldier bonus bills. The President signed the former and vetoed the latter, with a strong message that won praise among people who understand condi-tions. Congress tried to pass the bill over the veto, but failed. The President signed the tariff bill, which became effective Sept. 21. A severe handicap was thus imposed on American economics.

Jan 10, 1922

By James Neale

FROM the beginning of its activities, the members of the National Production Committee have felt that the following points were essential to the success of its work: The operators must. feel that their operations were not 100 per cent. efficient; that they should be courteous and fair in their treatment of their employees; and that they should set an example of hard work and patriotic interest in increased production. Every move made must appeal to the sense of fairness of all parties concerned. The men must feel that in working more faithfully, and consequently producing more coal, they are rendering a distinct service to their Government in the time of its great need. As the workers feel that greater efficiency on their part results only in greater profits to the operators, the advantage to the operator should be lost sight of, as far as possible, and the advantage to the Government in fighting the war emphasized. Both operators and workers should know that the Government considered increased production an obligation, and opportunity for service, resting on both parties and not on the operators or the workers alone, and that both parties could very much better the efficiency of the pre-war period. Had the committee intimated that it thought the coal shortage was clue entirely to the idleness and inefficiency of the workers, its campaign would have failed, for the men would have resented the charge because only too frequently their efforts to produce more coal were thwarted by bad management; besides the operators would have lacked stimulus to better effort. On the other hand, had the impression been given that the committee thought that the coal shortage was clue entirely to bad management, the operators would have resented the charge because only too frequently their efforts to produce more coal were thwarted by the idleness and inefficiency of the workers; and the workers, having been thus indirectly pronounced 100 per cent. efficient and patriotic, would have lacked stimulus to better effort.

Jan 2, 1919

ARTHUR BRICE deSAULLES In the death of, Major A. B. deSaulles at South Bethlehem, Pa., on Dec. 24, 1917, the Institute lost a valued and esteemed member, one of the last few of those who, in May, 1871, at Wilkes-Barre, attended the first meeting of the Institute, in response to a call that had been issued by R. P. Rothwell, Eckley B. Coxe, and Martin Coryell. Major deSaulles was born Jan. 8, 1840, at New Orleans, and was the son of Louis and Armide Longer deSaulles, each of French descent. As a boy he was privately tutored in the South, and then schooled in New England to enter the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, where he was graduated with honors in the class of '59. Following his graduation he studied in France and Germany for two years, returning to New Orleans in 1861 to enter the Confederate Army, in which he served with distinction- as an engineer throughout the Civil War, rising to the rank of Major and the command of his Corps. After the close of the war he pursued his studies abroad for another year, returning to New York in April, 1866, when be became engineer for the New York & Schuylkill Coal Company, and remained at its plant near Wilkes-Barre until October, 1871, when it was sold to the Philadelphia & Reading Coal and Iron Company.. He then returned to New York where for several years he was engaged in the practice of his profession. In 1869, he married Catharine M. Heckscher, daughter of Charles Heckscher of New York City. Mrs. deSaulles survives him. In 1876, Major deSaulles became superintendent of the Dunbar Furnace Company in Fayette County, Pa., with which company he remained until 1883. As a feature of the Pittsburgh meeting in May, 1879, Major and Mrs. deSaulles entertained the members of the Insti-

Jan 4, 1918

By A. S. Learoyd

The Anthracite Division, Bureau of Distribution, of the United atates Fuel Administration, came into existence about Oct. 20, 1917. There had been no definite policy determined upon and the distribution had been carried out by the producers and distributors of this fuel as under normal conditions. The domestic sizes had been shipped from the beginning of the coal year on Apr. 1 in about their usual proportions to the various sections of the anthracite consuming territory of this country, which, in a general way, extended as far west as Nebraska and Montana, and in the south along the Atlantic seaboard to Florida. With the advent of cold weather, about the middle of November, acute shortages commenced to develop all over the northeastern section of the country, due to largely increased demand by the public in general, to enormously increased population in centers where industrial war activity was concentrated, and by the needs of the war industries themselves. Commencing with the early part of December, this demand was aggravated by extreme low temperatures and heavy snow; and the production decreased for the same reasons. From that date until the change in the weather, about the latter part of February, it was simply a question of getting coal into communities as emergencies occurred, to take care of individual cases. No definite plan of distribution could be followed. The coal mined between Apr. 1 and Nov. 1 had been distributed as mined and therefore only current production was available for distribution. The Anthracite Division, during this period, consisted of a Director, two assistants, together with an office force .of seven or eight clerks and stenographers. The trying experiences of the winter of 1917-18 had, however, shown a ready willingness on the part of the anthracite operators and distributors to cooperate in every way with the United States Fuel Administration. It was realized that if a definite and comprehensive plan of distribution could be formulated to become effective Apr. 1, 1918, determined on the actual needs of each state and community, the producers

Jan 1, 1920

By J. B. Neale

FRom the beginning of its activities, the members of the National Production Committee have felt that the following points were essential to the success of its work: The operators must feel that their operations were not 100 per cent. efficient; that they should be courteous and fair in their treatment of their employees; and that they should set an example of hard work and patriotic interest in increased production. Every move made must appeal to the sense of fairness of all parties concerned. The men must feel that in working more faithfully, and consequently producing more coal, they are rendering a distinct service to their Government in the time of its great need. As the workers feel that greater efficiency on their part results only in greater profits to the operators, the advantage to the operator should be lost sight of, as far as possible, and the advantage to the Government in fighting the war emphasized. Both operators and workers should know that the Government considered increased production an obligation, and opportunity for service, resting on both parties and not on the operators or the workers alone, and that both parties could very much better the efficiency of the pre-war period. Had the committee intimated that it thought the coal shortage was due entirely to the idleness and inefficiency of the workers, its campaign would have failed, for the men would have resented the charge because only too frequently their efforts to produce more coal were thwarted by bad management; besides, the operators would have lacked stimulus to better effort. On the other hand, had the impression been given that the committee thought that the coal shortage was due entirely to bad management, the operators would have resented the charge because only too frequently their efforts to produce more coal were thwarted by the idleness and inefficiency of the workers; and the workers, having been thus indirectly pronounced 100 per cent. efficient and patriotic, would have lacked stimulus to better effort.

Jan 1, 1920

By Frank E. Hall

The needs of the World War showed the necessity of a metal stronger than cast iron which would supplement the supply of steel. SO patriotic metallurgists were spurred to new efforts to improve the status of that half-breed of the metal world that had been, more or less erroneously, christened semisteel. As a result, it was developed that for certain purposes semisteel was superior to steel in the manufacture of shells. Steel, because of its greater strength and toughness, is able to carry a greater charge of explosive, weight for weight; consequently, a steel shell can be expected to cause greater destruction when used against fortifications or other inanimate objects, while semisteel, because of its comparative brittleness and its resulting greater fragmentation, is capable of inflicting more serious loss of life when used against opposing forces of men. Therefore, each has its proper place in the economy of war. For the present purpose, steel may be defined as a comparatively pure iron whose physical nature is modified by small amounts of carbon, silicon, sulfur, phosphorus, manganese, and possibly other rarer elements; while cast iron generally is limited to approximately 93 per cent. of iron, the remainder consisting of larger percentages of carbon, silicon, sulfur, phosphorus, and manganese. Semisteel may be defined as cast iron in which the carbon and silicon have been reduced to as low a point as is consistent with maintaining the nature of gray iron, and in which the remaining elements are adjusted so as to give the greatest strength. The fact that the addition of steel scrap, in varying percentages, is the means used to reduce the carbon, together with the fact that a considerable increase in strength results, is probably the explanation of the origin of the name semisteel. That ordinary grades of steel show from three to four times the tensile strength of cast iron is due to the fact that the crystals, or grains, of cast iron are interspersed with flakes of

Jan 1, 1922

By Frank E. Hall

The needs of the World War showed the necessity of a metal stronger than cast iron which would supplement the supply of steel. SO patriotic metallurgists were spurred to new efforts to improve the status of that half-breed of the metal world that had been, more or less erroneously, christened semisteel. As a result, it was developed that for certain purposes semisteel was superior to steel in the manufacture of shells. Steel, because of its greater strength and toughness, is able to carry a greater charge of explosive, weight for weight; consequently, a steel shell can be expected to cause greater destruction when used against fortifications or other inanimate objects, while semisteel, because of its comparative brittleness and its resulting greater fragmentation, is capable of inflicting more serious loss of life when used against opposing forces of men. Therefore, each has its proper place in the economy of war. For the present purpose, steel may be defined as a comparatively pure iron whose physical nature is modified by small amounts of carbon, silicon, sulfur, phosphorus, manganese, and possibly other rarer elements; while cast iron generally is limited to approximately 93 per cent. of iron, the remainder consisting of larger percentages of carbon, silicon, sulfur, phosphorus, and manganese. Semisteel may be defined as cast iron in which the carbon and silicon have been reduced to as low a point as is consistent with maintaining the nature of gray iron, and in which the remaining elements are adjusted so as to give the greatest strength. The fact that the addition of steel scrap, in varying percentages, is the means used to reduce the carbon, together with the fact that a considerable increase in strength results, is probably the explanation of the origin of the name semisteel. That ordinary grades of steel show from three to four times the tensile strength of cast iron is due to the fact that the crystals, or grains, of cast iron are interspersed with flakes of

Jan 1, 1922

By Ove Sandberg, Olav Bowitz

The operational characteristics of the Soderberg vertical spike anode are briefly discussed stressing the importance of the flow properties of paste in the fluid zone, the thermal shrinkage in the carbonizing zone, and the surface disintegration in the consumption zone. The requirements for paste recipe and binder quality are combined with design and operation of cell. A low temperature susceptibility of viscosity and low thermal shrinkage of paste together with a low microporosity of the binder coke are important properties. PRACTICAL application of Soderberg's idea of a selfbaking carbon electrode proved successful just before 1920. Shortly after, experimental work was started with the aim of developing a continuous electrode that could be adopted as anode in aluminium reduction cells. The intermittent operation of a large number of small prebaked anodes made the idea of developing a continuous anode for electrolytic production of aluminium especially tempting. Moreover, the electrode consumption in this process, even on a theoretical basis, is very high. Many installations were carried out in the 1930's and during the Second World War. During the tremendous post-war expansion of the aluminium industry, the Soderberg electrode has been steadily more widely adopted. Thus, today more than 60 pct of the Western World's output of aluminium is produced in cells with selfbaking anodes, see Big. 1. The quality of the anode paste of Sfiderberg elec- trodes is considered a major factor influencing the specific carbon consumption. The purpose of this paper is to survey the fundamental requirements which must be met in order to obtain good anode operation. We have limited this paper to a discussion of Elektrokemisk's research on the vertical spike type anode. I) FUNDAMEKI'TALS OF ANODE CARBON PERFORMANCE A) Brief Introduction. The only practical method for producing a conductive carbon anode of the size required is to form and carbonize a mixture of a carbonaceous binder and a precalcined dry aggregate coke. In the Soderberg electrode, the forming and carbonization take place in the electrolytic cell

Jan 1, 1962

By Charles H. MacDowell

Up to 1909 the American public had little knowledge of, or interest in, potash. Some remembered that it had to do with soft soap and sore throat,, but further they knew not. In 1909-10, the German-American potash war, and the publicity attending hostilities, brought home to America the knowledge that potash was an important article of commerce; that Germany monopolized its production and distribution, and exercised all the prerogatives attending complete control. The present war, with its transportation embargo, has again directed attention to Germany's strength as a potash producer and her present unfortunate situation as a distributor. As a consequence, the search for potash takes on new life and it again becomes a subject of general interest. My first knowledge of potash came from a study of the German potash exhibit at the World's Fair in 1893. This investigation led to the recommendation that Armour & Co. engage in the manufacture of commercial fertilizers and the fertilizer branch was organized early in 1894. From then to now " potash " has been a live subject. Two and eight-tenths per cent. of the earth's crust consists of potassium oxide. It is an important constituent of feldspar, granite, and other igneous rocks. Potash is valuable commercially in a water-soluble form. In igneous rocks it is locked in so tight that it is of little value and no utilization in a commercial way has been made of these insoluble forms. Potash in water-soluble form is found in large deposits in Germany; in smaller deposits in Austria and Spain; and in brines in some of our Western arid basins. The deposits in Germany, Austria, and Spain are concentrations from sea waters containing potash derived from the decomposition of potash-bearing rocks. It has been found that the amount of potash remaining in decomposed rocks is not the same as that in the original rock. For instance, granite containing originally 5.58 per cent. potash contained only 1.49 per cent, in the decomposed rock. Syenite containing 6 per cent. in the original

Jan 1, 1915

By Alexander Gakner

Since the end of World War II the Soviet Union has made great strides toward economic development of the country. Today it is firmly established as the world's second largest industrial power after the United States and it has committed itself before the people on both sides of the Iron Curtain to catch up with and to overtake us within a few decades. No nation could achieve such a degree of industrialization or aspire to become the world's industrial leader without a large supply of many basic mineral raw materials or at least easy access to such resources. In addition, it requires technical competence, a large skilled labor force, and a high rate of capital investment. Why should we concern ourselves with these Soviet aspirations? The Free World's yardstick of measuring a nation's well-being is the standard of living of the people in that country. Presumably even Communist governments are committed to some, however gradual, improvement in the standard of living of their people. The population of the USSR is 20 pct greater than that of the United States. Hence, if they ever achieve a standard of living equal to ours, they must by all logic reach a greater overall industrial output. However, in the U.S.S.R. the standard of living of the masses has not kept pace with the expanding industrial production and is still far behind that of the United States. Our concern, therefore, is with what the USSR intends to accomplish with its expanding industrial power: Will they produce large mineral raw-material surpluses and manufacture products to compete with us for world markets and attempt to put us out of business if not use it directly to wage war; or will they use their resources merely to produce more consumer goods for the Soviet people; or will they, along with other Communist nations in the not-too-distant future, compete with us for the world's sources of mineral raw-materials to maintain a high level of mass consumption?

Jan 6, 1960

THE story of Miami really is two stories. First, that of an excellent Porphyry Copper mine, ably managed as a business enterprise, and always among the leaders in technical progress. Concentrating its first ore in 1911, it had by 1925 paid dividends totaling $30,000,000 or $40 per share on stock that had cost the public $5 per share in March, 1908. The ore, containing 2.5 per cent copper at the start, had become progressively leaner but the recovery had tended to improve. Production costs had gone up during the World War and the early post-war period; and had come down again. In all these respects it had followed the norm. If the mine had been abandoned as exhausted and the company had been liquidated late in 1925 (a program that had been given earnest consideration in 1924), Miami would have gone down into history a first-rate mining venture; as an active and progressive participant in the great Porphyry achievement. But Miami was not liquidated in 1925; instead it started to write the record of its second and really amazing story. Near the old mine was a large body of low-grade ore containing, in place, less than 20 lb. of copper to the ton, and without, incident- ally, any considerable sweetening of gold and silver. Any method of underground mining that was cheap enough would certainly entail some dilution, so that ore as sent to the concentrator necessarily would average much less than 20 lb. As a matter of record, the average for 1929 was 16.6 lb., from which 11.726 lb. was recovered as concentrate. As already said, the exhaustion of the older orebody during 1925 was foreseen; but in 1924 the decision was reached to enlarge the concentrator and develop a new mine. An expenditure of $2,500,000 was entailed in this program. By October, 1925, the

Jan 1, 1933

By Edwin B. Eckel

THIS paper, based on brief field examination and on data supplied by the operators, records the condition of the Italian mercury industry as of March 1945, not long after Italy's collapse. Except for the once-Italian but now Yugoslavian Idria mine near Trieste, virtually all the known mercury deposits are in the Monte Amiata district in Siena and Grosseto Provinces, 75 miles north of Rome. This district contains the Abbadia San Salvatore, the Siele, the Argus, and the Cerreto Piano mines besides numerous prospects and unproductive mines. Under pressure from Germany the principal mines were highly productive during the early part of the war, but production fell off long before its end. All of the mines were damaged in some way at the German withdrawal but by September 1944 the Abbadia had resumed production and several others were only lacking power by the early spring of 1945. The Monte Amiata district is characterized geologically by a thick series of sedimentary rocks that range from Triassic to Eocene in age and are surmounted on Monte Amiata itself by a thick cap of extrusive trachyte. Bodies of travertine and of landslide detritus, younger than the trachyte, are rather widespread. The structure is complex and little known but most of the ore deposits seem to lie along or near a major, north-trending fault or on associated cross-fractures. Cinnabar is the only important ore mineral and clay minerals are by far the most abundant products of hydrothermal alteration. A southward increase in the amount of stibnite, relative to cinnabar, suggests horizontal zoning. The grade of ore ranges from 0.60 to 3.0 pct and the reserves, as compared with those in American mines, are enormous. Even in the face of war-time scarcities, the mines are remarkably self-sufficient and labor is plentiful, but the costs of production are estimated to be not greatly below those of the better American mines. Notes on the principal mines, on the mining and metallurgical methods, and on the manufacture of synthetic cinnabar are included in the paper.

Jan 1, 1947

During the war period of quicksilver activity there were a number of departures from what may be termed the classical quicksilver metallurgy. Attempts were made to beneficiate low-grade ores by gravity concentration and flotation; mechanical furnaces began to replace the Scott furnace and the vertical coarse-ore furnaces, and condensers of sewer tile and redwood tanks were used in place of the older brick and stone condensing chambers. Other developments that have occurred during the current period of quicksilver activity are mainly in the nature of improvement and further refinement of those started during the war period. Each period of quicksilver activity has been accompanied by the proposal of various new processes, including wet methods for the treatment of quicksilver ores and innovations in furnaces, retorts and condenser equipment. As far as the author knows, nothing of economic significance in the way of "new processes" has been developed. There is in fact no real need for any essentially new process for the treatment of quicksilver ores; the direct furnace treatment is simple and inexpensive. Moreover, with rare exceptions, the quicksilver industry has no complex or refractory ore problems corresponding to those which are receiving more and more attention from metallurgists in other branches of the nonferrous field. Untler these conditions improvements in quicksilver metallurgy must be looked for through the adaptation of current developments in engineering and metallurgy generally to the particular needs of quicksilver practice rather than through the invention of new processes. Preliminary Treatment of Quicksilver Ores At Sulphur Bank, in the treatment of old dump material left by the early operators, wet screening is being used as a preliminary step in concentration ahead of flotation. Power shovels and trucks are used to deliver some 400 tons of ore per day to the lower terminal of a hoist, which in turn discharges the material at the top of the screening plant. Wet screening is carried on in two stages. Depending on the character of the material, 1-in. or 2-in. punched screens are used on the first trommel.

Jan 1, 1930

By Robert Keeney

THE electric smelting of manganese ore and the production of ferro- manganese did not exist as an industry, in the United States or elsewhere, previous to the outbreak of war in 1914. Ferromanganese had been produced, electrically, during times of high prices by two companies at Niagara Falls and by several European companies, but the production. was spasmodic, and none was electrically produced when ferromanganese sold at from $35 to $40 per ton. Thus the electric smelting of manganese ore must be considered as a development caused by the high prices prevailing during the years 1916, 1917 and 1918, and the necessity of smelting domestic ore in order to fill the ferromanganese requirements of the steel industry of the United States, which increased from 189,088 tons in 1914 to 356,356 tons in 1918. The electric furnace is well adapted to smelting domestic-ore because it can be located in small units near the source of ore supply. In 1918, the ferromanganese production of the United States was 333,027 tons, of which about 7 per cent., or 23,000 tons, was produced in the electric furnace. The electric furnace not only assisted materially in the development of a domestic-ore supply but made a considerable saving of coke, as it requires about 1,4 tons of bituminous or lignite coal per ton of ferromanganese compared with a blast-furnace consumption of 2.9 tons of coke per ton of ferromanganese. Some of the plants in the United States that smelted manganese ore in the electric furnace during the war and in 1920 are listed in Tabled. From early in 1919 to about February, 1920, little ferromanganese was produced in the electric furnace. During this period the price of ferro-manganese (78 to 82 per cent. manganese) was about $100 per ton. During the first half of 1920, several plants resumed operation when the, price of. ferromanganese (76 to 80 per cent. grade) gradually increased to $200 per ton, delivered.

Jan 2, 1921

By Robert M. Keeney, Jay Lonergan

The electric smelting of manganese ore and the production of ferro-manganese did not exist as an industry, in the United States or elsewhere, previous to the outbreak of war in 1914. Ferromanganese had been produced, electrically, during times of high prices by two companies at Niagara Falls and by several European companies, but the production was spasmodic, and none was electrically produced when ferromanganese sold at from $35 to $40 per ton. Thus the electric smelting of manganese ore must be considered as a development caused by the high prices prevailing during the years 1916, 1917 and 1918, and the necessity of smelting domestic ore in order to fill the ferromanganese requirements of the steel industry of the United States, which increased from 189,088 tons in 1914 to 356,356 tons in 1918. The electric furnace is well adapted to smelting domestic ore because it can be located in small units near the source of ore supply. In 1918, the ferromanganese production of the United States was 333,027 tons, of which about 7 per cent., or 23,000 tons, was produced in the electric furnace. The electric furnace not only assisted materially in the development of a domestic-ore supply but made a considerable saving of coke, as it requires about 11/4 tons of bituminous or lignite coal per ton of ferromanganese compared with a blast-furnace consumption of 2.9 tons of coke per ton of ferromanganese. Some of the plants in the United States that smelted manganese orc in the electric furnace during the war and in 1920 are listed in Table 1. From early in 1919 to about February, 1920, little ferromanganese was produced in the electric furnace. During this period the price of ferromanganese (78 to 82 per cent. manganese) was about $100 per ton. During the first half of 1920, several plants resumed operation when the price of ferromanganese (76 to 80 per cent. grade) gradually increased to $200 per ton, delivered.

Jan 1, 1922

By Jay Lonergan, Robert M. Keeney

The electric smelting of manganese ore and the production of ferro-manganese did not exist as an industry, in the United States or elsewhere, previous to the outbreak of war in 1914. Ferromanganese had been produced, electrically, during times of high prices by two companies at Niagara Falls and by several European companies, but the production was spasmodic, and none was electrically produced when ferromanganese sold at from $35 to $40 per ton. Thus the electric smelting of manganese ore must be considered as a development caused by the high prices prevailing during the years 1916, 1917 and 1918, and the necessity of smelting domestic ore in order to fill the ferromanganese requirements of the steel industry of the United States, which increased from 189,088 tons in 1914 to 356,356 tons in 1918. The electric furnace is well adapted to smelting domestic ore because it can be located in small units near the source of ore supply. In 1918, the ferromanganese production of the United States was 333,027 tons, of which about 7 per cent., or 23,000 tons, was produced in the electric furnace. The electric furnace not only assisted materially in the development of a domestic-ore supply but made a considerable saving of coke, as it requires about 11/4 tons of bituminous or lignite coal per ton of ferromanganese compared with a blast-furnace consumption of 2.9 tons of coke per ton of ferromanganese. Some of the plants in the United States that smelted manganese orc in the electric furnace during the war and in 1920 are listed in Table 1. From early in 1919 to about February, 1920, little ferromanganese was produced in the electric furnace. During this period the price of ferromanganese (78 to 82 per cent. manganese) was about $100 per ton. During the first half of 1920, several plants resumed operation when the price of ferromanganese (76 to 80 per cent. grade) gradually increased to $200 per ton, delivered.

Jan 1, 1922

By AIME AIME

AN unusually interesting meeting devoted to the discussion of the ways and means of improving coal mining practice, through the larger use of machinery underground, was held in the Auditorium of the Engineering Societies Building on March 11. The meeting was organized by the Materials Handling Division of the A. S. M. E. and held under the auspices of the Metropolitan Section of that Society and the National Coal Association. The New York Section of the A. I. M. E., which had been invited to participate, found itself unable to do so formally because of a conflicting date for its March meeting but informally did its part to aasure the success of the meeting. As a result of the discussion at and preceding the meeting, the National Coal Association, through Walter Barnum, chairman of its research committee, has asked the A. S. M. E. and A. I. M. E. to join the Association in a study of the present problems of the bituminous coal industry. Messrs. Harry L. Gandy, Calvin W. Rice and H. Foster Bain have been selected to act as a committee which shall develop plans for a joint program.

Jan 1, 1926

By Martti E. Maliniemi

The Svappavaara mine is located 47 km southeast of Kiruna C. The ore deposit now being worked, Leveäniemi, belongs to Luossavaara- Kiirunavaara AB (LKAB) and is the company's, and also Sweden's, third biggest mine after Kiirunavaara and Malmberget. The distance by rail to the Norwegian port of Narvik is 214 km and to Lulei on the Gulf of Bothnia 340 km (Fig. 1). The village of Svappavaara has about 800 inhabitants. The climate is arctic in character. The temperature during the months of December to February is about -20º to -35ºC, and the ground is covered by a blanket of snow for about eight months of the year. The brief, intensive summer often arrives with startling speed, bringing both sunshine and warmth. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Mining operations took place in Svappavaara as far back as 300 years ago. During the period 1655-1684, copper ore was taken from the deposit called Gruvberget in the vicinity of the village. The total production of raw copper was probably about 1,045 tons. During the 18th and 19th centuries, several attempts were made to extract iron ore from the numerous deposits found within the district. These brave attempts, however, were foiled by the high phosphorus contents and the enormous transport difficulties. The present-day mine fields in Leveäniemi were discovered in 1897. At that time, it was difficult to determine the size and value of the deposit because of the thickness of the soil cover (3 to 15 m) and the

Jan 1, 1969

By Amitava Gangulee, Michael B. Bever

The order-disorder transition in Ag-Mg alloys in the range 17 to 26 at. pct Mg was investigated and some thermodynamic, electrical and mechanical properties of ordered Ag-Mg alloys were measured. A modification of the phase diagram is proposed on the basis of measured transition temperatures. The stability of the ordered structure is analyzed in terms of the quasichemical theory. Kinetic aspects of the order-disorder transition were also investigated. The energies of ordering at 273°K of Ag-Mg alloys were measured by liquid metal solution calorimetry. The electrical resistivities and the tensile Properties of the ordered alloys were measured. The exothermic energy of ordering increased with magnesium concentration up to the composition Ag3Mg; it is discussed in terms of the quasichemical theory. Pronounced order hardening was observed and can be explained by several strengthening mechanisms, which are particularly effective because of a change in crystal structure associated with the ordering transition. IN silver-rich solid solutions containing approximately 17 to 26 at. pct Mg, long- range ordering may occur during appropriate therma1 treatments. Clare-brough and Nicholas1 first detected such long-range order in the solid solution of composition Ag3Mg and suggested that the unit cell of the superlattice contained 256 atoms. x-ray2 and electron diffraction3 investigations confirmed the occurrence of long-range order, but indicated a shifted Ll2-type structure. On the basis of recent X-ray measurements the crystal structure of ordered Ag3Mg has been confirmed as type D023.4 The present paper is concerned with the order-disorder transition in silver-rich Ag-Mg solid solutions and some thermodynamic, electrical, and mechanical properties of the ordered alloys. The effects of short-range order on the properties of silver-rich solid solutions containing up to 26 at. pct Mg are discussed in a concurrent paper.5 1) EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 1.1) Preparation of Specimens. Specimens of Ag-Mg alloys containing from 18 to 26 at. pct Mg were prepared in the form of 1.0-mm-diam wires as described in Section 1.1 of Ref. 5. Disordered specimens were prepared by annealing at 773°K for 1 hr and quenching into iced brine. Ordered specimens were prepared by annealing at 773°K for 1 hr and slowly cooling to room temperature over a period of 15 days. The specimens were stored at 78°K. 1.2) Resistivity Measurements. Electrical resistivi- ties were measured by a potentiometric method.' Equilibrium values were obtained at several temperatures. The kinetics of ordering were investigated by following the time-dependent changes of the resistivity of initially disordered specimens during annealing. The specimens were enclosed in copper capsules and immersed in salt pots; the heating up was accelerated by injecting preheated helium into the capsules. 1.3) Calorimetry. The energies of ordering of the alloys were measured in a tin solution calorimeter as the difference between the heat effects of additions of completely ordered and disordered specimens of the same composition. The procedure and the method of calculation have been described.6 Magnesium was used for thermal compensation in most calorimetric runs in order to improve the accuracy.677 1.4) Mechanical Tests. Tensile tests were carried out with wire specimens at room temperature as described in Section 1.5 of Ref. 5. Microhardness measurements were also made.? 2) RESULTS AND DISCUSSION The characteristics of the order-disorder transition of silver-rich Ag-Mg solid solutions will be discussed first. Some thermodynamic, electrical, and mechanical properties of the ordered alloys will then be considered and compared with the corresponding properties of dis-disordered alloys. 2.1) The Order-Disorder Transition. 2.1.1) Thermodynamic and Structural Aspects. The transition temperatures Tt were determined from discontinuities in the slope of the equilibrium resistivity vs temperature curves. Normalized curves for three compositions are shown in Fig. 1. The transition temperature increases with the magnesium concentration and reaches a maximum at the stoichiometric composition Ag3Mg. The transition temperature of the alloy Ag3Mg was measured as 665° ± 2°K and compares with published values of 660°,1 663°,8 and 66°k.3 In the slopes of the resistivity vs temperature curves of alloys containing 22.2 and 22.5 at. pct Mg, discontinuities were observed at two temperatures. Such upper and lower discontinuities indicate a two-phase field. A modified form of the published phase diagram9 is shown in Fig. 2. A two-phase field was found only on the low-magnesium side of the composition Ag3Mg. On the high-magnesium side, the existence of a two-phase field could not be established because of insufficient resolution, but such a field must be present. This part of the phase diagram can be made complete by a eutec-toid-type reaction a = (a' + ß). The existence of a boundary between the two-phase fields (a + ß) and (a' + ß) is also in accord with published lattice parameters.3 The crystal structure of ordered Ag3Mg (type Do23)

Jan 1, 1969

By Karl F. Peterson, H. K. Najarian, Robert E. Lund

PRIMARY products of the Josephtown smelter are zinc metal of various grades, lead-free zinc oxide pigments, cadmium metal, and sulphuric acid. Zinc concentrates of domestic and foreign origin are blended and desulphurized at the roaster plant. The equipment includes five, 12-hearth Herreshoff roasters and two modified Trail-type suspension roasters. The sulphur dioxide containing gases from the roasting operation are diverted to a four-unit contact acid plant for the manufacture of sulphuric acid. The roasted calcines are agglomerated by sintering on Dwight-Lloyd-type sintering machines; the sinter is crushed and sized within required limits; and the sized sinter is smelted in vertical shaft-type electro-thermic furnaces. Of the 13 electrothermic furnaces of various sizes now in operation, four are designed to produce American process zinc oxidc of various specifications; and the remaining nine furnaces are equipped with vacuum-type condensers and produce zinc metal. Papers describing the general smelting practice at Josephtown have been published by AIME. Since both High Grade zinc metal and lead-free zinc oxide pigments are produced direct from the electrothermic furnaces without need for subsequent refining, the elimination of impurities such as lead and cadmium has to be accomplished during roasting and sintering operations. To effect the producing of both High Grade and Prime Western zinc products, the roasting and sintering operations are on two separate circuits. A High Grade circuit produces finished sized sinter low in lead, cadmium, etc., for the High Grade furnaces; and the Prime Western circuit produces finished sinter destined for the furnaces producing Prime Western metal. Sintering at the Josephtown smelter differs in many important respects from the sintering practice in smelters operating horizontal retort zinc furnaces. Requirements of the electrothermic smelting furnaces define the physical characteristics of the sinter, while the chemical composition of the sinter is controlled according to the grade of metal and oxide to be made as final products. Three principal objectives in the sintering process at Josephtown smelter are: 1. To transform the zinc calcine from the roasting operations into a hard, yet porous agglomerate that will not crumble in the smelting furnace. 2. Crushing and sizing of the sinter to obtain a proper screen analysis which is normally —% in. down to +1/4 in. particle size. 3. To eliminate, particularly in the High Grade circuit, as much of the impurities such as sulphur, lead, and cadmium as possible. The sintering plant as originally built in 1930 was equipped with three standard 42 in. x 44 ft Dwight-Lloyd sintering machines. Each machine was equipped with a 15x60 in. sintering corporation fan driven by 150 hp, 900 rpm synchronous motor through a magnetic clutch and capable of delivering 30,000 cfm of air at 15 in. of water and 150°F. Each sintering machine was driven by 7½ hp dc motor with controllers for varying the speed of the machine from 8 to 32 in. per min. The pallets were cast iron and the grates of the herringbone type. The charge was mixed in a 4 ft diam x 8 ft Stehli pugmill and transported by belt conveyor, elevator and tripper conveyor to a small bin over each machine. Shortly after the start of operations the following changes were found necessary: 1. The herringbone grates which plugged very quickly and were difficult to keep clean were replaced by straight, narrow cast-iron grate bars running at right angles to the travel of the pallets. These grate bars are held in place by a center bar extending across the pallet on the 24 in. dimension and by removable retaining plates which form the sides of the pallets. 2. Mechanical grate knockers were developed in conjunction with new grate bars for continuously and automatically cleaning the grates. 3. As the cast-iron pallets cracked, they were replaced with cast-steel pallets. In 1938, the capacity of the sinter plant was increased with the installation of two 42 in. x 22 ft machines which were brought from the company's Herculaneum lead smelter. With a circulating load of some 250 to 300 pct, production of finished sinter on the 42 in. x 44 ft machines at this time amounted to about three tons of sized sinter per machine hour. In 1945, one of the 42 in. x 22 ft machines was replaced by a 60 in. x 44 ft machine of our own design. In 1948, as part of the plant-wide expansion program, the sinter plant not only was expanded but also divided into two separate plants; namely, Prime Western and High Grade circuits. The sinter destined for furnaces producing Prime Western zinc metal is made in a new plant comprising two 60 in. x 44 ft Dwight-Lloyd-type sintering machines, each having a 45,000 cfm Sturtevant fan at 18 in. water static pressure and served by an 8 ft diam x 12 ft long rotary charge pclletizer and auxiliary crushing and sizing equipment. The sinter destined for furnaces producing High Grade zinc metal and zinc oxide pigments is produced in the old sinter plant which was expanded to accommodate four of the 60 in. x 44 ft sintering machines, replacing the old sintering units. In the High Grade sinter circuit, two units of the 60 in. x 44 ft machines are used as preliminary soft sinter machines; and the remaining two units of the 60 in. x 44 ft machines are used to make finished hard sinter. Purification Theory Partial elimination of lead and cadmium in the sintering of zinc ores is common knowledge. However, by some manipulation and by taking advantage of the double circuit, it is possible to make zinc sinter which is nearly free of contaminators. Lead

Jan 1, 1952