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By C V. B Cunningham

The assessment of blasting results under production conditions is extremely difficult. As a result, it can take months or years to establish objective and valid estimates of explosive performance in achieving rockbreaking goals. This fundamental problem often results in decisions related to the manufacture, marketing, purchase and use of explosives being largely swayed by calculated energies from detonation codes. However, these codes are by no means standardised. Different energies are given by different codes because these employ varying combinations of fundamental science and empiricism. After a basic review of code operation, important guidelines to dependability are given with reference to ICI’S state-of-the-art codes IDEX and CPEX. Distinctions are drawn between Ideal, Non-Ideal and Blasting Codes. Concepts of explosive energy are discussed in brief.

Jan 1, 1991

By Kameron Ray, Ruilin Yang

This paper compares the modeling results obtained by using a single seed waveform (SS) versus multiple seed waveforms (MS) as inputs to the Multiple Seed Waveform (MSW) blast vibration model. The field data for the comparison was collected at a coal mine. The results of the comparison showed that the MSW model yields more accurate predictions and significantly higher correlation to field measurement when using MS as input. When using a single seed waveform as input, different seed waves result in different predictions of PPV. In contrast, using the multiple seed waveforms as an input, more consistent results are obtained.

Jan 1, 2013

By Kimberlee Falkenstein, Volha Kibitkina, Jessica Steeves

A series of experiments were conducted to obtain site specific constants for the vibration produced by a single charge and by more charges detonating in sequence, using short delay intervals. All charges were placed in relatively long boreholes in granite without a free face other than the ground surface. The boreholes were filled with water to provide good coupling with the rock and to provide identical confinement for all the blasts. Vibrations were recorded close to each blast in the vertical direction by uniaxial high frequency geophones and far field using a triaxial geophone.

Jan 1, 2013

By Unknown

Blast Site Security Involves: * Clearing the area * Controlling Access * Warning Signals

Jan 1, 2003

By R Yang, M Lownds

This paper reports studies showing the effects of delay scatter on the peak particle velocity (PPV) of blast vibration using a multiple seed wave (MSW) vibration model developed in recent years. The case studies also show the advantage of accurate delay timing on frequency control of blast vibration. The site parameters used in one of the studies are from a case in which the MSW model has been tested and confirmed to yield accurate predictions. This study uses an open pit blast design and a tunnel design in which blast vibrations using electronic detonators are compared with those from pyrotechnic detonators. Mean peak particle velocity (PPV) and the 97.5% upper bound PPV are compared. It is found that both these values increase significantly with the increase of the coefficient of variation of the site parameter. Using an open pit blast design, the modeling shows that electronic initiation shifts vibration energy to the expected frequency for a selected point of interest. However, for the same design of nominal initiation timing pyrotechnic detonators fail to shift vibration to the expected frequency due to its large scatter of timing.

Jan 1, 2011

By Steve Dillingham

Whenever misfired holes or portions of misfired holes remain after a blast is fired, a hazardous situation exists until the unfired explosive materials have been disposed of properly. Yet, there are so many factors that can contribute to misfires that it is impossible to give blanket instructions on how to handle them. To complicate matters, misfires today are rare due to reliable blasting products. As such, it isn’t very surprising that many blasters have never had to deal with a misf i re condition. While the likelihood of a misfire occurrence is minimal, you should always be pre p a red to handle a misfire should you be involved in such an event. To begin, every blaster and blasting org a n i z a t i o n should develop a misfire policy which contains the company’s safe operating pro c e d u res, emergency contact list, as well as any regulatory compliance re q u i re m e n t s . Tailgate and/or company-wide safety meetings should communicate the company’s contingent misfire pro c ed u res and any special site-specific precautions BEFORE the start of any project.

Jan 1, 2004

By Junya Tokita

In Japan, packaged explosives have traditionally been used as the most common explosive for tunneling. Recently, some blasting systems such as ANFO with a kettle loader and emulsion explosives with a pump loader have been trialed in order to improve safety and efficiency of the charging process. There are issues with these systems relative to the Japanese market. ANFO dissolves in water easily, and generates ammonia gas when it contacts with concrete. Emulsion explosives need costly pump ing unit s, and there is a need to control residuals in the pump unit. Additionally, there are obstacles by Japanese law to site mixing of emulsion explosives.

Jan 1, 2005

By Enver Alan, MerkeziYapı

People are migrating because of economic, social, natural and political reasons. These natural and humane factors effects the distribution of populations. The need for tunnels has grown in order to provide a comfortable life and reduce losses such as waste of time, labor, energy, efficiency and so on. It is inevitable to carry out excavations in rock tunnels (shears, platforms, lines, connections, wastewater, distribution, energy, transportation etc.), that will be built by excavating with conventional method, by controlled blasting regarding with constrains. In this study of applied explosives engineering the blasting applications are evaluated, which were carried out for research and development purposes at Yenisahra Station tunnels in Kartal Formation which was built with the aim of solving İstanbul's transportation problem within the framework of the Kadıköy-Kartal Metro Project. Twenty-four shots were made by using explosives in 60 blastholes that were drilled in the tunnel faces, which were located between and outside of two different faults. Six microphones were used to measure the air shock and eight geophones were used to measure the parameter values of the vibrations (particle velocity, frequency, displacement, acceleration, amplitude, wavelength etc.), which were placed at predetermined points of the surface, occurred during the blasting applications. Data from the geophone and microphones were recorded on six seismographs. The coordinates and the distances between the shot points and the measurement stations are determined by an electronic theodolite. The total number of seismic records, recorded in seismographs, is 118. The number of records of vibrations that crossed the faults is 42 and the number of records of vibrations that did not cross the fault is 76. The particle velocity, frequency, amplitude, acceleration, displacement and wavelength were measured in transverse, longitudinal and vertical directions. The total number of measurements is 354. By evaluating all seismic records, the effect of delay intervals, faults and scaled distances on the particle velocity, frequency, amplitude, displacement, acceleration, wavelength and air shock were investigated. When the vibrations formed during the Research & Development (R&D) blasts were examined, it was determined that the parameter values of vibrations that crossed the faults are lower than the ones that did not cross the faults. In addition, when the particle velocity values of all vibrations are examined according to the present circumstances, it is determined that the waves did not cross the fault in all delay intervals are superposed in all directions, and that the least superposing occurred in the 50 ms delay range.

By Bruce Vandenberg, R. Frank Chiappetta, John Foley

Recent advances in solid-state, field portable, fast framing compact video camera systems and PC based frame capture hardware now allow blast imaging up to 1000 frames per second. Up to 4.1 seconds of data can be captured directly into the unit, downloaded to a PC or archived to a standard VCR without data compression. Since no film processing is involved, motion analysis can be performed instantly and on-site within a few minutes. This paper will describe the design features and applications of the MotionMeter system and compare these with the analogous aspects of film-based cameras and other systems. Of all blast monitoring systems and techniques available today, high-speed motion picture photography and videography still remain as the most valuable, stand alone, diagnostic techniques for troubleshooting and evaluating full scale blasts in the mining and explosives industries. High-speed image data, coupled with information obtained from other instrumentation systems, such as continuous velocity of detonation recorders, laser surveying systems, refraction and ground vibration recording seismographs, etc., can eliminate many assumptions about what actually took place in a blast. Thus, diagnostic confidence in evaluating both excellent and poorly designed blasts is increased, and optimum blast results, (which are application dependent), are achieved considerably faster when compared to the trial and error approach of relying on strictly the experience factor. Applications include developing site-specific blast designs, decay equations relating burden, burden velocity and explosive energy, determining ground response times, reducing coal damage, quantifying backbreak, evaluating the effectiveness of sternming, checking delay detonator firing times, evaluating air decks and for studying general dynamics. Motion analysis is performed with a 2D and 3D software package developed specifically for video analysis, but is also directly applicable to film analysis when using a digitizer. Dimensional controls, lens aberration, field set-ups and camera orientation are all automatically corrected for with matrix analysis.

Jan 1, 2000

By Alastair Grogan

In October of 2002, the author was retained by Public Works and Government Services Canada, on behalf of the Department of National Defense, to design, construct and test the effectiveness of a bubble curtain system at an underwater demolition range, near Victoria, BC. The purpose of the bubble curtain was to reduce the potential for fish mortalities at the site. This paper presents some of the elements of the design, along with the results of overpressure monitoring during blasting and compares the results of fish mortality and animal behaviors with and without the bubble curtain in operation.

Jan 1, 2005

By Erkan Bayrak, Serkan Erkara, Ozkan Duzgun, Ekin Gungor

This paper presents part of the outcomes of the drill and blast optimization project carried out at Kisladag Gold Mine in Turkey. Kisladag Gold Mine is the largest gold mine in Turkey with a low-grade, bulk-tonnage, open pit operation that uses heap leaching for gold recovery. After blasting, the ore is fed to a three-stage crushing circuit which prepares crushed ore approximately -10 mm (0.39 in) for heap leaching. Crusher downtime analysis showed that blocky material and insufficient feed are causing significant downtimes with the primary crusher. This was supported by the fragmentation data collected to date. It was decided to initiate a fragmentation project to understand the variation in the run-of-mine (ROM) size with a view to provide a consistent feed to the crushing circuit. The study includes the analyses of the ore strength and structure, image analysis of the fragmentation pictures acquired from blasts, blast auditing and quality assurance and quality control (QA/QC) analyses. During this project, over 200 fragmentation pictures were acquired from 47 blasts to optimize ore and waste blasts. Ore strength varies between 30 and 120 MPa and rock quality designation (RQD) ranges between 30 and 100. A site-specific fragmentation model was used to calibrate the fragmentation for blast domains formed. In addition, alternative cases were simulated to achieve blasts designs with consistent ROM fragmentation size distribution. Alternative blast designs that include stemming length and powder factor changes were suggested. Long stemming length, drill cuttings use, free faced blasts, small shot sizes and poor stemming length control were some of the key issues causing coarse fragmentation.

Jan 1, 2015

By Jerry Wallace

The goal: At an industrial site, sever a well pipe containing an interior obstruction in a timely, cost effective manner by using a shape-charge to cut through the casing more than 50 meters below ground surface from the outside, doing so while inside a larger pipe, without damaging the larger pipe. The problem: Pumps and retrieval tools stuck nearly 50 meters below ground surface inside a 305 mm diameter by 9.5 mm wall thickness water well casing. The well, depth of 185 meters, had to be inspected for contaminates then properly decommissioned before industrial expansion could take place overhead. The limitations: A 508 mm diameter pipe had been driven around the 305 mm pipe to a depth of 63 meters. The usable internal diameter of the larger pipe was about 480 mm while the smaller pipe had buckled at one point forming a 350 mm wide spot. The charge thickness was limited to less than one-half the difference. Additionally, water that filled the annular space between the two pipes had to be displaced for the charge to work properly. The solution: Enlist the support of the shape-charge manufacturer to design, build and test a charge to work under the conditions present, then make it work in the field.

Jan 1, 2000

By Ron Frye, Carl Liibbe, Wayne Curtis, Julie Pecori, Dan Leach

Test work comparing the performance of a Low Density Porous Ammonium Nitrate Prill to regular Porous Ammonium Nitrate conducted in Pennsylvania and New York showed that less ammonium nitrate was required to perform the same work and that improved sensitization of an emulsion/ammonium nitrate blend reduced “orange fumes”. Fragmentation was similar in all tests with improved heave and throw experienced.

Jan 1, 1997

By Ralph E. Burnham, Jeff Taylor, Jonson Montgomery, J. Kelly Ratliff, Rennie Montgomery, Martin Brashear

Top priorities for all blasting companies and individual blasters are risk management, safety of company personnel and the general public, regulatory compliance, and liability protection. On a daily basis, hundreds of shots are detonated by well-trained, skilled, and experienced blasters without incident. Unfortunately, accidents inevitably occur, which is why blasting is considered an “ultra hazardous” or “inherently dangerous” activity from a legal perspective. Despite countless regulations, recent advances in technology, improved training, ongoing research, and improved communication in the industry, mistakes and the resulting incidents continue to occur during blasting operations. These result in dangerous or deadly flyrock, site security lapses, increased complaints, blast damage claims, and lawsuits, which lead to increased insurance costs and other financial tolls for blasting companies. In life, lessons learned the hard way are rarely forgotten. The same is true in blasting operations. Blasting missteps and the resulting events are often the best catalysts for improving risk management and thereby reducing accidents, liability, and financial tolls. This paper provides a summary of two incidents, one safety and the other liability related, and the errors that resulted in a fatality in one case and a multi property lawsuit in the other. The two incidents provide examples that serve as a case study for lessons learned the hard way in blasting operations and offer guidance for the considerations that blasters and blasting companies should incorporate into daily operating procedures.

Jan 1, 2018

By Larry Schneider

"0 ne of the incentives that led to the development of non-electric shock tube initiation systems was the desire within the industry to improve detonator safety. And to the extent that nonelectric initiators are immune to the hazards of stray current and radio frequency energy found on normal blast sites, an advancement in safety has been accomplished. However, as a cautionary note, it is important to realize that there are still many hazards associated with any initiation system. While some of these hazards may differ from those associated with electric detonators, others are identical to those associated with any type of initiation system. For instance, contrary to what some uninformedblasters may believe, lightning remains a hazard when using nonelectric initiation as well as electric initiation."

Jan 1, 1995

By Ray Jambakhsh, Gabrielle Bourget

In the summer of 1998, Ontario Hydro awarded a contract to demolish an obsolete and inefficient chimney by blasting. The Ontario Hydro Thunder Bay Thermal Generating Station (T.G.S.), is a fully operational hydro thermal generating station located in Thunder Bay, Ontario, Canada. The Chimney was a 356 ft (108 m) high freestanding structure constructed of reinforced concrete with a brick liner. Falling the chimney required careful planning due to the highly sensitive structures and equipment which surrounded it. Damage either sustained to the existing systems through ground vibrations or direct contact would have resulted in expensive power outage and/or lost production. The role of Explotech Engineering Ltd. on this project was to provide and evaluation of the proposed demolition procedure, defme the predicted and maximum seismic vibrations at sensitive structures including underground services, conduct pre-blast / post-blast inspections and recommend various safety precautions. The general contractor for the project, LeBrun Northern Contracting Ltd., of Thunder Bay, Ontario was responsible for all site preparations and post-blast clean up. All demolition blasting calculations and operations were conducted by Dykon demolition experts from Tulsa, Oklahoma. On September 13, 1999, the chimney was successfully demolished. Extensive analysis of the vibration records and visual post-blast inspections of the surrounding structures concluded that the demolition event induced no damage to any of the Ontario Hydro facilities.

Jan 1, 2000

I had the opportunity recently to visit a magazine site of a major explosives company. It was fun to see the storage areas again and it was really interesting to see one of the old magazines that probably dated back before my time. Now that’s an old one. As son Tom says, “When Dad was young the Dead Sea was just sick.” While the magazine has been upgraded with a modern lock to match today’s standards it still has the old tumbler lock that is opened with the large bronze key. Those old tumbler locks were just about standard on magazines years ago. Those bronze keys were heavy and would make a good display item today or maybe a substitute for a blackjack. I don’t think the old locks would stop the modern criminal but then in those days we were all less sophisticated. And maybe I shouldn’t say this but honesty was a bit more prevalent then. Maybe ‘cause old fashioned police brutality still prevailed.

Jan 1, 2004

By Jerry Wallace

This project consisted of blasting for expansion of a major interstate natural gas transmission pipeline pump station. The pump station handled 400-500 million cubic feet (1 l- 14 million cubic meters) of gas per day.

Jan 1, 1996

By B. Papillon

There has been a veritable increase in the adoption of electronic detonators in the last few years. Electronic detonators offer several distinctive features over electric and non-el (shock tube) detonators including better timing accuracy resulting in excellent fragmentation and vibration control, certainly key mining parameters. The field programmability also helps in reducing the on-site magazine storage of detonators with diverse fixed delays. A typical electronic detonator may consist of a logic core, a communication interface, storage capacitor(s) and the ignition element. Being electronic components, the electronic detonators may be susceptible to RF or electromagnetic interference (EMI). RF sources are virtually everywhere: cellular phones/towers, radio transmission, microwaves, walkie-talkies, high voltage (HV) transmission cables and wireless networks with their characteristic frequency emissions. Safety issues prevail; e.g., whether the RF interference can cause premature or inadvertent firing whether directly or indirectly. From a reliability perspective, the RF interference may also impact on bus communications, e.g., during the logging, verifying, charging and firing phases. The deleterious communications disturbance may result in a misfire (non-firing of one or more of the detonators) which is terribly inconvenient for the mine operators and even pose a safety hazard.

Jan 1, 2009

By Hans Perlid

In the handling of emulsion explosives pumping is a key operation. A number of serious accidents has shown that pumping can be a risky operation and should be carefully considered and investigated. This is the background behind a series of pump tests carried out by NITRO NOBEL.

Jan 1, 1996