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By Joan K. Kuenzi

The purpose of this U.S. Bureau of Mines information circular (Ie) is to discuss how job analysis methods taken from different disciplines can be used together to form a more complete picture of jobs in the mining industry. "Job analysis" is a term used by many researchers, but use of the term is far from standardized. Authors of papers on this subject often state that there is confusion in how or why jobs are to be analyzed, what the resulting information is to be used for, and what the "job analysis" actually means. The process of breaking a job into elemental tasks and analyzing them is used to determine what skills and knowledge are needed to perform a given job, to improve efficiency, and to develop safer job procedures. All are valid reasons to analyze jobs, but the methods used to accomplish the analyses may be very different. In order to create a more complete picture of a job, it may be useful to incorporate methods and information from different areas of study rather than choosing one method for analysis.

Jan 1, 1995

By Thomas J. Fisher, Christopher C. Jobes, Edward F. Fries

This report (Software Safety 2.2) is the third in a nine-part series of recommendations addressing the functional safety of processor-controlled mining equipment. It is part of a risk-based system safety process encompassing hardware, software, humans, and the operating environment for the equipment’s life cycle. Figure 1 shows a safety framework containing these recommendations. The reports in this series address the various life cycle stages of inception, design, approval and certification, commissioning, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning. These recommendations were developed as a joint project between the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and the Mine Safety and Health Administration. They are intended or use by mining companies, original equipment manufacturers, and aftermarket suppliers to these mining companies. Users of these reports are expected to consider the set in total during the design cycle. • 1.0 Safety Introduction.—This is an introductory report for the general mining industry. It provides basic system/software safety concepts, discusses the need for mining to address the functional safety of programmable electronics (PE), and includes the benefits of implementing a system/software safety program. • 2.1 System Safety and 2.2 Software Safety.—These reports draw heavily from International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard IEC 61508 [IEC 1998a,b,c,d,e,f,g] and other standards. The scope is “surface and underground safety-related mining systems employing embedded, networked, and non networked programmable electronics.” System safety seeks to design safety into all phases of the entire system. Software is a subsystem; thus, software safety is a part of the system’s safety .• 3.0 Safety File.—This report contains the documentation that demonstrates the level of safety built into the system and identifies limitations for the system’s use and operation. In essence, it is a “proof of safety” that the system and its operation meets the appropriate level of safety for the intended application. It starts from the beginning of the design, is maintained during the full lifecycle of the system, and provides administrative support for the safety program of the full system. • 4.0 Safety Assessment.—The independent assessment of the Safety File is addressed. It establishes consistent methods to determine the completeness and suitability of safety evidence and justifications. This assessment could be conducted by an independent third party. • 5.0 Safety Framework Guidance.—It is intended to supplement the safety framework reports with guidance providing users with additional information. The purpose is to assist users in applying the concepts presented. In other words, the safety framework is what needs to be don and the guidance is the how it can be done. The guidance information reinforces the concepts, describes various methodologies that can be used, and gives examples and references. It also gives information on the benefits and drawbacks of various methodologies. The guidance reports are not intended to promote a single methodology or to be an exhaustive treaty of the subject material. They provide information and references so that the user can more intelligently choose and implement the appropriate methodologies given the user’s application and capabilities. [ ]

Jan 9, 2001

By John J. Sammarco, Edward F. Fries

This report (Independent Functional Safety Assessment 4.0) is the fifth in a nine-part series of recommendations addressing the functional safety of processor-controlled mining equipment. It is part of a risk-based system safety process encompassing hardware, software, humans, and the operating environment for the equipment’s life cycle. Figure 1 shows a safety framework containing these recommendations. The reports in this series address the various life cycle stages of inception, design, approval and certification, commissioning, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning. These recommendations were developed as a joint project between the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and the Mine Safety and Health Administration. They are intended for use by mining companies, original equipment manufacturers, and aftermarket suppliers to these mining companies. Users of these reports are expected to consider the set in total during the design cycle. • 1.0 Safety Introduction.—This is an introductory report for the general mining industry. It provides basic system/software safety concepts, discusses the need for mining to address the functional safety of programmable electronics (PE), and includes the benefits of implementing system/software safety program. • 2.1 System Safety and 2.2 Software Safety.—These reports draw heavily from International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard IEC 61508 [IEC 1998a,b,c,d,e,f,g] and other standards. The scope is “surface and underground safety-related mining systems employing embedded, networked, and nonnetworked programmable electronics.” System safety seeks to design safety into all phases of the entire system. Software is a subsystem; thus, software safety is a part of the system’s safety. • 3.0 Safety File.—This report contains the documentation that demonstrates the level of safety built into the system and identifies limitations for the system’s use and operation. In essence, it is a “proof of safety” that the system and its operation meets the appropriate level of safety for the intended application. It starts from the beginning of the design, is maintained during the full lifecycle of the system, and provides administrative support for the safety program of the full system. • 4.0 Safety Assessment.—The independent assessment of the safety file is addressed. It establishes consistent methods to determine the completeness and suitability of safety evidence and justifications. This assessment could be conducted by an independent third party. • 5.0 Safety Framework Guidance.—It is intended to supplement the safety framework reports with guidance providing users with additional information. The purpose is to assist users in applying the concepts presented. In other words, the safety framework is what needs to be done and the guidance is the how it can be done. The guidance information reinforces the concepts, describes various methodologies that can be used, and gives examples and references. It also gives information on the benefits and drawbacks of various methodologies. The guidance reports are not intended to promote a single methodology or to be an exhaustive treatment of the subject material. They provide information and references so that the user can more intelligently choose and implement the appropriate methodologies given the user’s application and capabilities. [ ]

Jan 5, 2003

By Thomas J. Fisher, John J. Sammarco, Gary L. Mowrey, Edward F. Fries

This report (Safety File 3.0) is the fourth in a nine-part series of recommendations addressing the functional safety of processor-controlled mining equipment. It is part of a risk-based system safety process encompassing hardware, software, humans, and the operating environment for the equipment’s life cycle. Figure 1 shows a safety framework containing these recommendations. The reports in this series address the various life cycle stages of inception, design, approval and certification, commissioning, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning. These recommendations were developed as a joint project between the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and the Mine Safety and Health Administration. They are intended for use by mining companies, original equipment manufacturers, and aftermarket suppliers to these mining companies. Users of these reports are expected to consider the set in total during the design cycle. • 1.0 Safety Introduction.—This is an introductory report for the general mining industry. It provides basic system/software safety concepts, discusses the need for mining to address the functional safety of programmable electronics (PE), and includes the benefits of implementing a system/software safety program. • 2.1 System Safety and 2.2 Software Safety.—These reports draw heavily from International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard IEC 61508 [IEC 1998a,b,c,d,e,f,g] and other standards. The scope is “surface and underground safety-related mining systems employing embedded, networked, and nonnetworked programmable electronics.” System safety seeks to design safety into all phases of the entire system. Software is a subsystem; thus, software safety is a part of the system’s safety. • 3.0 Safety File.—This report contains the documentation that demonstrates the level of safety built into the system and identifies limitations for the system’s use and operation. In essence, it is a “proof of safety” that the system and its operation meet the appropriate level of safety for the intended application. It starts from the beginning of the design, is maintained during the full lifecycle of the system, and provides administrative support for the safety program of the full system. • 4.0 Safety Assessment.—The independent assessment of the safety file is addressed. It establishes consistent methods to determine the completeness and suitability of safety evidence and justifications. This assessment could be conducted by an independent third party. • 5.0 Safety Framework Guidance.—It is intended to supplement the safety framework reports with guidance providing users with additional information. The purpose is to assist users in applying the concepts presented. In other words, the safety framework is what needs to be done and the guidance is the how it can be done. The guidance information reinforces the concepts, describes various methodologies that can be used, and gives examples and references. It also gives information on the benefits and drawbacks of various methodologies. The guidance reports are not intended to promote a single methodology or to be an exhaustive treatment of the subject material. They provide information and references so that the user can more intelligently choose and implement the appropriate methodologies given the user’s application and capabilities. [ ]

Jan 5, 2002

Preventive maintenance practices are listed in the manufacturers' instruction books. In general, equipment that requires frequent and extensive preventive maintenance is generally the most costly. The manpower spent on these frequent trips to remote areas is such that it is usually better to invest in a more costly system which requires little preventive maintenance. The best preventive maintenance for the system is a good installation. 7.2 Preventive Maintenance and Inspections With any system, periodic inspection is required because of the corrosive atmosphere and adverse conditions that exist in underground mines. These inspections can spot potential trouble in the system. Repair or replacement at that time averts the possibility of losing effectiveness of all or part of the system. 7.2.1 Cables Approximately once per month all cables in the communications system should be inspected for kinking, chafing, cracking, wear, stretching, or other signs of physical abuse. Particular attention should be paid to cable glands at the entry or exit points to the various units in the system, where the cable goes around sharp corners, in the vicinity of holding cleats which may be clamping the cable too tightly causing potential damage, and across the areas where the cable is exposed to physical damage from outside sources, such as equipment or falling objects. If a cable is damaged, it should be replaced as soon as possible. It is mandatory that the ground leads and connections to carrier current phones be thoroughly inspected and maintained in good condition, since considerable hazard may exist to the operator or equipment if a ground connection is broken. 7.2.2 Pager Phones The most readily available test set to determine if a pager telephone is operating correctly is the pager phone itself. The following physical check of the system can be performed at any phone station. 7.2.2a Listen Circuit Remove the handset from its cradle and listen to determine if the circuit is functional, as indicated by the presence of noise or conversation on the line. If no noise or voice signals are present at the handset receiver, take the following corrective action: 1. Operate the handset press-to-talk switch several times. Any corrosion on the contacts of this switch may cause a receiver to be temporarily inoperative. Repeated operation may clear the condition. 2. Open the cabinet and see if the battery cables are properly connected and are making firm contact. Check the handset cable and its connections in the cabinet of the pager phone, and see if there is any evidence of a break in the cable, corroded contacts, or poor connections. 3. Remove the handset receiver earpiece by unscrewing it counterclockwise (to the left), and remove the receiver from the socket. Examine the handset cavity; in some units, a patch of cotton batting or floss is used as a barrier to reduce acoustic feedback in the handset. If the cotton patch has absorbed moisture, remove it and replace with a crumpled ball of soft rubber, stuffed just far enough into the handset so it will not touch the receiver or switch terminals. 7.2.2b Page Circuit and Talk Circuit Push the page switch, squeeze the handset press-to-talk switch, and call any other phone. Release the page switch

Jan 1, 1984

By John J. Sammarco

This report (Safety File Guidance 6.0) is the eighth in a nine-part series of recommendations and guidance addressing the functional safety of processor-controlled mining equipment. It is part of a risk-based system safety process encompassing hardware, software, humans, and the operating environment for the equipment’s life cycle. Figure 1 shows a safety framework containing these recommendations. The reports in this series address the various life cycle stages of inception, design, approval and certification, commissioning, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning. These recommendations were developed as a joint project between the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and the Mine Safety and Health Administration. They are intended for use by mining companies, original equipment manufacturers, and aftermarket suppliers to these mining companies. Users of these reports are expected to consider the set in total during the design cycle. • 1.0 Safety Introduction (Part 1).—This is an introductory report for the general mining industry. It provides basic system/software safety concepts, discusses the need for mining to address the functional safety of programmable electronics (PE), and includes the benefits of implementing a system/software safety program. • 2.1 System Safety (Part 2) and 2.2 Software Safety (Part 3).—These reports draw heavily from International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard IEC 61508 [IEC 1998a,b,c,d,e,f,g]and other standards. The scope is “surface and underground safety-related mining systems employing embedded, networked, and nonnetworked programmable electronics.” System safety seeks to design safety into all phases of the entire system. Software is a subsystem; thus, software safety is a part of the system’s safety. • 3.0 Safety File (Part 4).—This report contains the documentation that demonstrates the level of safety built into the system and identifies limitations for the system’s use and operation. In essence, it is a “proof of safety” that the system and its operation meet the appropriate level of safety for the intended application. It starts from the beginning of the design, is maintained during the full life cycle of the system, and provides administrative support for the safety program of the full system. • 4.0 Safety Assessment (Part 5).—The independent assessment of the safety file is addressed. It establishes consistent methods to determine the completeness and suitability of safety evidence and justifications. This assessment could be conducted by an independent third party. • Safety Framework Guidance.—It is intended to supplement the safety framework reports with guidance providing users with additional information. The purpose is to assist users in applying the concepts presented. In other words, the safety framework is what needs to be done and the guidance is how it can be done. The guidance information reinforces the concepts, describes various methodologies that can be used, and gives examples and references. It also gives information on the benefits and drawbacks of various methodologies. The guidance reports are not intended to promote a single methodology or to be an exhaustive treatment of the subject material. They provide information and references so that the user can more intelligently choose and implement the appropriate methodologies given the user’s application and capabilities. The guidance reports comprise parts 6 through 9 of the series and are listed below: [5.1System Safety Guidance (Part 6).—This guidance supplements 2.1 System Safety. < 5.2 Software Safety Guidance (Part 7).—This guidance supplements 2.2 Software Safety. < 6.0 Safety File Guidance (Part 8).—This guidance supplements 3.0 Safety File. < 7.0 Independent Functional Safety Assessment Guidance (Part 9).—This guidance supplements 4.0 Independent Functional Safety Assessment.] [ ]

Jan 4, 2006

By John J. Sammarco

This report (System Safety Guidance 5.1) is the sixth in a nine-part series of recommendations and guidance addressing the functional safety of processor-controlled mining equipment. It is part of a risk-based system safety process encompassing hardware, software, humans, and the operating environment for the equipment’s life cycle. Figure 1 shows a safety framework containing these recommendations. The reports in this series address the various lifecycle stages of inception, design, approval and certification, commissioning, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning. These recommendations were developed as a joint project between the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and the Mine Safety and Health Administration. They are intended for use by mining companies, original equipment manufacturers, and aftermarket suppliers to these mining companies. Users of these reports are expected to consider the set in total during the design cycle. • 1.0 Safety Introduction (Part 1).—This is an introductory report for the general mining industry. It provides basic system/software safety concepts, discusses the need for mining to address the functional safety of programmable electronics (PE), and includes the benefits of implementing system/software safety program. • 2.1 System Safety (Part 2) and 2.2 Software Safety (Part 3).—These reports draw heavily from International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard IEC 61508 [IEC 1998a,b,c,d,e,f,g]and other standards. The scope is “surface and underground safety-related mining systems employing embedded, networked, and nonnetworked programmable electronics.” System safety seeks to design safety into all phases of the entire system. Software is a subsystem; thus, software safety is a part of the system’s safety. • 3.0 Safety File (Part 4).—This report contains the documentation that demonstrates the level of safety built into the system and identifies limitations for the system’s use and operation. In essence, it is a “proof of safety” that the system and its operation meet the appropriate level of safety for the intended application. It starts from the beginning of the design, is maintained during the full life cycle of the system, and provides administrative support for the safety program of the full system. • 4.0 Safety Assessment (Part 5).—The independent assessment of the safety file is addressed. It establishes consistent methods to determine the completeness and suitability of safety evidence and justifications. This assessment could be conducted by an independent third party. • Safety Framework Guidance.—It is intended to supplement the safety framework reports with guidance providing users with additional information. The purpose is to assist users in applying the concepts presented. In other words, the safety framework is what needs to be done and the guidance is how it can be done. The guidance information reinforces the concepts, describes various methodologies that can be used, and gives examples and references. It also gives information on the benefits and drawbacks of various methodologies. The guidance reports are not intended to promote a single methodology or to be an exhaustive treatment of the subject material. They provide information and references so that the user can more intelligently choose and implement the appropriate methodologies given the user’s application and capabilities. The guidance reports comprise parts 6 through 9 of the series and are listed below: [< 5.1 System Safety Guidance (Part 6).—This guidance supplements 2.1 System Safety. < 5.2 Software Safety Guidance (Part 7).—This guidance supplements 2.2 Software Safety. < 6.0 Safety File Guidance (Part 8).—This guidance supplements 3.0 Safety File. < 7.0 Independent Functional Safety Assessment Guidance (Part 9).—This guidance supplements 4.0 Independent Functional Safety Assessment.] [ ]

Jan 8, 2005

By D. Harrington, M. W. Von Bernewitz

"The erection of barricades by men who are shut off from escape in mines at time of fire or after an explosion has been consistently advocated by the United States Bureau of Mines. Largely through the publicity given by the bureau to this excellent type of emergency safety endeavor, several hundred lives have been saved during the past 20 years. One of the earliest instances of barricading in the United States of which there is fairly complete record was in connection with the Cherry mine fire in Illinois in 1909; in this fire 259 lives were lost, but 20 men were saved by two barricades and were brought safely to the surface after seven days. In another coal-mine fire, followed later. on by an explosion, at Delagua, Colo., in 1910, 79 lives were lost, but 18 men saved themselves by erecting canvas brattices or barricades; the miners in one barricade were removed safely after five hours and those in another after 21 hours. In 1911, after an explosion in a coal mine at Briceville, Tenn., in which 84 lives were lost, five persons were brought out alive after 58 hours behind a barricade. Twenty hours after an explosion in which 73 were killed at McCurtain, Okla., in 1912, 13 men were taken out alive and one dead from behind a barricade or partition constructed of canvas. In 1914, after an explosion at Eccles, W. Va., in which 181 were killed, 35 men barricaded themselves in one place and after four hours were brought to the surface alive; this barricade was also of canvas. In 1915, 112 men were killed in an explosion at Layland, W. Va., but two groups of men, 47 in all, were able to barricade themselves; after four days 46 men were rescued alive, but one man was dead. In 1915, an explosion at Boomer, W. Va., killed 23, but 27 others barricaded themselves in one place and after seven hours came out alive. All of the foregoing instances of barricading were in coal mines. In 1917 there were three cases of barricading in a Montana metal-mine fire (the North Butte) during which 163 lives were lost. One of the barricades, sheltering 19 men, failed because the region barricaded was in porous broken ground through which the poisonous gases seeped and killed the entire group. From another of the barricades, engineered by an assistant foreman, 8 men were taken out, 6 uncon¬scious and 2 dead, 50 hours after the fire started. The 6 unconscious men lived, out the assistant foreman who directed the men was one of the 2 who had died. In the third case of barricading in this metal-mine fire,,men, also led by an assistant foreman, kept themselves closed in for about b6 hours and then broke barricade or bulkhead, 25 oing in one direction to safety, and 4, including the assistant foreman, going in another direction to death from poisonous gases. There have been a number of other cases of barricading, some successful and others a failure. Probably the worst failure was that in the argonaut (gold) mine fire in California in 1922; all of a group of 46 miners behind a barricade were found dead when reached after 21 days."

Apr 1, 1933

By John J. Sammarco, Janet S. Flynt

This report (Independent Functional Safety Assessment Guidance 7.0) is the last in a nine-part series of recommendations and guidance addressing the functional safety of processor-controlled mining equipment. It is part of a risk-based system safety process encompassing hardware, software, humans, and the operating environment for the equipment’s life cycle. Figure1 shows a safety framework containing these recommendations. The reports in this series address the various life cycle stages of inception, design, approval and certification, commissioning, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning. These recommendations were developed as a joint project between the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and the Mine Safety and Health Administration. They are intended for use by mining companies, original equipment manufacturers, and after-market suppliers to these mining companies. Users of these reports are expected to consider the set in total during the design cycle. • 1.0 Safety Introduction (Part 1).—This is an introductory report for the general mining industry. It provides basic system/software safety concepts, discusses the need for mining to address the functional safety of programmable electronics (PE), and includes the benefits of implementing a system/software safety program. • 2.1 System Safety (Part 2) and 2.2 Software Safety (Part 3).—These reports draw heavily from International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard IEC 61508 [IEC 1998a,b,c,d,e,f,g]and other standards. The scope is “surface and underground safety-related mining systems employing embedded, networked, and nonnetworked programmable electronics.” System safety seeks to design safety into all phases of the entire system. Software is a subsystem; thus, software safety is a part of the system’s safety. • 3.0 Safety File (Part 4).—This report contains the documentation that demonstrates the level of safety built into the system and identifies limitations for the system’s use and operation. In essence, it is a “proof of safety” that the system and its operation meet the appropriate level of safety for the intended application. It starts from the beginning of the design, is maintained during the full life cycle of the system, and provides administrative support for the safety program of the full system. • 4.0 Safety Assessment (Part 5).—The independent assessment of the safety file is addressed. It establishes consistent methods to determine the completeness and suitability of safety evidence and justifications. This assessment could be conducted by an independent third party. • Safety Framework Guidance.—It is intended to supplement the safety framework reports with guidance providing users with additional information. The purpose is to assist users in applying the concepts presented. In other words, the safety framework is what needs to be done and the guidance is how it can be done. The guidance information reinforces the concepts, describes various methodologies that can be used, and gives examples and references. It also gives information on the benefits and drawbacks of various methodologies. The guidance reports are not intended to promote a single methodology or to be an exhaustive treatment of the subject material. They provide information and references so that the user can more intelligently choose and implement the appropriate methodologies given the user’s application and capabilities. The guidance reports comprise parts 6 through 9 of the series and are listed below: [< 5.1 System Safety Guidance (Part 6).—This guidance supplements 2.1 System Safety. < 5.2 Software Safety Guidance (Part 7).—This guidance supplements 2.2 Software Safety. < 6.0 Safety File Guidance (Part 8).—This guidance supplements 3.0 Safety File. < 7.0 Independent Functional Safety Assessment Guidance (Part 9).—This guidance supplements 4.0 Independent Functional Safety Assessment.] [ ]

Jan 4, 2006

This surveillance report summarizes data on work-related fatal and nonfatal injuries, illnesses, and hazardous exposures in the mining industry for the 10-year period 1986-1995. The term "surveillance," as used in public health, may be new to many readers of this report. With regard to occupational safety and health, the goal of surveillance is to describe the occurrence of work-related injuries, illnesses, and known hazardous exposures; to identify new hazards that may occur due to the introduction of new technology or other factors; and to assess the effects of preventive measures designed to improve worker safety and health. Surveillance provides an overall picture, which can be used to focus resources on areas most in need of prevention programs or further research. Surveillance generally requires the use of multiple sources of data, all of which have their own strengths and limitations. Surveillance in the U. S. mining industry is complicated by the fact that U.S. national data systems that provide information on mining are based on two different definitions of the mining industry. One is established by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), the other by the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) System [Office of Management and Budget 1987] and the 1980 U. S. Bureau of the Census (BOC) Classification System [U.S. Bureau of the Census 1982]. The mining industry as defined by MSHA is based on the regulatory jurisdiction of that agency. Reporting requirements for injuries, illnesses, and workplace exposures are stipulated under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977. Of note is that the oil and gas extraction industry falls outside of MSHA jurisdiction. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) was charged with enforcement in the oil and gas industry under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. Under the SIC, the definition of mining covers the extraction of naturally occurring minerals, including liquids (petroleum), gases (natural gas) and solids (coal, metal, and nonmetallic minerals). Exploration and development of mineral properties are also included in the SIC definition of the mining industry. The SIC was developed by the Office of Management and Budget for use in classifying establishments based on the type of economic activity in which they are engaged and serves as the industry classification standard for all establishment based Federal economic statistics. This classification is important for occupational safety and health surveillance because it also serves as the industry classification system for all data on work-related injuries and illnesses collected by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The U.S. Bureau of the Census uses an industry coding scheme similar to that used by the SIC. For the mining industry, the categorization is identical in both systems. Death certificate data made available by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) are categorized under this system. Death certificate data are particularly important for surveillance of mortality from work-related illnesses. Key differences between the SIC/BOC categorization system and the MSHA system can be summarized as follows: • MSHA excludes the oil and gas industry, which is classified as part of the mining industry under SIC/BOC. • MSHA excludes work that is done off of mine property; work off of mine property is included under SIC/BOC if it is performed by an establishment falling into one of the SIC/BOC mining industry codes. • MSHA includes mine-associated mills and processing plants; these are classified under the manufacturing industry, rather than mining, according to the SIC/BOC coding structure. Since the data collected by MSHA and the data collected by BLS and NCHS using the SIC/BOC classification system are both important sources of information on the mining industry and in many cases serve different purposes, data from both systems are presented in this report. In general, data using the SIC/BOC system are comparable across U.S. industries and should be used when comparing mining to other U.S. industries. Much of the data in this report are presented in the form of frequencies or rates. A frequency provides only a count of the number of cases without providing any information about the risk of occurrence. Rates provide an estimate of the risk of injury or illness. The reader is cautioned, however, that rates based on small numbers can be unstable; thus, any inferences should be drawn with care. In this report, no rates are presented for groups in which there were fewer than three cases. The incidence of most injury and illness conditions differs by age, sex, and race. For this reason, data in many surveillance reports are adjusted for these demographic factors. It was not possible to do this for most of the rates in this report because information on demographics was not available. With the exception of the proportionate mortality ratios (PMRs), all data presented are unadjusted. A detailed account of the sources of data is in appendix A. The methods used in data selection and analysis are described in appendix B.

Jan 5, 2000

By J. R. Thoenen

This circular is part IV of the third paper (entitled "Sand and Gravel Excavation") of a series summarizing the technical problems involved in the production and preparation of sand and gravel. Part I discussed the use of power shovels, draglines, and excavator cranes; part II discussed the use of power scrapers, slackline cableway excavators and hydraulic monitors; and part III discussed the use of hydraulic, clamshell, ladder, and dipper dredges. This circular discusses haulage equipment in general, particularly the use of industrial cars with locomotives or hoists as the motive power. Part V, to follow, will discuss the use of other types of haulage equipment.

Oct 1, 1935

By J. W. JOYCE

The Geophysical section of the United States Bureau of Mines has received many inquiries regarding the application of geophysical methods to the location of small, buried metallic objects. The object of this paper is fourfold: (1) To sketch as briefly and non- technically as possible the principles underlying the operation of several elec- trical geophysical methods of prospecting applicable to the finding of small, buried metallic objects; (2) to point out the possibilities and limitations of these methods; (3) to present, whenever possible, data showing actual results obtained from their use; and (4) to enumerate and describe methods that lack scientific background or foundation.

Oct 1, 1935

By R. D. Currie

The practicability and dependability of two permissible methane-indicat- in detectors recently developed were proved conclusively by extensive tests in the return airways of all mines operating in the anthracite region in most of which samples and readings were taken with one or the other of the two in- dicating detectors. These detectors roved dependable and accurate within practical limits, and their general use should be encouraged as an aid to bet ter ventilation, more accurate control of air currents, and greater safety in mines.

Feb 1, 1936

By R. V. Ramani, R. Stefanko, G. W. Luxbacher

CALCULATION OF MINE HEAD LOSSES FROM ALTIMETER SURVEY DATA USBM PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY - MINERAL ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT USBM USBM USBM THIS PROGRAM CALCULATES PRESSURE LOSSES USING THE USBM METHOD GIVEN USBM IN USBH IC 7809 BY MCELROY AND KINGERY.1957. THE MAJOR DIFFERENCE USBM BETWEEN THIS PROGRAM AND THE CITED REFERENCE IS THE TREATMENT OF AIR USBM

Jan 1, 1977

By Linda L. Chasko, Charles P. Lazzara, Ronald S. Conti, William J. Wiehagen

Fire has long been a concern for underground mine workers. A mine fire can occur at any time and can result in a partial or total evacuation of mine personnel and the loss of lives. Fires can grow rapidly. Time is the critical element. Prompt detection, timely and accurate warnings to those potentially affected, and a proficient response by underground miners can have a tremendous impact on the social and economic consequence of a small underground fire. Fire preparedness and response have components of technology and people. These components can work synergistically to reduce the time it takes to bring the system back in balance. This report deals with the preparedness of miners to respond to underground mine fires. It is intended to aid the mining industry in understanding the various roles of emergency responders and the training techniques used to increase their skill levels. The report also presents a technology overview to assist in effective response to mine fires.

By Frank Pilotte

Proper design characteristics for a seismic system to locate miners during a mine disaster are considered in terms of a total system concept. Field hardware, processing equipment, operating personnel, deployment, training, and supportive R and D are necessary elements of the total system. Each of these elements is discussed and an indication given as to the requirements necessitated by each one. Hardware must be portable, rugged, and fieldworthy. Processing equipment must be simple to operate, expandable for future processing improvements, and ruggedized for field use. A small well-trained team must be available for quick response in times of emergency. Alternative deployment procedures are necessary to allow for a variety of situations including both ground and air delivery. Supportive R and D is used to support training and upgrading of the system.

Jan 1, 1974

By H. H. Fields, Joseph Cervik, G. N. Aul

Coal is a soft and brittle material. Drilling rates in the Pittsburgh coalbed using a drag bit exceed 3 ft/min at 2,500-pound thrust. However, maintaining the bit on a horizontal trajectory or parallel to bedding planes to attain lengths of 1,000 feet is difficult. This Bureau of Mines report presents a drill string configuration that can be guided through the coalbed. The angle of the borehole is measured periodically and by proper combinations of bit thrust and rotational speed (r/min), bit trajectory can be lifted or dropped to keep the bit in the coalbed. An example of a hole drilled to 2,126 feet is presented to show levels of thrust and rotational speed used to lift or drop the bit, the seemingly unexplainable events that occur, and the strategy used during drilling. Thrust levels during drilling range from 600 to 2,500 pounds. Hydraulic motors powered by a 30-hp, 440-volt motor provide ample power for drilling horizontal holes 2,000 feet long.

Jan 1, 1975

By L. B. Berger

In this investigation, the ampoule type of carbon-monoxide (CO) detector which is manufactured under license of U. S. Patent 1,644,014 (October 4, 1927) was tested for sensitivity and reliability. This detector was devised primarily for examining the air of manholes and sewers for possible dangerous contamination with CO before workman enter those places, but dine to the simplicity of the device it may have a more general usage for examination of atmospheres which are known or suspected to be contaminated with CO. Some of the suggested uses are the examination of the air in garages, tunnels, mines, around blast furnaces, gas plants, and in the home.

Jan 1, 1930

By C. W. Davis

Before listing the laboratories and the work performed there, it is proper to make clear what is done and what is not done by Federal bureaus, States, and Territories, as well as by countries to the north and south of the United States. FEDERAL Bureau of Mines. - The Bureau of Mines does not make assays or analyses for individuals or firms unless the samples are part of the ore-testing and ore-dressing investigations of the Metallurgical Division on representative ores from mining districts and of possible benefit to the entire mineral industry through published reports. All significant results obtained in this way are made public. Any mineral sample sent to this Bureau for simple identification will be examined.

Jan 1, 1938

ESTABLISHMENT of an effective inspection system has been held essen¬tial to any international agreement that may be designed primarily to curb the testing of nuclear weapons. A number of reports and papers already have described basic inspection concepts and appraised various pro¬cedures, techniques, and methods as to their probable effectiveness in detecting and identifying violations under such agreement. This report results from a study of only one part of the contemplated inspection system, specifically the final phases embracing onsite investigations and mine examination techniques. The results and reports of earlier work were reviewed in detail, and subjects that were found to have been exhaus¬tively evaluated are recognized by reference and not redescribed here. In other instances, previously described techniques, methods, and clues were revaluated to define more clearly their practical value to the final objective of an onsite inspection. Previous documentation does not refer to a number of subjects, techniques, tools, clues, and methods considered by the study; this report treats these in detail, even though when applied singly or collectively their practical value may be questionable.

Jan 1, 1962