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By G. A. Brown

Major mining projects are developed with the assistance of lending institutions who provide hundreds of millions of dollars in funding over several years, and of course expect those funds to be returned with interest. Two Australian banks have adopted the Equator Principles, an emerging financial industry benchmark for assessing and managing environmental and social risk in project financing. Project financiers have encountered environmental and social issues that are both complex and challenging, particularly with respect to projects in the emerging markets of Asia-Pacific and elsewhere. There are many recent and historical examples of failures by resource companies to effectively manage their environmental, social, safety and security risks, some of which have caused the project to fail completely, and some of which have caused the temporary cessation of production. These events put the financial institutions' funds at risk through inadequate management capacity and non-compliance adversely affecting the ability of the borrowers to repay the loans. They can also reflect adversely on the reputation of the lending institutions. In assessing these risks, lenders are increasingly looking at the track record of the borrower in its country of origin and in other countries where it operates. Lenders are wary of companies that have one standard for operations in a developed country, where the regulatory environment may tightly control what they do, and another standard for operations in countries where the regulatory regime is perhaps less stringent. Lenders may require environmental and social reviews or audits to be conducted on their behalf by competent third parties prior to a loan being approved, and annually over the life of the relationship. The mining industry's concept of the unwritten `social licence to operate' is highly relevant in relation to the delivery of community benefits that are sustainable post-mine closure. This paper provides examples of recent practices that support financial viability and sustainable development, as well as examples of some failures that have put lenders at risk.

Jan 1, 2007

By G S. C Murray

Major mining projects are developed with the assistance of lending institutions who provide hundreds of millions of dollars in funding over several years, and of course expect those funds to be returned with interest. Two Australian banks have adopted the Equator Principles, an emerging financial industry benchmark for assessing and managing environmental and social risk in project financing. Project financiers have encountered environmental and social issues that are both complex and challenging, particularly with respect to projects in the emerging markets of Asia-Pacific and elsewhere. There are many recent and historical examples of failures by resource companies to effectively manage their environmental, social, safety and security risks, some of which have caused the project to fail completely, and some of which have caused the temporary cessation of production. These events put the financial institutionsÆ funds at risk through inadequate management capacity and non-compliance adversely affecting the ability of the borrowers to repay the loans. They can also reflect adversely on the reputation of the lending institutions. In assessing these risks, lenders are increasingly looking at the track record of the borrower in its country of origin and in other countries where it operates. Lenders are wary of companies that have one standard for operations in a developed country, where the regulatory environment may tightly control what they do, and another standard for operations in countries where the regulatory regime is perhaps less stringent. Lenders may require environmental and social reviews or audits to be conducted on their behalf by competent third parties prior to a loan being approved, and annually over the life of the relationship. The mining industryÆs concept of the unwritten æsocial licence to operateÆ is highly relevant in relation to the delivery of community benefits that are sustainable post-mine closure. This paper provides examples of recent practices that support financial viability and sustainable development, as well as examples of some failures that have put lenders at risk.

Jan 1, 2007

By Dean McDonald

The Committee Bay Greenstone Belt extends over 300km and is one of the largest unexplored greenstone belts in North America with excellent gold and diamond potential. Committee Bay Resources Limited holds over 550,000 acres of land with prospective geology in the Committee Bay area southwest of Melville Peninsula, Nunavut. Committee Bay is a typical Archean greenstone belt comparable to the Yellowknife, Red Lake, Kirkland Lake and other prolific gold belts. Drilling during 2003 at Committee Bay resulted in: 1) the discovery of high-grade gold-bearing quartz veins with silicification and sulphidation at Three Bluffs, and 2) the continuation of high-grade gold mineralization in the hinge area of the iron formation at Inuk. Gold mineralization at Three Bluffs is identified in iron formation and adjacent sediments and has been traced by drilling for over 700m. The Three Bluffs iron formation is open to depth and along strike where is has been traced on surface for over 6km. In January 2004 Committee Bay and joint venture partner Gold Field?s announced a $7.1 million exploration program for the Committee Bay project in 2004. A total of 8,000m in exploration drilling has been approved for the expansion of the Three Bluffs to the resource stage and drilling of at least five new target areas. Additional mapping, sampling and geophysics will be used to identify new gold targets along the very prospective Committee Bay belt.

May 1, 2004

Executive A R LEDOUX, Chairman ARTHUR S DWIGHT CHARLES F RAND E P MATHEWSON J V W REYNDERS Membership E DEGOLYER, Chairman W Y WESTERVELT, Vice-chairman WILLIAM H BASSETT H G MOULTON C MINOT WELD Finance WALTER H ALDRIDGE, Chairman GEORGE D BARRON GALEN H CLEVENGER Library GEORGE C STONE,' Chairman JOHN H JANEWAY ALEXANDER C HUMPHREYS, ROBERT LINTON FREDERICK F SHARPLESS

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By James M. Barker

No commodity agreements now exist for sulfur and a lack of reference to sulfur commodity agreements exists in the literature. Law (1975) made a passing reference to sulfur as one of a group of commodities where "there have been additional control efforts of various types." Clearly, sulfur was a candidate, at least conceptually in the past, for some form of commodity agreement and the following discussion centers on the world sulfur market of the early 1980's in this context. GENERAL THEORY OF COMMODITY AGREEMENTS The upsurge in demands for commodity agreements seen in the last decade or so stems largely from agitation by the less developed countries (LDC) for better economic treatment by more developed countries (MDC). Several economic factors, real or imagined, adversely affect the LDC's as follows (MacAvoy, 1977): 1) variable demand in MDC's causes wide fluctuations in commodity prices which hurt the economies of commodity producers, who are often LDC's although consumer economies may also benefit from more predictable prices; 2) a general decline of commodity prices relative to the price of manufactured goods which hurts commodity producers in their balance of trade while their stocks and overcapacity rise; 3) instability of LDC economies enhanced by the above factors lowers internal stability, inhibits foreign investment, and retards economic growth; and 4) a lack of self respect when dealing with developed countries o, following the OPEC lead, LDC producers want the stature related to cartel market power.

Jan 1, 1985

By F. H. Buttner

Commodity currency intrigues most of us because of the problems it offers to solve for the Third and the First Worlds. What problems might be solved, if commodity currency were to be adopted in the Third World? That is really the question we are probing here right now. It would take a while to think through all their subtle consequences of this question, but, off the top, it might well have at least three important impacts. Most important of these to this audience is relief from unfair Third World competition. Second, it might well liberate Third World economies from financial indebtedness to the First World and give them freedom from the liquidity limitations. The third benefit is that it might help relieve World trade tensions. All three benefits are interrelated. We could start our speculations on the application of commodity currency from anyone of these starting points. But let us use the starting point most important to you, unfair competition to the U.S. mining industry. From there we might wind up with some thoughts on things you, yourselves, can do to improve things.

Jan 1, 1978

1. Domestic Production and Use: Twelve companies operated 31 primary aluminum reduction plants, three firms accounting for 66% of production. Washington, Oregon, and Montana accounted for 32% of the total production; Gulf Coast States, 25%; Northern States, 29%; and other Southern States, 14%. Output of primary metal in 1973 was valued at $2.2 billion. About 80% of the secondary recovery was from new aluminum base scrap and 20% was from old scrap. Aluminum consumption by 25,000 firms was centered in the East Central United States. Of aluminum consuming industries in 1972, building accounted for 28%; transportation 19%; electrical, 13%; packaging, 16%; and consumer durab1es, 10%.

Jan 1, 1974

1. Domestic Production and Use: In 1974 twelve companies operated 31 primary aluminum reduction plants, three firms accounting for 64% of production. Washington, Oregon, and Montana accounted for 32% of the total production; Gulf Coast States, 24%; Northern States, 33%, and other Southern States 11%. Output of primary metal in 1974 was valued at $3.4 billion. About 80% of the secondary recovery was from new aluminum base scrap and 20% was from old scrap. Aluminum consumption by 25,000 firms was centered in the East Central United States. Of aluminum consuming industries in 1974, building accounted for about 27%; transportation 19%; electrical, 13%; packaging, 15%; and consumer durab1es, 9%.

Jan 1, 1975

1. Domestic Production and Use: In 1975.12 companies operated 31 primary aluminum reduction plants, with 3 firms accounting for 67% of production capacity. Washington, Oregon, and Montana accounted for 37% of the total production; Gulf Coast States 21%, Northern States 29%, and other Southern States 13%. Output of primary metal in 1975 was valued at $3.0 billion. Aluminum consumption by 25,000 firms was centered in the East Central United States. Of aluminum consuming industries in 1975, building accounted for about 21%; transportation 19%; electrical 14%; packaging 18%; and consumer durables, 9%.

Jan 1, 1976

Domestic Production and Use: In 1976, 12 companies operated 31 primary aluminum reduction plants, with 3 firms accounting for 63% of production capacity. Washington, Oregon, and Montana accounted for 36% of the total production; Gulf Coast States 19%, Northern States 29%, and other Southern States 16%. Based on published producer prices output of primary metal in 1976 was valued at $3.8 billion. Aluminum consumption by 25,000 firms was centered in the East Central United States. Of aluminum consuming industries in 1976 building accounted for about 25%; packaging 22%; transportation 19%; electrical 13%; , consumer durables 8%; and other uses, 13%.

Jan 1, 1977

By R. L. Virta

Common clay is a natural, fine-grained material composed of hydrous aluminum silicates. Shale is a laminated sedimentary rock formed by the consolidation of clay, mud and (or) silt. Government and legislative programs The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) invited industry to nominate representatives to a review panel that will help the EPA develop rules to regulate air toxics from the production of brick and structural clay products. The EPA was required to establish a review panel because these regulations will significantly affect small businesses. The regulation of air toxics falls under the Clean Air Act.

Jan 1, 2010

By Victor F. Hollister

Introduction Trends of successful discovery technology and psychology emerge from a thoughtful study of various companies' exploration programs. These subjective patterns can be generalized into groups of factors for discussion. Here, for convenience, factors that influence exploration success are separated into management and geologic concerns. Most successful discoveries have a demonstrably favorable management combined with a technically competent geologic input. Both are required. But the management input is decisive. Management factors include the correct definition of management's role; cost of exploration; time needed for exploration; commodity selection; and the fostering of autonomy, creativity, and confidence in the geology department. Geologic factors include imaginative technical competence (field as well as academic), correct development and use of empirical exploration or prospecting models, and dedication. Success comes to those entities that are properly managed and have technological competence. A management team that directs a company's business has been compared to a dynasty. The dynasty lays out policy and follows up with appropriate action. In that management's power is pervasive, the term is appropriate. Management's role is, however, more important. Many examples can be cited where the geologic input was impeccable. But management somehow snatched defeat from the jaws of victory, and the exploration success was turned to a third party's profit. Management Factors Management's role can be broadly generalized to four parts. These are to identify the commodities it seeks, define its part in the exploration process, develop a functioning exploration department, and have the desire to succeed. It must have confidence in its geologists and delegate to them the authority and responsibility they need to operate successfully. Head office management cannot do the thinking for a field staff thousands of kilometers away. There is no substitute for confidence and delegation of authority. Successes came to those who had the freedom to act. Motivation is a management requisite. Management's role is to prevent destructive, internecine political battles within the corporate structure. Most large US mining corporations have well known histories of political strife that have damaged their exploration efforts. Management's role must, above all, include the desire to succeed. There are cases where management has been confronted with a commercial exploration success, but their reaction is to request additional study or exploration. Perhaps the problem of bringing a commercial find into production is beyond their capabilities. But a bona fide discovery sent back for additional work commonly is lost due to that management. The cost of exploration is a factor that management must accept. A variety of studies made during the past 40 years shows the cost per discovery to be $25 million, $38 million, $200 million, or even $290 million. These figures are derived by dividing the total exploration expenditure by the number of discoveries. However, successful management dynasties have a much lower cost per discovery during their management regime. Asarco, from 1948 through 1963, had one of the lowest cost discovery rates in the world. Duval Corp., from 1948 through 1968, had comparably low discovery costs. Placer Development, from 1955, was equally successful. Western Mining in Australia has had one of the longest lived dynasties associated with exploration success. Time is vital in exploration success. Most successful exploration case histories stress sufficient time in project exploration so that the target is well tested. A large target cannot always be adequately evaluated by a few holes (strat or concept testing). Serendipity helps in exploring large targets, but it best operates in a lengthy program. Numerous case histories include pleasant surprises. But these came mostly after the 10th hole. Commodity markets are important factors governing exploration success. Management's decision to explore for a specific commodity can doom its effort if that product suffers from severe oversupply. Unquestionably, progressive copper price increases from 1948 through 1968 helped convert marginal porphyry copper discoveries

Jan 8, 1985

The Prominent Hill copper-gold deposit is located approximately 150 km north west of Olympic Dam, on the southern margin of the Mount Woods Inlier in South Australia. Its discovery in November 2001 resulted from the application of a geological model developed from geological, geophysical and petrophysical data pertaining to the Olympic Dam deposit. The discovery has dispelled the notion the Olympic Dam may be unique, and that another deposit like it is unlikely to be found. The Prominent Hill mineralisation is hosted by haematite-matrix hydrothermal breccias, which have suffered extensive iron-sericite-silica alteration and overprinting. Copper, gold, barium, fluorine, uranium, cerium and lanthanum are all intrinsically associated with the hydrothermal iron. Breccias intrude an east-west striking, fault-controlled sedimentary succession, which is flanked to both the south and north by volcanic complexes. Many similarities between Prominent Hill and Olympic Dam are documented including geological setting, mineralogy, breccia styles, and alteration. Differences relate largely to the nature of the immediate host rocks. The similarities and difference provide key data for improving exploration models for this style of iron oxide copper-gold deposit, both within the Gawler Craton as well as globally.

Jan 1, 2004

By Art Cooper

Granulation systems are customarily viewed as problem areas in metallurgical operations. The inherent risk of explosion when combining a high temperature melt with water creates a safety hazard. Separation of the granulated material from the quenching medium generally involves equipment that can have significant maintenance and operating costs. Granulation systems' reliability and availability can negatively affect the plant production. Against this background, granulation systems have been treated by design firms and producers as an add-on and a necessary evil. The technology is becoming better understood and solutions to common problems are being found. This paper will discuss typical problems in common systems, and some of the improvements that have been made, with particular reference to non-ferrous applications.

Jan 1, 2006

By Art Cooper

Granulation systems are common in the metals industry. The process of granulating slags, mattes and metals is more than a century old, and a number of different systems have been developed to accomplish this task. These systems have followed an evolutionary path, and may be characterized by common elements in terms of molten material handling, granulation methods and post-granulation processing. This paper will summarize the more common systems used in the metals industry, with particular reference to non-ferrous applications.

Jan 1, 2006

By B Mennie, R Poedjono, G Coad

PT Freeport Indonesia operates a large copper and gold mining operation near Tembagapura, Papua (formerly, Irian Jaya), Indonesia. This is a remote location with its own set of unique operational characteristics. The mining and concentrating operations typically produce a concentrate containing 2500 tpd of copper and 6000 oz of gold per day from the combined mining of a 45 000 tpd (ore) block cave operation (DOZ Mine) and a 190 000 tpd (ore) open pit mining operation (Grasberg Open Pit). The Grasberg Open Pit mine will be exhausted in 2015 at which time FreeportÆs operations will entirely underground mining methods. The Common Infrastructure Project (CIP) incorporates the elements required for the shift to underground mining at a production rate approaching 200 000 tpd. The AB Adit portion of the CIP will provide deep level access to the Grasberg Block Cave (below the Open Pit), Kucing Liar, Big Gossan, and the Mill Level Zone orebodies. Commencement of the project was September 2003. The Grasberg Block Cave is planned to start production in 2014. This paper provides details on the project scope, innovative contractual framework, advancement of mining methods throughout the life of the operation, equipment selection, manpower selection, training, geological, and socio-political conditions related to the project.

Jan 1, 2005

By R J. Holmes

The procedures and equipment used for sampling iron ore process streams have generally improved in recent years. However, there are a number of areas where significant issues still commonly occur, including sampling high capacity streams, sample cutter design and operation, division of primary increments at the secondary sampling stage, the performance of crushers installed to reduce the particle size prior to sample division, and the sample mass that is retained at each sampling stage. These issues of non-conformance with correct sampling principles are caused by factors such as increasing the speed and loading of conveyor belts to increase throughput, which changes the trajectory of the ore stream and may result in an inability of the sample cutter to handle the increased flow rate without sample loss. Failure to sample the entire primary increment stream at the secondary sampling stage is also a common issue as well as failure of crushers to provide crushed products of the required particle size due to ongoing maintenance and/or adjustment issues. These common pitfalls can all be addressed through careful attention to detail.CITATION:Holmes, R J, 2017. Common pitfalls in sampling iron ore, in Proceedings Eighth World Conference on Sampling and Blending , pp 261–264 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne).

May 9, 2017