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By A. T. Iannacchione

Unfortunately from 1991 through 1995, 44 miners were fatally injured in the stone industry. Of these 12 occurred at underground mines from a total work force of less than 2,000 miners. Nine of these 12 miners were fatally injured in falls of roof or rib. A safer environment for the miners can be achieved by evaluating the nature of the hazardous ground and by developing more efficient and effective ground control strategies. Roof and rib conditions in the underground stone industry were observed and assessed at 33 mines in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia (Figure 1). Hazard assessment indicated that those ground failures occurring under moderate to substantial overburden ( > 30 m [100 ft]) were caused by stress concentrations and geologic structures. Ground failures near the surface are caused by solution (water) processes. Selection of the mining horizon and mine layout decisions tremendously influence ground stability.

Jan 1, 1997

By David A. Heitman

The Buick Concentrator is a highly automated operation which utilizes a process control system for continuous monitoring and control. The process control system development, installation, and application to the concentrator grinding and flotation circuits are presented in this paper. The design and implementation of analog field sensing instrumentation, a continuous on-stream X-ray analyzer, grinding and classfication circuit controls, and a recent digital process control system utilizing a centralized computer are discussed. Emphasis is placed on the project planning and installation of the digital control system including a presentation of future plans for continuing application of computer control.

Jan 1, 1982

By K. F. Unrug

Fractures of sedimentary rocks in the vicinity of the outcrop are commonly encountered around the world. Mine highwalls and numerous highway cuts give excellent views for detailed study of surface fractures. This paper gives an explanation of the origin of fractures as well as characterization of the distribution and extent of joint system with reference to lithologic composition of the rocks. Practical implications of the joint system affecting mine operations are described. Among the subjects discussed are: discontinuous deformation as an effect of surface subsidence, stability of mine portals and near outcrop underground operations, and stability of highwalls, when using highwall miners and strip operations. Some design procedures are recommended that can minimize the problems encountered in mining areas with intense joint systems.

Jan 1, 1994

By K. W. Harris, K. A. Perry

Reserve depletion in Central Appalachia is continuously creating unique ground conditions for underground coal mines with many of these difficult environments directly attributable to multiple seam mining and/or deeper overburdens. While many empirical studies have been performed in an effort to improve understanding of these problems along with potentially improving safety and extraction, many of the difficulties encountered lie outside of the normal realm of expected behavior. This is often the case when mining in bump prone ground, where additional concerns are introduced and design buffers are warranted. The boundary element software LaModel was used to study three bump events in a deep-cover, multiple-seam reserve located in Harlan county in the Kentucky region of Central Appalachia. This region is notoriously bump prone due to significant areas of deep cover, the presence of strong to massive lithology (such as sandstone), and an extensive history of underground mining that increases the probability of multiple seam interactions. Multiple seam interactions are best understood with respect to site-specific parameters, including both the geological and geometrical components of interburden, overburden and mine workings. Initially, empirical-based approaches (ARMPS/AMSS) were used when attempting to back-analyze the bump events. However, it was recognized that a more detailed investigation was necessary to understand the fundamental causes/conditions associated with the bump events. Consequently, the LaModel study resulted in a mine-specific calibration method for the reserve. With this method in place, enhanced bump prediction throughout the reserve is expected, such that the stability, recovery and safety of future mining may be improved.

Jan 1, 2014

By R. Flattery, Z. Agioutantis

Coal and rock pillar design is critical not only for mineral extraction but also for the safety of the mine operators. Pillar strength can be estimated through numerous empirical formulas that are available in the literature, which are typically based on a statistical analysis of case study data. The limitation of most of these equations is that they only considered the width to height ratio and in situ rock or coal strength for pillars in horizontal seams. The adoption of such equations to estimate pillar strength in inclined seams may overestimate the pillar strength and ultimately lead to a poor pillar design. This paper will discuss different techniques that can be used to estimate pillar strength in inclined seams as well as present preliminary modeling results for stress redistribution around inclined pillars. Factors in the parametric analysis include pillar shapes, geometry, and seam inclination.

Mar 2, 2022

By David Oliveira

"INTRODUCTIONOne of the key drivers for the selection of a mechanized tunneling method in good quality rock masses is a good excavation advance rate. In order to achieve satisfactory advance rates, a good geotechnical performance of the rock grippers in main beam open tunnel boring machines (TBM) is required, besides other factors related to ground support and the performance of the cutter head.One well known potential issue of main beam gripper TBM is associated with the bearing capacity of the tunnel side walls while crossing fault zones or poor rock masses in general. Such a mechanism is similar to that of footings on rock and perhaps the most common problem associated with gripper performance. Depending on the quality of the rock, the rock under the gripper contact may experience significant damage and crushing (Figure 1), eventually affecting the TBM advance rate due to a lack of tunnel wall reaction/support. Such a mechanism is primarily dependent on rock quality, applied loads and gripper size.In the case of large diameter TBMs (e.g., D > 12 m), a second potential failure mechanism may arise associated with the loss of confinement within a rock pillar between twin tunnels, even in good quality rock but particularly in bedded sedimentary strata. Punching of the rock pillar may develop due to excessive shear along bedding partings and sub-vertical joints (Figure 2), particularly under a low stress environment. As a result, this mechanism is dependent on both the rock pillar width between twin tunnels and stress conditions around the tunnels, in addition to the previous factors described for the first failure mechanism."

Jan 1, 2016

By David A. Zegeer

Since 1980, more than 40 miners have lost their lives by being trapped and suffocating in stock-piles, bins, silos, and similar facilities. Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) is concerned about these accidents, most of which could be prevented if management and miners appreciated the hazard. In February 1986, the coal industry had a suffocation accident that drew national attention. A group of engineers were standing on a coal stockpile. It gave way under their feet. Five of the engineers were buried in the coal and suffocated. As with all fatal accidents, MSHA investigated the cause of this tragedy. I also asked my staff to look into the history of similar accidents. I found out it is rare to have multiple fatalities due to suffocation in material. But, over the years, there has been a long series of individual fatalities from this type of accident. Here are some examples. In Oct. 1985, a coal mine employee in Virginia entered a hopper to collect a coal sample. The feeders were started while he was standing in the hopper. He sank into the coal and suffocated. In Sept. 1985, an employee at a Texas sand company climbed onto a surge pile, to check a problem with sand flow. When other employees found him, the sand had swallowed him. Only his face and one hand were showing. Though the victim's face was clear of the sand, he suffocated before rescuers could free him. Many people do not realize you can suffocate in this kind of situation, though your head is free. Every time you exhale, the material has room to shift and press harder against your chest. Then you have less room to inhale. If this goes on long enough, it gets to the point where you cannot inhale at all. That is what happened to the victim in this accident. In May 1985, a plant operator at a Wisconsin sand and gravel operation purposely slid into the drawhole of a surge pile. He tried to break up large rocks that were clogging the drawpoint. Material piled on the side of the surge pile slid down and buried him. The operator was wearing a safety belt and line. But he was covered by 3 to 3.7 m (10 to 12 ft) of material and could not be pulled free. This incident illustrates another point. A safety line can help. But it is not enough. Workers should never put themselves in a position where loose material can fall on them from above. In Jan. 1985, a young Utah coal miner was waiting for a ride home from a co-worker whose job was at the tipple. A jam developed in the coal bin. The men could not clear the jam from the outside. So the young miner jumped into the bin. He started digging with a shovel at the toe of the coal pile. It caved in on him and he suffocated. The young miner had only three months of mining experience. He had not been trained for work around the coal bin. Since 1980, 16 coal miners and 26 nonmetal miners have lost their lives in loose-material suffocation accidents. Suffocation accidents occur in many areas around mines - bins, hoppers, stockpiles, surge piles, and silos, among others. One recent accident occurred at a surface coal mine in Illinois. The victim was walking over an area that had been drilled and blasted the week before. He fell into a void that had been crusted over with earth. He too suffocated. And many materials have been involved in suffocation accidentscoal, crushed stone, sand, salt, different kinds of ore, ammonium nitrate pellets used in blasting, and a powdery byproduct of iron ore milling called calcine. In addition to fatal accidents, there are near misses. We do not know how many. Most of them are not reported. A person who gets trapped in material, but is rescued, is usually unhurt. MSHA sometimes hears about these accidents by chance, or because they are reported in the local media. We do know that near misses are happening far more often

Jan 1, 1987

By Someswar Kesh, Gavin J. Faulkner

Introduction Powered supports in longwall mines essentially operate under two conditions: 1. Static (non-working) 2. Dynamic (working) There is a variety of static conditions which may exist in a mine. These may include a temporary stoppage of work for a few minutes or stoppage of work for days because of strikes or lack of demand for coal. Studies on pressure behavior were made during brief stoppages of work (few hours) as well as a long stoppage of work (two weeks). In dynamic conditions, the pressure variation on supports is expected to follow a certain pattern. However, in many cases that does not happen. Pressure-time characteristics of each leg of the supports were studied. This paper discusses the research findings of the studies made on powered support pressure behavior under both static and dynamic conditions. Studies on Pressure Variation in Static Conditions It has been noted (Brenner et a1.,1975) that the pressure distribution on mechanized longwall faces is random in nature and changes with time and position along the face. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the distribution of support pressures for the front left leg of supports in two different mines. In both the cases it can be seen that the variation of the support pressures along the face is indeed absolutely random. However, the nature of randomness in both the cases is very different. The data in Figure 1 (Mine 1) is much more random than the data in Figure 2 (Mine 2). This can also be seen from the standard deviation of the data (81 26 Pa versus 4000 pa) . By comparing the results of ten other sets of data the same conclusions can be arrived at. Since it was found that in Mine 1, the pressure on support legs was extremely random, batches of ten supports each were taken and the mean pressure plotted. This mean pressure line is shown in Figure 1. It was expected that this would smooth out the variation due to individual props and reveal a better picture of the support pressure distribution. For the case cited, the standard deviation is lowered to 5043 Pa from 8126 Pa which indicates that, on an average, the supports tend to take loads more uniformly, however for individual support legs the load on the supports is very random. The significance of this is that, if the supports are selected on the basis of theoretical load calculations alone (based on the roof block concept or some other concept), only the mean value of the support load required will be known. In the case of a pressure distribution with a high standard deviation, some supports selected on the basis of mean value will fail, while others will be supporting low loads. Hence, for proper selection of support capacity, it is not only necessary to know the average load but also the expected nature of the distribution. The only reason why the supports are supporting the roof in Mine 1 well is the fact that the yield load is above the highest level of load attained. If Mine 2, which has a much higher average load, had the same sort of standard deviation, the loads on the individual legs could easily exceed the support load. For example, if the pressure distribution followed a normal curve and the mean pressure was 36,700 Pa with a standard deviation of 9000 Pa, it is possible that 67% of the supports will be within the pressure range of 36,700 plus or minus 9,000 Pa, or 22,700 and 45,700 Pa. Many of the supports could then exceed the yield load of 40,000 Pa. It is clear then that the mean load is an inadequate criterion for estimating support resistance. The nature of the problem is statistical and such an analysis should therefore be made as far as pressure data are concerned. Statistical Analysis of Pressure Data. In general, in longwall mining and other geo-mechanics studies, it is extremely difficult to specify the exact nature of the distribution of a variable. Under these circumstances, probability

Jan 1, 1986

By Ingemar Marklund

INTRODUCTION Today at LKAB, the primary mining method used is sublevel caving, independent of ore-body size, shape, dip, and geographical location. The mining of small ore bodies with relatively flat dip involves a lot of develop¬ment work, a large initial investment, big dilution, and large ore losses. In 1975 serious investigations into other possible methods, especially for those small ore bodies which do not lie in direct contact with other ore bodies, began. Different methods were studied and a number of in¬teresting ideas came from Russian mines. An analysis was made of one of the proposed methods, sublevel benching, in which mining is carried out from raises, and which uses the throw from the blast to place the broken ore. However, there were reservations about working in big open rooms at great depth, and doubts about the possibility of getting acceptable drilling results in an acceptable environment from raised platforms. Testing was therefore delayed for a time. However the investigations continued and in the fall of 1976, it was decided to try vein mining in a small ore body (Indian) (see Figs. 1 and 2). MINING RESULTS The results are now available from the mining of Indian and are as follows: Ore plan area 1200 m2 Level height 50 m Ore volume 60 000 m3 Ore tonnage 270 000 t Iron content 62% Dip 0.69 rad (40°) Ore thickness 14 m Ore compressive strength 26 MPa Ore C-factor (fracture density) 0.21 Hanging wall compressive strength 28 MPa Hanging wall C-factor 0.27 About 40 000 m of the holes were drilled by ring drills with an average productivity of 85 m/shift; loading of a round (2 rows, 750 m of hole) was usually accomplished in one shift. The total ore recovery was about 270 000 t with an average iron content of 59%, and three to four shifts were required per round (4700 t) to load. The principal of "throwing" the rock during blast¬ing worked well, and no ore remains on the footwall. ROCK CONTROL Before mining commenced at Indian, it was dis¬covered that the rock strength in its vicinity was rela¬tively poor. Since the ore is flatly dipping, and mining was to take place with open rooms, the strength of the hanging wall was of great importance. A supplementary program of exploration drilling was done during the fall of 1976 in order to assess fracture spacing and rock strength from the drill cores. Results showed that the strength of the hanging wall was low because of the many fractures. A decision was made to try cable bolting of the hanging wall by extending some of the ordinary blast¬holes. Cables (20 mm diam) were grouted in these larger holes and the rest of the hole was then utilized for ordinary loading (see Fig. 2). About 100 bolts altogether were installed and, to date, only small falls have occurred and the hanging wall is holding. Its exposed area is 2100 m2 DEVELOPMENT WORK On the 350-m level, four crosscuts (two per mining room), one longitudinal drift, and two elongated drifts (one per raise) for the raise climber were developed as shown in Fig. 1. Of the 230 m of drift, 60 m were in ore and the rest in waste. For mining room A alone, a total of 115 m of drift were needed with 30 m in ore. The drift dimensions were about 4.5 X 5.5 m. In the drifting on the 300-m level, two connecting drifts were driven from one existing transport drift forward to the respective raises. The total development was 93 m, all in waste (Fig. 1). The two raises having a length of 80 m each were driven at an angle of 0.68 rad (39°) from the hori¬zontal. They were driven along the footwall contact with a separation of 30 m and had an area of 10 m2. LONG-HOLE DRILLING The drilling of long holes with the ring drilling unit began in the fall of 1977 in raise A. The equipment consisted of an Alimak raise climber, equipped with a lower platform from which the charging was done.

Jan 1, 1982

By Janet A. Johnson, T. B. Borak, K. J. Schiager

INTRODUCTION In the USA regulatory agencies have adopted standards which limit the allowable concentration of ore dust in underground uranium mines. The American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists has recommended a threshold limit value for silica which has been incorporated by reference in federal regulations (30 CFR 57, 1980). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) imposes a limit for unprocessed uranium ore dust for reducing the exposure to radioactive materials from inhalation (10 CFR 20, 1980). We have been unable to trace the origin of the NRC standard. Recently the ICRP has published recommendations concerning limits for intakes of radionuclides by workers (ICRP, 1979). We have used the ICRP methodology to compute the dose equivalent commitment to lung and bone from inhalation of insoluble ore dust particles. These values were used to derive air concentrations which would provide an acceptable risk for induction of cancer from occupational exposure. Results indicate that the new ICRP recommendations are more restrictive than the present NRC standard for radioactivity. The maximum allowable dust load in a uranium mine will depend on both the concentration of silica (% Si02) and the amount of radioactivity (% U308). We have combined these standards assuming complete independence of biological hazard to establish boundary conditions for which either silica or radioactivity is the dominating factor. Based on these results we present suggestions for analysis of ore dust to insure compliance with regulatory agencies. SILICA STANDARDS Silicosis, fibrotic lung disease produced by crystalline silica, was one of the earliest forms of occupational disease to be recognized. The pulmonary lesions caused by silica, silicotic nodules, consist of concentrically arranged bundles of collagen fibers. Fusion of these nodules results in progressive massive fibrosis causing alveolar changes which decrease ventillation and blood flow in the lungs. The current Threshold Limit Value (TLV) for mineral dusts is based on the concentration of free silica. The standard is expressed in three forms: (1) Particle count standard: TLV (mppcf) = 300/(% Si02 + 10) (mppcf = million particles per cubic foot) (2) Respirable dust mass standard: TLV (mg/m3 ) = 10/(% respirable Si02 + 2) (3) Total dust standard: TLV (mg/m3 ) = 30/(% Si02 + 3) The most commonly used form is the respirable mass standard. These curent values for silica are based primarily on epidemilogical studies of Vermont granite workers and other occupationally exposed workers. In the Vermont study no cases of silicosis were seen in individuals employed after dust control measures were initiated and whose subsequent exposure averaged less than 5 mppcf. The free silica concentration in the airborne dust to which these workers were exposed averaged 25%. A concentration of 10 mppcf of granite dust is considered equivalent to 0.1 mg/m3 quartz. The current respirable mass standard allows a maximum silica concentration of 0.1 mg/m3. NIOSH (1974) has recommended a reduction in the current TLV for respirable silica to 0.05 mg/m3 Si02. As with radiation standards, the TLV for mineral dusts is an upper limit for time weighted average exposure. It is recommended that dust concentrations be maintained as far below the TLV as current practices permit. RADIATION STANDARDS The present concentration limit for airborne natural uranium in ore dust prior to chemical separation is 75 µg of uranium per m3 of air ( 10 CFR 20, 1980) . This corresponds to 1.85 Bq/m3 (50 pCi/m3 ) of natural uranium, U-238, U-235 and U-234 and is equivalent to 3.7 Bq/m3 (100 pCi/m3 ) of gross alpha activity with radioactive equilibrium between the long-lived alpha progeny through Ra-226. The origin or basis for this standard is not known, but it presumably includes both chemical toxicity and risk from somatic radiation injury. Recently the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP, 1977) has published recommendations concerning the objectives and criteria for limiting radiation exposures. This was followed b y a revision of the limits for intake of radionuclides by workers (ICRP, 1979; ICRP, 1980). The previous compilation of limits for internal emitters was published by ICRP Committee II in 1959 (ICRP, 1959). The latest version includes new methodlogy outlined in ICRP Publication 26 (ICRP, 1977) as well as extensive metabolic information

Jan 1, 1981

By Rafael Moure

On April 21, 1980 the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union (OCAW) submitted a petition urging the revision of the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) permissible exposure limit to radon daughters in underground mines. This petition asks for: 1. Annual worker exposure to be lowered from the current 4 WLM/year to 0.7 WLM/year; 2. Full economic protection for workers whose exposure exceeds the proposed 0.7 WLM/ year; and 3. The primary means of lowering workers' radiation exposures shall be environmental controls. I will present the scientific rationale for the lower standard requested in our petition to the Department of Labor. [1. Radiation Exposures to Uranium Miners] Two types of radiation exposures are present in the environment of uranium mines: A. [External Exposure] to gamma sources which until 1978 was considered as negligible compared with internal alpha radiation. R. E. Utting (1), in an investigation of three Canadian uranium mines, found levels of exposures adding to an annual dose equivalent of 3 rems (30 mSv)/year. He concluded that gamma dosages may be a major fraction of the maximum permissible dose for many individual miners. The U.S. experience has shown that there is significant gamma exposure in U.S. uranium mines and, therefore, it could contribute to the total radiation exposure to the lungs in combination with internal alpha radiation. Before ventilation improvements in uranium mines, the contribution of external radiation to total lung dosage was relatively small. After improvements in ventilation, the reduction in internal radiation exposure appears to be in 1980 as low as 1/10 of the 1950 dosages. However, ventilation improvements do not affect external gamma radiation. Gamma radiation remains at the same 1950's level, and it represents today a higher proportion of the total radiation burden to the miner's lungs. MSHA regulations (57.5-47) state that if gamma exposure is below 2.0 milliroentgens per hour, then workers are not required to wear gamma dosimeters and cummulative gamma radiation records need not be kept. Assuming an exposure of 1.9 milliroentgens per hour per 173 hours/month for 12 months,a miner would accumulate a dose from external radiation of 3.9 rems/ year. This dosage would, of course, go unrecorded. MSHA, therefore, should consider a downward revision of the external radiation permissible exposure limit of 2.0 milliroentgens/hour. MSHA should make clear that this exposure level, when added to the internal exposure, does not make for sound health physics -even though the measured current levels do not approach 2.0 milliroentgens/hour. B. [Internal Exposure] to alpha radiation is still the larger contributor to lung irradiation in uranium miners. The target organ is still the lung. The parameters to be considered in determining the biological radiation load appear in Table I for radon daughters present in the upper respiratory tract (URT). TABLE I RADIATION DOSE PARAMETERS IN THE URT OF URANIUM MINERS Parameter Uranium Underground Mining [1. Quantity of the Absorbed Radon daughters (Po-218, Nuclide Pb-214, Bi-214) deposit in bronchial and lung tissue. (Measured by air concentration, Working Levels) 2. Type of Radiation Emitted Alpha Particles 3. Energy of Radiation High-Linear Energy Transfer 4. Half-life of the Nuclide Ra 222, 3.8 days in the Organ Po-218 (RaA), T1/2 = 3.1 minutes Pb-214 (RaB), T1/2 = 26.8 minutes Bi-264 (RaC), Vi = 19.7 minutes 5. Selection Factor of the Direct inhalation with mine Organ dust to be deposited in the tipper Respiratory Tract 6. Mass and Form of the Organ Especially cancer sensitive, tracheobronchial region and bronchi* 7. Distribution of the Activity Dependent on deposited dust in the Organ distribution in the Upper Respiratory Tract 8. Chemical Nature of All compounds (RaA, RaB, RaC) Incorporated Substance biologically insoluble. (Only localized, irradiation) *See Reference (2)] The parameters of Table I depend, in turn, on the demography of the exposed population, especially: 1. Age 2. Sex 3. Health Status 4. Genetic Constitution 5. Lifestyle (Smoking, Diet) Some of these demographic characteristics of uran-

Jan 1, 1981

By William D. Cassity, Batric Pesic

Introduction Gold mining on an industrial scale is becoming increasingly dependent on low-grade refractory sulfide ores that contain large amounts of pyrite (FeS2) and arsenopyrite (FeAsS). Gold is usually present as sub-microscopic particles dispersed evenly throughout the sulfide matrix. Without some form of preoxidation, efficient recovery of this finely disseminated gold through cyanide leaching is hampered because the surface of the sulfide particle becomes passivated and impervious to penetration of the cyanide. Traditional methods for recovery of refractory gold from arsenopyrite ores include roasting and autoclave leaching. A modem alternative method is to preoxidize the mineral using the bacterium Thiobacillus ferrooxidans prior to attempting to re- cover the gold through cyanidation. The bioleaching of arsenopyrite ores presents a problem in the mobilization of large quantities of arsenic, present both in the +5 and +3 ionic states. Dissolved arsenic species pose a dual problem: they are -1 to the bioleaching process itself through inhibition of bacterial activity, and they also pose an environmental threat. The arsenate anion (AsO2) has been shown to be more toxic to living organisms, including Thiobacillus ferrooxidans, than the arsenate anion (AsO43) (Collinet and Morin, 1989). There is some disagreement as to the fate of arsenite in bioleaching solution. Mandl, Matulova, and Docekalova (1992) reported that dissolved arsenite concentration was constant during a long-term bioleaching study of chalcopyrite using Thiobacillus ferrooxidans. Torma and Oolman (1992) report that Thiobacillus ferrooxidans has been found capable of oxidizing As3+ to As5+. The solid products of arsenopyrite/pyrite bioleaching include jarosite (MFe3(SO4)2(OH)6 where M can be K+, Na+, NH4+ or H3O+), scorodite (FeAsO4.2H2O), ferric hydroxides, and ferric hydroxysufites (Carlson et. al., 1992; Van Breemen, 1982; Lazaroff et. al., 1982). The particular species formed is a function mainly of pH. Little study has been performed on the effect of solid products on bioleaching. Pesic and Kim (1993) showed that Thiobacillus ferrooridans cells served as a nucleation sites for jarosite particles, which grew rapidly and eventually killed the cell. Most bioleaching studies are performed at low pH&apos;s (<2.0) under uncontrolled conditions. By studying bioleaching of arsenopyrite under controlled pH conditions and at higher pH&apos;s (2.0 to 3.0), the distribution of iron and arsenic between the solid and liquid phases can be controlled, and their effects studied. The objective is to develop a bioleaching process that operates at high efficiency while keeping amounts of dissolved heavy metals low. Pesic, Stohok, and Torma (1993) demonstrated the usefulness of this approach in the leaching of cobaltite (CoAsS) concentrates. Materials and Methods The focus of this study was the bioleaching of arsenopyrite ore by Thiobacillus ferrooxidans. The parameters studied included the effects of pH, and the effects of arsenate (AsO43 and arsenite (AsO2). pH studies included pH set initially but not controlled, and pH controlled continuously with NaOH or LiOH. Bioleaching results from two strains of Thiobacillus ferrooxidans with different adaptation histories were compared. Bioleaching experiments were conducted in 150 ml stirred glass reactors using a strain of Thiobacillus ferrooxidans adapted to arsenopyrite ore, supplied by the U.S. Bureau of Mines. These bioreactors were innoculated with stock cells grown on arsenopyrite ore for 14-16 days. Typical elemental breakdown for this ore was: As, 9.90%; Fe, 18.60%, Stot, 9.26%; Suifide, 7.50%; SiO2, 25.90%. Mineralogically, the ore contained both arsenopyrite and pyrite. Bioleaching efficiency was measured by withdrawing bioleach solution samples at selected intervals, filtering, and measuring the amount of dissolved cobalt, iron, and arsenic by atomic absorption spectroscopy. Because the precipitation of iron and arsenic at higher pH&apos;s would lead to unreliable results, a 100 mg tracer of cobaltite concentrate from the Blackbird mine in southern Idaho was added to solution. Dissolution of the cobaltite tracer was used to indicate bioleaching of the bulk arsenopyrite ore. Cobalt has been shown to be stable in solution even when iron and arsenic were precipitated (Pesic, Storhok, and Tonna, 1993). The pa-

Jan 1, 1995

By R. L. Grayson, R. C. Althouse, L. A. Layne, M. J. Klishis

Introduction The researchers combine a detailed microanalysis of accident data and roof bolting field observations to develop new and meaningful risk indices for the roof bolter job classification. These indices incorporate information that has not been used in traditional measures of risk. The significant parameters that these new indices incorporate are the total number of accidents occurring within a particular work activity, the amount of time a miner usually spends performing the work activities in which the accidents occurred, and the average severity of the injuries incurred in the accidents. Being specific for a particular job, they aid comparisons among work tasks performed in the bolting cycle. The indices&apos; specificity provide anew basis for reexamination of training and operational development of miners for specific jobs. Microanalysis The roof bolting microanalysis was performed by examining the empirical data and written summaries for all bolting accidents reported in the West Virginia Safety Information System (WVSIS) for the years 1983-1987. The WVSIS database contained more than 15,000 accident narratives. The microanalysis of bolting accidents covered 2083 reported personal injuries (RPIs). This large number of injuries, performed at an industry-wide level, provides a broad picture of the nature of roof bolting injuries. The analysis focuses on the activities associated with the cyclical routines of the roof bolting process. For this analysis, roof bolting tasks were categorized into work routines based on the sequence of work activities performed by roof bolters. Four work routines were identified within the overall bolting cycle. And these routines comprised 70% (1217) of all roof bolting accidents at the face. The routines include: face area preparation; tramming, positioning and setting the automated temporary roof support (ATRS); drilling holes; and installing bolts. The types of injuries most common within a routine and the average severity of those RPIs were also identified. Table 1 gives a breakdown of the percentage of accidents by the bolting routines. Another 19% of the roof bolting RPIs cannot be classified in a particular routine because of the vagueness of the narratives. However, it was clear that these accidents involved drilling holes or installing bolts. These results are consistent with previous research. It identified drilling and bolting, followed by tramming, as the most frequent sources of injuries (Helander, Krohn & Curtain, 1983). [Table 1-Accidents by bolting routines at the face Accidents Bolting routine Percent Number Face area preparation 18.2 222 Tram, position, ATRS 23.3 284 Drilling holes 34.2 416 Installing bolts 24.2 295 Total 1217] Roof bolter operators were involved in 82% (1706) of the 2083 accidents. The RPIs incurred by classified roof bolters occurred largely on working sections (95%) and at the face area on the working section (75%). Approximately 23% of the 1706 roof bolter RPIs occurred during tasks which were not part of the bolting cycle. These included belt utility work, providing supplies and section moves. Miners in other job classifications who were involved in roof bolting accidents accounted for the remaining 18% of the 2083 roof bolting RPIs. Among this group were section utility men and general laborers (41%), section machine operators (38%), and electricians and mechanics (11%). Another 9% were performing on-section supervisory functions. Face area preparation Face area preparation work led to a substantial number of injuries, although it accounted for the lowest number of injuries of the four routines. Several tasks were associated with the injuries incurred in this routine. Table 2 shows the percentage of injuries associated with face area preparation. [Table 2- Accidents occurring during face area preparation 26.6% Setting temporary and supplemental supports 24.8% Scaling roof and ribs 21.2% Installing ventilation devices 15.8% Handling supplies and materials 11.6% Miscellaneous tasks] The injuries commonly involved overexertion and &apos;struck by&apos; falling coal and rock. Handling materials often led to overexertion injuries. Nearly 66% of the scaling-related injuries and about 33% of the injuries incurred during the setting of temporary supports involved &apos;strikes&apos; by equipment, materials, top and rib. Tramming, positioning and setting the ATRS During tramming operations, workers were often struck by components of the machine and hit by loose roof and rib. Poor footing also led to slips, sometimes against the moving machinery. Table 3 gives a breakdown of accidents in this routine. Control levers were a significant problem in this routine.

Jan 1, 1993

By R. T. Torrie, J. R. Mernagh, D. B. Chambers

l, INTRODUCTION Uranium mine and mill workers are exposed to external gamma and beta radiation fields from radioactive ore. In the past the average uranium content of ores mined in the United States and Canada ranged from about 0.1% to 1.0% U308 with pockets of much higher grade ore. Holiday (1973) reported that radiation surveys in the U.S. uranium mines found mean gamma "radiation rates ranged from 0.20 to 0.70 mrem/h. Such radiation rates cause relatively insignificant exposures." Others also concluded that the external gamma radiation fields associated with uranium mining did not result in significant worker exposures (Federal Radiation Council, 1967; Simpson, S.D. [et al], 1959) Gamma exposure levels in most modern-day Canadian uranium mines are reported to be low with average annual exposures estimated to be less than 1 rem/a (Frost, S.E. [et al], 1981). However, two developments are taking place which affect the potential significance of external radiation fields in the uranium mining environment. The first development stems from the most recent system of dose limitation developed by the ICRP which is intended to limit the workers&apos; overall risk from exposure to ionizing radiation through the adoption of a sum rule (ICRP 26, 1977) which combines external and internal radiation exposures. In the case of exposure to radon daughters the sum rule will have the effect of reducing the annual exposure limit below the recommended limit by an amount that depends on external radiation and other sources of internal exposure such as the inhalation of ore dust (ICRP 1980). The Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada (AECB) is reviewing this subject and is expected to produce its recommendations shortly. Irrespective of the form of the sum rule eventually adopted by the AECB, it is clear that the net effect of the sum rule will be a collective reduction of the individual dose limits for individual exposure pathways. The second factor is the increasing development of high grade uranium deposits in Northern Saskatchewan. Some of these ore bodies have an average ore grade of 1% to 5% U308 or greater. Since the potential external radiation fields increase in proportion to the ore grade, it is apparent that increased effort in radiation protection planning is required in order to develop safe yet workable methods for mining and milling such ores. This paper is intended to provide information which can be of assistance in the formulation and development of a mining and milling plan. The principal focus of the paper is source identification and the design of radiation protection measures to limit external gamma radiation exposure. The exposure of workers to external beta radiation fields is also discussed. The paper is organized as follows: - Section 2 deals with source characterization. - Section 3 discusses the effects of finite source size and distance (i.e. geometry effects). - Section 4 presents selected data that are useful in evaluating shielding requirements. - Section 5 discusses the potential beta radiation fields. - Section 6 discusses practical data requirements for worker exposure scenarios. - Section 7 presents a variety of work exposure calculations. - Section 8 is a summary of this paper. 2. SOURCE CHARACTERIZATION This section develops the basic formulae for estimating the fluxes and doses from external gamma radiation. The calculation of the radiation flux due to a distributed source (i.e. a linear, area or volume source) as a function of distance assumes that any distributed source can be treated as a summation of point sources. [ ] Uranium ore contains radionuclides from both the decay chains of U-238 and U-235. In this paper the radioactive daughters are assumed to be in secular equilibrium with the uranium parent. (If natural thorium were present in the ore in significant quantities, the gamma rays originating from Th-232 would have to be added to the gamma rays from the uranium series). In all, there are over 50 separate gamma rays (as well as alpha and beta particles) emitted from the U-238 and U-235 radioactive decay series (USHEW 1970). The total

Jan 1, 1981

By L. C. Lang

INTRODUCTION The introduction of 165-mm (61/z-in.) holes to underground mining operations has made possible the application of Canadian Industries Ltd&apos;s (CIL) vertical crater retreat (VCR) mining method, illustrated in the accompanying sketches. This unique and revolutionary new application of spherical charge technology (see the Appendix), when applied to primary stopes and pillar recovery, eliminates raise boring, slot cutting, and dilu¬tion of ore by backfill; greatly improves fragmentation; reduces labor and time requirements; eliminates uphole drilling and blasting; and minimizes or completely elimi¬nates damages by blasts to the walls and retreating backs of the stope or pillar. If vertical large diameter holes are drilled on a designed pattern from a cut over a stope or pillar to bottom in the back of the undercut, and spherical charges of explosives are placed within these holes at the calculated optimum distance from the back of the undercut and detonated, a vertical thickness of ore will be blasted downwards into the previously mined area. Repeating this loading and blasting procedure, min¬ing of the stope or pillar retreats in the form of horizontal slices in a vertical upwards direction until the top sill is blasted and the mining of a stope or pillar is completed. The VCR method is also applicable to drop raises and has the potential to replace all other raising methods under most circumstances. PILLAR RECOVERY Levack Mine Inco Metals Co., Ontario Div., provided the first opportunity for the method in pillar recovery. The Levack mine&apos;s high grade ore pillar No. 4800 on the 975-m (3200-ft) level was used for the production¬scale experiment (Figs. 1 to 3). The pillar was about 49 m (160 ft) long, 6 m (20 ft) wide, and 20 to 26 m (65 to 85 ft) high. The mined area on both sides of the pillar was backfilled with a 1:30 cement:sand mixture. The pillar was removed in two phases. In phase 1, the standard uphole method was used to blast down the 18-m (60-ft) long section of waste from the bottom of the ore into the undercut. From the pillar&apos;s top sill, 165-mm (61/a-in.) holes were drilled downward into the pillar, and by measuring the depth of the holes, the results of the uphole blast were determined and roof line 1 was established. The bottom of each hole was plugged, then filled with sand to place the center of gravity of each spherical charge (loaded from the top sill) at a predetermined optimum distance from the horizontal free surface. The charges were then detonated. After detonation, both draw drifts were full of extremely well-broken material. The depth of each hole was measured again, and the plot of these depths re¬sulted in roof line 2. The same blasting procedure was repeated and the resultant new back elevation was marked by roof line 3. The poor results of the initial uphole blast at one location (notice the peak in area 1) appeared to influ¬ence the subsequent new backs. A third blast success¬fully evened the back, and resulted in roof line 4. An unblasted slab averaging 6.3 m (20.9 ft) thick remained below the pillar&apos;s top elevation as the final sill. In all three spherical charge blasts fragmentation of the blasted material was extremely fine. The backfill was fully exposed on both sides of the now-blasted pillar. The backfill remained undamaged and the ore was not diluted by sand. The remnants of all the 165-mm (61/2 -in.) holes remained clean and undamaged, and the holes had well-defined bottoms that could be easily measured and plugged. Each blast took down a 3.9 to 4.2-m (13 to 14-ft) thick horizontal slab of ore. Productivity was three times greater than that of the previously practiced cut-and-fill method. Since this was the first such experiment, blasting the remaining 6-m (20-ft) thick final slab was the sub¬ject of some deliberation. If the described method was repeated, we could have ended up with a 1.8-m (6-ft) thick sill unsafe to work on. It was therefore decided to blast the whole sill using two spherical charges prop¬erly placed in each hole, but with the application of

Jan 1, 1982

By Wenkai Wan, Charlie C. Li

Strain burst can occur in underground hard rock excavation when the in-situ stresses are high enough. The prerequisite for rock burst is that the total energy released from the rock mass is higher than the energy needed for rock fracture. The total released energy is contributed by both the burst rock and the surrounding rock. The part of the energy from the burst rock is constant per unit volume of the rock, but the part from the surrounding rock is associated with the burst volume. A greater amount of energy will be released from the surrounding rock in the case of a larger volume of burst rock. The postulation for the energy conversion in strain burst is verified through a FLAC3D model in the paper. It is assumed that the strain burst occurs in a circular tunnel that is located in the hydrostatically loaded rock mass in the model. Six pairs of notches with different depths are created in the opposite walls of the tunnel to simulate the bursts. The energies released from the notch rocks and from the surrounding rock are calculated during the burst. The simulation results show that the percentage of the energy released from the surrounding rock in the total released energy increases with the notch depth. The numerical modelling confirms the postulation that the surrounding rock contributes more energy than the burst rock itself in large-scale strain bursts

Apr 26, 2022

By Hamid Maleki

Mine seismicity is influenced by the mechanical properties of both near-seam strata and overburden/underburden and the prudent selection of mining methods and mine layout designs, utilizing sitespecific structural setting of the mines. The importance of adequate data collection, monitoring, and prudent structural designs has long been recognized and utilized in many U.S. operations with adequate engineering resources. In this paper, two case studies of historic seismic events and contributing factors, in deep coal and trona mines with overburden thickness exceeding 1,500 ft, are reviewed using observations and analysis. By back analyzing the overburden response in a historic room-and-pillar coal mine, the overburden collapse mechanism associated with a 3.3 magnitude seismic event is reviewed as well as the need for improvements in designs including panel and barrier pillar widths. Similar high-order seismic events were also experienced in trona mines of the Green River Basin during 1990s, interrupting room-and-pillar mining and creating ground control concerns. Efforts to improve structural mine designs are described in this paper leading to stable and productive operations for decades following the high-order seismic events in both coal and trona case studies. These efforts included improving room-and-pillar extraction layouts and utilizing properly designed longwall mining techniques that were verified using long-term geotechnical instrumentation. The study mines are located on the Wasatch Plateau (WP), Utah and in the Green River Basin (GRB), Wyoming. More recently, in Utah’s East Mountain alone, Energy West Mining Company (EWMC) has extracted some 165 million tons of coal without any significant incidents. Overall, favorable geologic conditions and prudent mine layout designs are key elements to this successful experience in both single- and two-seam layouts. Utilization of conservatively designed longwall mining technique in the GRB has been geotechnically stable, using reported experience in 15 panels and monitoring results in the Northwest (NW) District with measurable longwallinduced seismicity being rare. These studies demonstrate a considerable amount of progress that has been made within the last four decades in the application of longwall mining technique, integrated monitoring, and analyses for the verification of structural designs in mines in the United States.

Jul 1, 2023

By B. H. Kim, P. Zhang, M. A. Van Dyke, D. Su, H. Dougherty

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) has been evaluating longwall mining-induced strata fractures and their impacts on casing stability of Marcellus shale gas wells located in longwall pillars. To understand the extent of overburden fractures after longwall mining, NIOSH researchers drilled a postmining corehole into the fractured strata above the Pittsburgh coal seam longwall gob. Knowing the extent of the fracture zone height will help gas operators minimize the hazards of drilling into longwall gobs. The core was retrieved from the surface down to the top of the gob void. Various fractures were encountered varying from 35 to 64 degrees, depending on lithologic type and relative closeness to the gob. The longwall panel dimension was 457 m wide and 3657 m long, in which the total fracture zone height was found to be at 141 m and the hydraulic connected fracture zone at 87.7 m above the top of the Pittsburgh seam. In addition to core drilling through the gob, FLAC3D modeling was also used to simulate the formation of fracture zone and the orientations of longwall-induced fractures. This study provides much-needed evidence on the fracture zone of Pittsburgh seam longwall gobs to help gas operators avoid potential hazards associated with drilling through highly fractured zones

Mar 2, 2022

By Peter Zhang, Daniel Su

Following the first longwall excavation at a deep-cover gas well site, the pre-mining modeling prediction of longwallinduced casing deformations in the fully cemented production casing were in excellent agreement with post-mining Caliper survey results. However, after second panel mining, the post-mining Caliper survey revealed a large plastic deformation near the top of the Pittsburgh Seam. The focus of this paper is to identify the possible cause of such an anomalous deformation. Very high longwall-induced casing stress near a thick claystone layer at 23 feet above the Pittsburgh seam horizon was identified as the primary cause. Leaving the production casing uncemented or using softer cementing material between intermediate and production casings is identified as the best practice.

Feb 1, 2024

By N. R. Sainath

This paper discusses a laboratory investigation that studied the microscale flow characteristics of copper ores and the variation in flow behavior resulting from flow of leach solution. Fractures in 40- and 100-mm-diam (1.5- and 4-in.-diam) cores were first mapped by visual inspection. The permeability of cores to water-stressed in a triaxial stress field representative of in situ conditions - was estimated. The samples were then exposed to 20g/L (2.7 oz/gal) sulfuric acid and the experiment was repeated. The porosity and the rate of recovery of copper from the specimen during leaching were also studied. The measured permeability of unleached samples with no visible fractures ranged from 10-16 to 10-19 m2 and it increased as leaching progressed. The porosity increased significantly with leaching, while the rate of copper recovery decreased.

Jan 1, 1994