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By F. N. Rhinos, B. J. Nelson

Studies upon the rates of oxidation of copper alloys containing small quantities of the alloying elementsl,2 have shown that steady growth of the scales at predictable rates is limited to a small concentration range and to oxidation at temperatures above 600°C., whereas unpredictable and erratic oxidation behavior is found with alloys containing larger additions and at low temperatures. The latter effect appears to be associated with modifications in the geometric disposition of the oxides. At low concentrations of the baser elements in copper, simple oxidation behavior is typified by the formation of two distinguishable zones of oxidation: (I) a subscale composed of discrete particles of the oxide of the alloying element embedded in substantially pure copper and (2) an external scale composed of cuprous oxide (with a very thin layer of cupric oxide on the outside) containing particles of the alloying element distributed throughout, but most profusely near the metal surface (see Fig. 2, top). Where this type of structure obtains, the process of oxidation is believed to be implemented, and its rate controlled, by the diffusion of the reacting elements through a' continuous matrix phase; i.e., through the alpha (metallic) phase of the subscale and alloy and through the cuprous oxide of the external scale. Copper is presumed to diffuse outward through the cuprous oxide layer to the external surface, where it reacts to form more cuprous oxide.3 Oxygen is delivered at the oxide-metal interface in the form of cuprous oxide, which may either react with the alloying element to deposit its oxide at the inner limit of the external scale or dissolve in the pure copper that remains at the surface of the metal after it has become depleted in its oxidiza-ble alloying elements. Both oxygen and the alloying element are pictured as diffusing through the metal, the oxygen inward and the alloying element outward. Where the two diffusion streams meet in sufficient concentration the oxide of the subscale is precipitated. If the oxygen pressure in the surrounding atmosphere is just below the pressure necessary to maintain cuprous oxide undecomposed, no cuprous oxide can be formed; some of the oxide of the alloying element may form upon the external surface, if its decomposition pressure is below that of cuprous oxide, and a normal sub-scale appears. This condition is achieved experimentally by enclosing the alloy with cuprous oxide together with an excess of copper. At temperatures from 600°C. downward, the precipitated oxides tend to accumulate at the grain boundaries of the alpha phase where a relatively small volume establishes a partial barrier to the diffusion of the reactants- Similarly, large volumes of Precipitated oxides tend to deposit in various patterns that may be expected to

Jan 1, 1944

By William H. Bassett, C. J. Snyder

Cable sheaths made from common lead have been used to protect underground cables since the beginning of the power-cable industry. Only within the last few years, however, has a systematic study of the production methods and of the causes of failures in cable sheathing been undertaken. Recent increases in the use and demands for service made upon power cables have emphasized the importance of high-quality cable sheaths. It was customary for the users to attribute the cause for their sheath failures to the lack of purity of the lead, but this contention has not been borne out by field and laboratory inspection of the sheaths. During the past two years the writers have had an opportunity to examine various types of sheaths that were removed from power cables after failure. These samples were obtained from various parts of the country and represent, it is supposed, the production of the principal cable manufacturers. Aside from corrosion, the common field difficulties can be classified either as mechanical or structural, as outlined below, and when structural irregularities are found they can all be attributed to manufacturing causes and in no way reflect the purity of the lead. Clasxification of Cable Sheath Failures Other Than Corrosive Mechanical Irregularities A. Splits caused by excessive internal pressure B. Injuries such as nail holes, cuts, tsars, etc. C. Intercrystalline cracks caused by vibration Structural Irregularities A. Splits C. Voids in wall of sheath a. Caused by imperfect welds a. Blisters 13. Holes through sheath b. Laminations a. Caused by yellow oxide inclu- D. Questionable structures sions in sheath wall a. Prominent flow lines b. Blowouts by entrapped gases b. Large areas filled with suboxide during manufacture c. Scattered yellow oxide or dirt C. Caused by inclusions of dirt and

Jan 1, 1933

By Herbert Clark Hoover, Lou Henry Hoover

QUESTIONS of assaying were explained in the last Book, and I have now come to a greater task, that is, to the description of how we extract the metals. First of all I will explain the method of preparing the ore1 ; for since Nature usually creates metals in an impure state, mixed with earth, stones, and solidified juices, it is necessary to separate most of these impurities from the ores as far as can be, before they are smelted, and therefore I will now describe the methods by which the ores are sorted, broken with hammers, burnt, crushed with stamps, ground into powder, sifted, washed, roasted, and calcineda.

Jan 1, 1950

By ROBERT H. BOOTH

THE happy intra-plant relationships of the Bridgeport Brass Co. are largely attributable to the interest of the management in this important business factor. In furtherance of this development Carl F. Dietz, President of the Company and a member of the Institute, has contributed the novel plan for the objective presentation of business economics, described herein. All of the officers of the corporation are active in its management and they together with many other workers filling both executive and subordinate positions have a substantial financial interest in the enterprise. The viewpoint of this organization is fairly reflected by the following quotation from Roosevelt's "The Foes of Our Own Household."

Jan 1, 1924

By CHARLES W. BENTON

THE following paragraphs comprise such information as the Secretary has been able to obtain concerning the members and associates whose deaths have been reported. Further particulars or corrections of errors, and biographical data concerning deceased members or associates not already noticed in this way, are solicited. Charles IV. Benton was born at Kezar Falls, Maine, Nov. 12, 1843. We have no accurate knowledge concerning the early part of his career. In 1871 he engaged with the N. Y. Honduras Rosario Mining Co., at San Juancinto, Honduras, C. A., and later was employed at the Monserrat mine at Yuscaran, and at Santa Lucia, Honduras, with the Tenero Mining Milling Co. of Pennsylvania. In 1897 he became a member of the Institute. At the time he was stricken with his last sickness he was employed at the Paymaster mine at Tucson, Ariz. He died at Fairmount, Denver, Colo., Sept. 9, 1907. William R. Boggs, Jr.-The notice in the Bulletin for January was incorrect in saying that the murder of Mr. Boggs occurred while he was employed as metallurgical. manager by Mr. W. B. A. Dingwall, at La Maroma, San Luis Potosi, Mex. Mr. Dingwall writes that in March, 1907, Mr. Boggs left him, to return to his home at Winston, N. C., whence he. subsequently went to Durango, Mex., to take, with the Topia Mining Co., a position which he occupied at the tine of his death, Nov. 17, 1907. Mr. Dingwall says that, while in his service, Mr. Boggs never had any trouble with the workmen, but was esteemed and liked by them, as by all who knew him ; and adds, injustice to the State of San Luis Potosi, that the population, even in the mining-camps of that State, is orderly and law-abiding, and that the authorities are vigilant and just. Our

Mar 1, 1908

By V. F. STANLEY

THERE is not the slightest doubt that the present recoveries of valuable minerals by the Broken Hill mills could be improved, and that further machinery would be installed for the purpose if it could be assured that a high price of metals would be maintained; but concentration, like all other com¬mercial propositions, is a question of profit and loss, and no sensible metallurgist would carry out his work in such a manner as to obtain high recoveries at a financial loss to his company. There is a point in all concentration at which the added money obtained from the higher recovery of minerals is balanced by the extra cost of obtaining the last part of the recovery; a wise metallurgist will be content with his work before his working-expenditure reaches this point. To a casual observer, the work being done by the various Broken Hill mills is identically the same. A closer investigation will show that this is far from being the case, for it is a remarkable fact that, although the larger mines extend over a length of approximately only 2 miles, such a difference in the physical and chemical properties of the ores exists that, from the first reduction downwards, special treatment is necessary in each case, and hardly any two mills are identical in operation. The details of this paper refer directly- to the work of one . particular mill in Broken Hill, for the reason that the ore from each mine presents special difficulties and requires its own special treatment. I have selected the mill referred to because it has been constructed and modified under my supervision.

Sep 1, 1909

By Yeatman, Pope

FOR many years geologists have felt that mining companies should adopt a more liberal policy in the publication of their reports. The increasing usefulness of the geologist to the mining profession in recent years demands that consideration be given to this question. Prior to 1900, the call for geologists of high reputation by mining companies was probably mainly in connection with lawsuits arising from the interpretation of rights or ownership as defined by the "Law of the Apex," and from problems such as finding the continuation of the vein or whether the vein followed was the main one or a branch. Later, outside of legal questions, the most intensive and general use of their services arose from the search for oil. Geologists to determine the position of the formations

Jan 1, 1938

By Albert Sauveur

THE senior author of this paper has expressed the belief that when gamma iron transforms into alpha iron on reaching the A3 point, each gamma grain does not change bodily into one or more alpha grains but that the alpha phase forms first at the boundaries and along the crystallographic planes of the austenite grains.1 To quote: On cooling through the point A, at about 900° C., iron passes from the gamma condition to a. new allotropic form generally designated as alpha. This transforma¬tion, however, is not instantaneous. There are good reasons for believing that it begins at the grain boundaries and along the octahedral planes of the crystals and that it progresses until each grain of gamma iron is changed into a grain of alpha iron, the resulting structure being similar to that of gamma iron. Were it possible to retain at room temperature pure iron but partially transformed, it seems probable that a Widmanstättian structure, or rather, as later explained, a martensitic structure would be observed (Fig. 1), consisting of alpha iron at the boundaries and at the octahedral planes, and of a groundmass of gamma iron. In order to confirm, if possible, the accuracy of that view, a number of experiments were conducted. Polished samples of electrolytic iron were heated in a vacuum, maintained in the gamma range for several hours and quenched in different media. It was hoped by such means to produce and retain on the polished surfaces a pattern which would reveal the mechanism of the allotropic transformation. The samples were placed in evacuated quartz tubes, heated to 1000° C. and held 2 hr. at that temperature. The tubes were then immersed in the quenching bath. Iced brine and liquid air were used first. The polyhedral austenitic structure existing at the time of immersion was very clearly revealed (Fig. 2). This is generally ascribed to iron volatilizing at the grain boundaries.

Jan 1, 1929

THOSE NOT MARKED ARE MEMBERS; MARKED THUS t ARE ASSOCIATES. HEAVY-FACED TYPE SIGNIFIES HONORARY MEMBERSHIP. JUNIOR MEMBERS ARE MARKED II. THE FIGURES AT THE END OF THE ADDRESS INDICATE THE YEAR OF ELECTION. AARONS, J. BOYD, Genl. Mgr., Chaffers G. M. Co., Boulder City, West. Australia. '05 ABADIE, EMILE R., Min. Engr Box 291, Porterville, Tulare Co., Cal. '76 ABBOTT, CLARENCE E., Genl. Supt., Iron Mines Div., 1405 Minnesota Ave., Bessemer, Ala. '04 ABBOTT, J. W., Min. Engr., "St. Omer," 123 N. Grand Ave., Los Angeles, Cal. '94 ABBOTT, Louis BENJAMIN, Chief Engr., Consolidation Coal Co., Elkhorn Div., Jenkins, Ky. '15 ABBOTT, ROBERT R., Met. Engr., Peerless Motor Car Co., Cleveland, Ohio. '12 ABE, ASAKA Yamagano G. M., Satsuma-Gori, Satsuma, Japan. '14 || ABRAHAMS, A. I., Student 1391 Madison Ave., New York, N. Y. '14 tACKER, E. O'C., Met Bethlehem Steel Co., Bethlehem, Pa. '86 ACKER, Louis K., JR., Min. Engr 565 Highland Place, Bellevue, Pa. '08 ADACHI, JINZOO 11 Shiba Park, Shiba-ku, Tokyo, Japan. '88 ADAMI, C. J., Min. Engr., St. Joseph and Doe Run Lead Companies, Bonne Terre, Mo. '12

Jan 1, 1917

By D. J. McAdam

In a recent survey of the literature, the author has found evidence incompatible with prevalent views regarding the technical cohesive strength and yield strength of metals. Some of the evidence regarding the technical cohesive strength was presented in a previous paper,21 and views were presented that are believed to be in better accord with the evidence. In that paper, it was shown that the technical cohesion limit (contrary to prevalent views) varies with the combination of principal stresses,t and that the influence of plastic deformation on the technical cohesive strength is not in accordance with prevalent views. In this paper, consideration will be given to both the technical cohesion limit and the yield stress as affected by the combination of principal stresses. Evidence will be presented that the variations of the yield stress and the technical cohesion limit with the combination of principal stresses are not in accordance with prevalent views. Consideration will also be given to ductility and work-hardening capacity, which depend on the initial difference between the technical cohesion limit and the yield stress. By the "technical cohesion limit" is meant the mean stress at actual or poten- tial* fracture. An example of a rechnlcal cohesion limit is the "true" breaking stress of a tension-test specimen, the breaking load divided by the sectional area at fracture. The cohesion limit thus obtained for a ductile metal, however, has been greatly altered by the plastic deformation. It is important to consider the cohesion limit of the metal prior to this deformation, and the variation of the cohesive strength with plastic deformation. The relation between the cohesion limit and the corresponding flow stresst determines the ductility of a metal and the energy that it will absorb before fracture. In this paper, as in the previous paper,21 tensile stresses will be viewed as positive and compressive stresses as negative. The algebraically greatest principal stress will be designated S1, the least principal stress will be designated S3, and the intermediate principal stress will be designated Sz In the previous paper, attention was confined to stress combinations with two of the principal stresses equal (with the intermediate principal stress S2 equal eithel to S3 or 31). In this paper, consideration will also be given to the effect of stress combinations with all three principal stresses unequal. In the earlier sections of the paper (pp. 3I I to 324), attention will be confined to stress combinations with

Jan 1, 1942

By D. J. McAdam

In a recent survey of the literature, the author has found evidence incompatible with prevalent views regarding the technical cohesive strength and yield strength of metals. Some of the evidence regarding the technical cohesive strength was presented in a previous paper,21 and views were presented that are believed to be in better accord with the evidence. In that paper, it was shown that the technical cohesion limit (contrary to prevalent views) varies with the combination of principal stresses,t and that the influence of plastic deformation on the technical cohesive strength is not in accordance with prevalent views. In this paper, consideration will be given to both the technical cohesion limit and the yield stress as affected by the combination of principal stresses. Evidence will be presented that the variations of the yield stress and the technical cohesion limit with the combination of principal stresses are not in accordance with prevalent views. Consideration will also be given to ductility and work-hardening capacity, which depend on the initial difference between the technical cohesion limit and the yield stress. By the "technical cohesion limit" is meant the mean stress at actual or poten- tial* fracture. An example of a rechnlcal cohesion limit is the "true" breaking stress of a tension-test specimen, the breaking load divided by the sectional area at fracture. The cohesion limit thus obtained for a ductile metal, however, has been greatly altered by the plastic deformation. It is important to consider the cohesion limit of the metal prior to this deformation, and the variation of the cohesive strength with plastic deformation. The relation between the cohesion limit and the corresponding flow stresst determines the ductility of a metal and the energy that it will absorb before fracture. In this paper, as in the previous paper,21 tensile stresses will be viewed as positive and compressive stresses as negative. The algebraically greatest principal stress will be designated S1, the least principal stress will be designated S3, and the intermediate principal stress will be designated Sz In the previous paper, attention was confined to stress combinations with two of the principal stresses equal (with the intermediate principal stress S2 equal eithel to S3 or 31). In this paper, consideration will also be given to the effect of stress combinations with all three principal stresses unequal. In the earlier sections of the paper (pp. 3I I to 324), attention will be confined to stress combinations with

Jan 1, 1942

By Lyon F. Terry

IN contemplating the prospects of natural gas being transported from the fields where it is produced to such distant points as Philadelphia, New Jersey, New York City, and New England, let us review the advance that natural gas has made and the projects currently scheduled for construction. This may give us a perspective of the point in the long-range development of the natural gas business in which we now find ourselves, and some basis for judging the further expansion of the industry. Authentic statistics of the total marketed production of natural gas in the United States have been compiled by the Bureau of Mines since the year 1906. The growth of the business is indicated by the following data on marketed production for each ten-year interval since 1906:

Jan 1, 1947

By AIME AIME

A SIDE from the technical sessions held as noted elsewhere, the chairman of the various sub-committees of the Mining Methods Committee, together with a few other specialists, were invited to a conference with President Bradley, which was held on Wednesday afternoon, Feb. 20. The general plan of a comprehensive series of comparable papers descriptive of mining practice in various parts of the country, launched by this committee some seven years ago having been adopted by the U. S. Bureau of Mines, the feeling was general that the Committee could safely 1eave.that part of its work in these capable hands and turn its attention to other matters. The plans of the Bureau were presented as below by Charles William Wright of the Bureau.

Jan 1, 1929

By JOHN A. FULTON

THE Comstock Lode is in Storey County, Nevada, and extends in a north and south direction through the towns of Virginia City and Gold Hill, with a total length of 4.27 miles. Its mines have produced silver and gold to a known value exceeding $400,- 000,000 since 1859, when the work first began. More than $126.000,000 was paid in dividends by the mining companies, although much more than this was probably realized from the ore, because many milling companies were independent companies owned by the directors and superintendents of the mines. The milling companies' contracts called for an extraction of only 65 per cent and, as much of the ore was worth $100 a ton and up- ward, they must have recovered substantial amounts for their own accounts over and above this guarantee. Gold was discovered in the spring of 1850 by a party of Normons bound for California. The discovery was made at the mouth of Gold canyon near Dayton, on the Carson River, about 10 miles south of Virginia City.

Jan 1, 1929

By Russell B. Cornell, William B. Plank

AT the close of the academic year 1940-'41 the largest number of students ever recorded received their first or bachelor degree in the mineral technology schools of the United States. The total of men thus prepared to enter their professional careers in the mineral industries was 1601, a number nearly 12 per cent larger than two years ago and nearly 75 per cent larger than four years ago. Notwithstanding this increase in the number of graduates and as had been predicted in the preliminary report in February, there was a slight decrease in the total student population of the schools in both the United States and Canada. During the college year 1940-'41, 9133 students were enrolled in the 54 schools of the United States and 764 in six of the seven schools of Canada.

Jan 1, 1941

By Lysle E. Shaffer

INCREASING attention has been given in the last decade to the possibilities of mine leasing in the West. The practice as described in this article does not refer to the leasing of entire properties for corporate operation. It is intended to deal rather with the advantages and problems incident to leasing portions of properties to individuals who themselves, individually or in groups, do the actual mining and transportation of the ore. These individuals are sometimes called "leasers" and sometimes called "tributors." The contracts under which they work set up an independent relationship of lessor and leaser, between themselves and the mineowner or operator. This relationship has many advantages to both sides over those created by the ordinary relationship of employer and employe. From the standpoint of the owners there is no liability on independent contractors for industrial injuries, social security taxes, unemployment taxes, or the manifold restrictions of the Federal Labor Relations and Wage Hour Acts and similar state acts where they exist. As the leaser's income depends on the quantity and quality of ore produced, there is a distinct incentive for maximum production of a good grade of ore. This in turn promotes careful mining of the areas under lease. Ordinarily in mining, labor cost is a high percentage of the total cost of operation. Under a leasing system, even if the leasers be allowed to retain half of the gross values that they produce, and the owner or operator gets half, in the case of marginal ore bodies this is ordinarily more than the lessor would realize if the property were worked by day labor. In some instances mineral deposits under a leasing system may become ore, whereas under a day-labor system they would

Jan 1, 1948

By Wallace E. Pratt

UNDER the stimulus of war psychology the American public has grown confused and jittery in its thinking on the subject of this nation's petroleum resources. This confusion arises from the failure of the average citizen, and even of many leaders in government, in our armed forces, and in the petroleum industry itself, to distinguish between our proved reserves of petroleum in the several oil-producing states and the total petroleum re- sources available to this nation. Leaders and public alike examine the accepted estimates of our proved reserves and thoughtlessly conclude that these estimates represent the total of our petroleum resources. Our fears are aggravated if we turn to the statistics on oil-finding and observe that the discovery of new reserves has waned decidedly in recent years. This confusion is dangerous because, under its influence, ill - considered policies spring up and flourish, choking out the most valuable fruits of the long experience of the American petroleum industry.

Jan 1, 1944

By C. A. Heiland

NOT only has the demonstration of progress in all fields of science been characteristic of the Chicago "Century of Progress," but the manner in which the fundamentals of these sciences have been displayed captivated the visitor's eye and ear at the same time. The average individual is interested most in progress which concerns his every-day life. He is fairly well educated in medicine, biology and certain aspects of physics. But how raw materials and chiefly minerals occur, how they are located, taken out of the ground and refined, is something which appears to be more remote from the every-day line of interest, and about which, therefore, the public knows comparatively little. This is particularly true of the oil industry, although it ranks in size second only to agriculture in the United States. In appreciation of the tremendous educational value which a complete exhibit on all phases of the mineral industries would have, both mining and metallurgical as well as oil inter¬ests took steps early to make these exhibits at Chicago a reality. The board of directors of the A. I. M. E. authorized an advisory committee to the Museum of Science and Industry early in 1932. It is divided into four subcommittees - for geology and petroleum, for metal mining, for coal mining, and for metallurgy respectively. The entire committee held its first meeting in Chicago on April 11 and 12, 1932, to advise with the Museum's officials and experts about the most advantageous arrangement of the minerals industries' and geology exhibits.

Jan 1, 1933

By Harry E. Krumlauf

The year 1957 was one of declining metal price and production. Many lead-zinc-copper mines were forced to close, and the remaining mines limited production to stay more in line with demand. High cost of labor, supplies, and equipment and high taxes aggravated the situation. Some operators postponed or abandoned expansion programs because of uncertain economic conditions. Output was curtailed by elimination of over- time employment and reduction of the working force. The number of employes laid off was small- reduction in the labor force was accomplished by not replacing those who left a company's employ.

Jan 2, 1958

By E. M. Murphy

(Presented by invitation at a meeting of the Spokane Local Section of the Institute, Feb. 17, 1912.) EIGHT years ago the Hecla mine, a lead-silver producer, situated at Burke, Idaho, was producing ore from but two levels, the 300- and the 600-ft. All hoisting was done with a 12- by 16-in. slide-valve, double-reel, hoist. The hoist was being worked to its capacity and was unsuitable for hoisting from greater depths. As the work of opening a new level was about to be started, it became necessary to remodel the then-existing equipment or install a new hoist. The recent advent of electricity from Spokane had made available a cheaper power than steam. By a series of tests conducted throughout the Coeur d'Alène district, it was found that it cost $109 per year to generate a horse-power with steam. Electric power was to be had for $50 a horse-power per year. It was decided to substitute for the engines a motor-drive, of sufficient capacity to operate from the 900-ft. level, and ultimately install an entirely new hoist. After disconnecting the engines, installing a new shaft, and making a few minor changes, a 300-h-p., 2,300-volt, 514-rev. per min., variable-speed motor of the induction type was geared to the reel-shaft. The reels were supplied with 3/8 by 4-in. flat rope, and the duty of the hoist was about as follows: Cage, 1,700; ore, 2,600; car, 1,400; rope, 2,250; total, 7,950 pounds. The Bristol ammeter chart, Fig. 1, shows the combined current-consumption of the hoist- and mine-motors. The large intermittent load is clearly shown ; this produced harmful fluctuations in the voltage of the long, lightly-loaded, 60,000-volt transmission-line from Spokane to the Coeur d'Alènes. The power company received no compensation for the increased cost of producing power for this intermittent or fluctuating load. In order to protect its system from similar excessive

Sep 1, 1912