Uranium Severance Taxes - Some Perspectives

Among the unforeseen consequences of the 1973 Arab oil embargo has been a considerable array of new or increased taxes on the so-called energy minerals. These taxes will be the subject of this report. Both Federal and State taxes have been enacted, but I will be concerned mostly with state severance taxes and particularly those on uranium. Severance taxes are considered to include all taxes having the distinctive feature of being applied on a natural resource at the stage of extraction. The tax may be based on units of production or on value, and if on values it may be on gross value or on gross value less either arbitrary or cost-related deductions. The tax has a number of aliases - resource excise tax, conservation tax, privilege tax, mining excise tax, ad valorem production tax, and more - and this makes comparison of tax burdens among states difficult. The windfall profit tax on oil is an example of a severance tax at the Federal level. Severance taxes are an established feature of state tax systems, but they continue to be a controversial issue, and proposals to raise or modify existing severance taxes are regularly submitted to the legislatures of the Western energy producing states. No concensus exists as to what is a reason- able and proper level of severance taxation or to the form it should take. The taxes which have been adopted by the various states reflect the interaction of a variety of interests and the specific circum- stances in each state. What follows is a summary of theoretical, practical, and emotional viewpoints and arguments that surface in any statehouse in which a severance tax bill has been introduced. The New Mexico experience will be heavily relied upon. THE ECONOMISTS Marginal effects. A severance tax which is based on a gross percentage of revenue or on units of production is a constant addition to variable costs, and to the mine operator has the same effect as any other increase in operating costs. The direction of these effects is straightforward: the tax will cause the property to have a lowered present value, to be mined at a lower rate than without the tax, raise the minimum grade that will be mined, lead to lower total recovery, make marginal properties sub-marginal and discriminate in favor of richer, more profitable operations (Lockner, 1965; Steele, 1967). In the short run, production facilities are fixed and imposition of a severance tax will have little effect on production levels. In the longer term, capital is mobile and investment and exploration expenditures will shift from minerals and jurisdictions with high taxes to those with low taxes. Over a considerable range of taxation the effect will be to change the relative position of the taxing state, but an overly optimistic evaluation of the capacity of mineral producers to absorb a tax can bring an industry to a halt. It is generally acknowledged that imposition of high severance taxes on taconite in Minnesota stopped development completely, and that only the adoption of a constitutional amendment limiting the amount of taxes that could be imposed in the future brought the firms back and encouraged them to make the huge investments required (Weaton, 1969). A tax which is a percentage of the net operating income (gross revenue less cash operating costs) does not influence the cut-off grade for recovery nor change the time preference for extraction, and hence, is free of the negative features of the tax applied to gross revenues or units of production. In theory it is a more efficient tax but relative administrative complexity and inherent difficulty in predicting revenue have discouraged its use. The Wyoming severance tax on uranium, which uses grade of ore as well as price in establishing taxable value, is the most cost related, and hence, the most neutral and efficient of the various state severance taxes on uranium. Economic rent. Despite the discrimination and the anti-conservation aspect inherent in most severance taxes, economists generally endorse their use because they are seen as a vehicle to appropriate rents - that is, returns greater than the long-run competitive supply price. Conspicuous examples of supposed economic rents are the returns to oil producers because of the OPEC cartel, the returns of the uranium producers under AEC buying contracts in the 19501s, and the high prices obtained by the uranium producers for contracts entered into in the 1976-1979 period. Mining of coal in the Western states is believed by some to generate huge economic rents because of the OPEC caused increase in price of a competitive fuel (McLure, 1978, p. 261), and possibly because of clean air regulations favoring the burning of low-sulfur coal. In theory, such surplus returns could be taxed completely away without affecting supply. In practice, the situation is more complex (Steele, 1967, pp. 234-236); economic rent of mineral production is an elusive quantity involving as it does replacement costs, and technical and market risk, and it, like beauty or pornography, probably exists mostly in the eye of the beholder. Rent may also be perceived to be present in the upper portion of a cyclic market which also has a downside. Where rent exists, it is almost certain to be short-lived - cartels self- destruct, government subsidies end, competitive adjustments occur - but the taxes imposed to capture it tend to be immortal. There is little doubt that the perception of un- usual and undeserved (obscene) profits in the mid- and late 1970's was a major factor in the adoption of energy mineral taxes strikingly higher than had been previously considered. At the New Mexico legislature of 1977 supporters of a moderate tax were repeatedly confronted with some variant of the statement, "You can't expect me to believe that a