The Seven Delusions in Disaster-Prone Organizations

Safety performance in many companies and even industries has stalled in the few years. Accidents rates are at a ?plateau? and yet, serious accidents and fatality rates are not. In more dramatic cases, such as in the BP Texas disaster, organizations that have ?exemplary? safety statistics, suddenly have a catastrophic or multi-fatality event occurring. Other classic examples are the Piper Alpha disaster and NASA?s Challenger and Columbia disasters and even the Chernobyl nuclear reactor. Looking into the root causes of these accidents provides an insight into the events and deficiencies that led up to the accident, but what are the common features in the organization?s mindset? What characterizes these organizations? decision making, their approach to safety and to risk and are there specific cultural features that can be delineated? The research and review presented in this paper covers a period since 1994, which started in the Australian resource industry and since then covered international events. The features of these organizations are summarized as the seven deadly delusions, based on extensive research since 1997 of organizations that suffered unexpected disasters. Their huge focus on safety, the achievement of lofty goals and celebration of safety successes led to ?mindset? that they are leaders in safety, protected by an extraordinary safety system and that their safety incident figures indicated a truly world-class safety performance. It led them into the trap of the seven deadly delusions?