The Permit Requirements to Site Coal Production Facilities in the Appalachian Region (f77bf781-80f6-4dab-ba04-6cf68abacaaa)

The regulatory process by which governmental authorities acknowledge and, in turn, permit the location, construction, and operation of large scale energy-related facilities has become extremely detailed in recent years. One example of the detail that is entailed in the regulatory process is the number of permits that must be acquired by operators prior to the construction and operation of energy-related facilities. It has been estimated, for example, that 75 permits are required prior to the opening of a new coal mine in Pennsylvania while 50 are required in Kentucky. From the perspective of facility owners and operators the regulatory process often appears overly complex and may be perceived as a constraint to the corporate decision making process. From the perspective of those responsible for administering regulations, the process is perceived as a means by which public desires-pursuant to social objectives such as environmental protection and occupational safety-can be achieved. As a result of conflicting organizational interests, the clash between energy facility owners and operators and their regulators appears to be inevitable. Furthermore, the resolution of this conflict lies in the trade-off between objectives and the costs of regulation. The balance of objectives and costs is a subject of the political process and not a topic of consideration in this paper. This paper is concerned with the actual administration of regulations, that is, the implementation of that which arises from the interplay of organizational interests. The paper assumes that environmental control laws will not likely be repealed, that regulations to implement the intent of these laws are here to stay and thus the paper seeks to assess how regulations are administered at various levels of government pursuant to objectives. The paper hypothesizes that the administration of objectives (or policy) has an impact on decision making which affects energy facility decision making. While recognizing the fact that regulatory policy cannot be totally divorced from administration, this paper proceeds under the assumption that elements of the regulatory process may be examined individually. The subject of this study is limited to the interplay between regulatory agencies and their clientele.