Oil Exploration Offshore China

INTRODUCTION At the time of the death of Mao Tse-tung in 1976, China was a major oil producing country with a daily oil flow in the order of 1.735 million barrels. This position had been achieved with minimal assistance from the outside world. Further, only some fifteen years had elapsed since the country's daily oil production capacity had hovered at the barely significant level of one hundred thousand barrels. Why then did the new leaders of China, after this very creditable record of success, suddenly change the direction of the country's drive for future hydrocarbon production? First, by switching much of the emphasis of exploration from onshore to the offshore continental shelf basins, and further by apparently abandoning the philosophy of self reliance calling upon the world's oil industry to share in the task of locating and developing these potential offshore energy reserves. The answer is probably only partly understood by those of us outside China, However, a number of factors exerting an important influence on this decision can be identified. THE MOVE OFFSHORE The new leadership was anxious to rapidly move China into her rightful place amongst the powerful and technologically advanced nations of the world. Modernization became the slogan, specifically modernization on four fronts, agriculture, industry, technology and military with the goal to "catch the west by the year 2000". But how to generate the capital to finance this massive modernization program? The rapid escalation of the price of crude oil following the 1973 Oil Embargo and the continuing apparently insatiable world demand for this now extremely precious primary resource was very clear to all. China, as a major producer, could export crude to help finance the ambitious development programs of the government. To do this, however, would require a very significant in¬crease in present production capacity, as the domestic demand even for China with her relatively low per capita energy consumption, is essentially equal to the current production. Trying to rapidly move the new regime's programs into actions, one can only assume that the planners looked at the success of the petroleum industry over the preceding fifteen years and quickly concluded that this well established curve could be maintained and indeed steepened with an increase in effort. The rapid discovery of a few more Daqing's (China's premier oil field, producing one million barrels a day) would have the country's ambitious modernization goals within reach. Petroleum would At the time of the death of Mao Tse-tung in 1976, China was a major oil producing country with a daily oil flow in the order of 1.735 million barrels. This position had been achieved with minimal assistance from the outside world. Further, only some fifteen years had elapsed since the country's daily oil production capacity had hovered at the barely significant level of one hundred thousand barrels. Why then did the new leaders of China, after this very creditable record of success, suddenly change the direction of the country's drive for future hydrocarbon production? First, by switching much of the emphasis of exploration from onshore to the offshore continental shelf basins, and further by apparently abandoning the philosophy of self reliance calling upon the world's oil industry to share in the task of locating and developing these potential offshore energy reserves. The answer is probably only partly understood by those of us outside China, However, a number of factors exerting an important influence on this decision can be identified. THE MOVE OFFSHORE The new leadership was anxious to rapidly move China into her rightful place amongst the powerful and technologically advanced nations of the world. Modernization became the slogan, specifically modernization on four fronts, agriculture, industry, technology and military with the goal to "catch the west by the year 2000", But how to generate the capital to finance this massive modernization program? The rapid escalation of the price of crude oil following the 1973 Oil Embargo and the continuing apparently insatiable world demand for this now extremely precious primary resource was very clear to all. China, as a major producer, could export crude to help finance the ambitious development programs of the government. To do this, however, would require a very significant increase in present production capacity, as the domestic demand even for China with her relatively low per capita energy consumption, is essentially equal to the current production. Trying to rapidly move the new regime's programs into actions, one can only assume that the planners looked at the success of the petroleum industry over the preceding fifteen years and quickly concluded that this well established curve could be maintained and indeed steepened with an increase in effort. The rapid discovery of a few more Daqing's (China's premier oil field, producing one million barrels a day) would have the country's ambitious modernization goals within reach. Petroleum would be the principal bridge to the bright future. The next decision involved the question of where to look for these vast new reserves. Chinese exploration teams had already looked at most of the onshore sedimentary basins and, while they were the first to admit that there was much yet to do, it was fairly clear to them that the potential for large new accumulations was confined to two areas: the little explored, remote, inhospitable regions of western China, principally Xinkiang Province and the equally unexplored offshore basins of the continental shelf and slope. In both cases China faced a very serious problem. The inhospitable environments were severely straining her petroleum industry's current technological ability to cope, particularly as the government needed rapid results. Thus the pragmatic and, to the foreign oil industry, unexpected decision to invite cooperation with the outside world. The reasons for the initial emphasis on the exploration of the offshore basins with the cooperation of foreign oil companies are again supposition on my part, but probably involved considerations of technical merit, ease of development and delivery to markets together with more sensitive issues such as controling the influence of foreign philosophies and values on the Chinese population by containing most foreign activity to the offshore. So within three years of the death of the great helmsman, China had developed a plan to involve foreign oil companies, both state and private, in a grand plan to rapidly increase the nations oil production. In fact, by this time, the first round of talks had been concluded and the first phase begun, and what a beginning. Some forty eight companies from thirteen countries had signed documents to participate formally in this world scale event. It was far easier to list those companies which did not participate than to list those which did. FOREIGN COMPANY INTEREST Why the rush by the world's oil industry to be involved in China? What was China offering which made everyone so anxious to join in? Again the answer is complex in detail, but principally involved a combination of factors which together caused this virtual stampede. Timing was a major element. Oil Companies, despite an ever increasing take by governments, were beginning to benefit. from the' rapid escalation of crude prices induced by OPEC and were looking for suitable areas to reinvest these funds. Producers