Metals Industry Forecasting: Information, Expectations and the Question of Capacity

The market prices received by producers of internationally traded commodity metals have been, and continue to be remarkably volatile and unpredictable compared with most other traded goods and services. This volatility results in an erratic financial performance on the part of producing companies, disruptive and often inflationary cost changes for consumers, unreliable tax revenues and export earnings for host governments and severe social and economic pressures on local, sometimes remote, communities which are dependent on the activity in question. Generally speaking, price volatility appears to be associated with the inability of the metal producing side of the industry to regulate the volume of supply in a manner that is consistent with metal demand, which in turn reflects broad macroeconomic and industrial developments around the world. This statement does not purport to apply to all metals or to all instances of volatility of course. Price movements may occur as a result of pure speculation or even illegal manipulation of the commodity markets. Embargoes, boycotts and other politically induced supply changes may contribute. Threatened or actual strikes also cause artificial swings in sales volumes and prices. How- ever, most of these developments are of a short-term nature. Yet metals price cycles may last for several years, as demonstrated by the extended copper price trough from 1981 to 1986. This paper deals with price volatility which reflects long-term economic cycles and the adaptive processes that exist within the industry in response to such cycles. Special emphasis is placed on the role of forecasts and forecasters in these processes. It should be said at the outset that this reflects the personal experience of one forecaster working in private sector commercial consulting practices that are independent of producers, consumers and host governments. However, the experience does cover the entire period since 1973 and has involved working with a substantial majority of the major companies that supply high volume commodity metals. By way of background it should be stated that the post-1973 world economy has provided a challenging environment for forecasters. One cannot be precise about the forecasting record of either industry insiders or outside consultants, financial analysts and academic forecasters because comprehensive records have not been kept, or if they have the results are too embarrassing to be published. Institutions such as the World Bank have published forecasts of the prices of major commodities on a regular basis and these have, presumably, had some influence on financing decisions in the industry. This record along with our own experience and numerous discussions with metal producers, major consumers and host governments permits certain generalizations to be made. The most important of these is that during the early 1980s. from about 1980 through 1985/6, the forecasters system- atically and substantially over- estimated metal prices. While some fore- casters did correctly anticipate a recession in the early 1980s and some consequential decline in prices, the magnitude and duration of the decline was far greater than anyone foresaw. This systematic forecasting "failure" appears to have occurred independently of the forecasting methodology employed. Moreover, its extent cannot be explained by obvious factors such as incorrect macroeconomic assumptions. There appears to have been some kind of structural change in the world mining and metals industry over this period