Keynote Address: A view of commodity agreements

For the last 4 years political leaders have found a new subject on which they can safely generalize wihout creating opposition. That subject is commodity prices. Since the four-fold increase in OPEC crude oil prices, public attention has focussed as never before on the subject of commodity prices. To advocate stabilizing commodity prices is akin to supporting motherhood or peace or better schooling. Everyone gives lip service to the concept that stable commodity prices are desirable. It is easier to state the principle than to achieve it. Prices that are stable in terms of one currency may be clearly unstable in terms of a different currency. This has become a troublesome matter since 1971, when the world's leading trading currencies were set free to float in relation to each other. To illustrate: consider copper prices in the interval between the end of 1974 and the end of 1977. During those 3 years, the copper price in pounds sterling on the London Metal Exchange rose by 25 per cent. During that period, however, in terms of the USA dollar equivalent, the price was unchanged. And during that period, in terms of the German mark equivalent the price shrank by 13 per cent while the Japanese yen equivalent fell by 20 per cent. Thus a price that appears stable in dollars, rose in terms of pounds sterling and fell in terms of marks and yen. Had this result been achieved as a consequence of an international effort to stabilize prices, an American would have said the effort was successful. An Englishman would have said it had failed to prevent a price rise. And a German or a Japanese consumer would have been happy to have covered his copper needs at a lower cost in terms of his own currency.